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Security Council

Seventy-first year

Provisional

7803rd meeting

Tuesday, 8 November 2016, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Seck	(Senegal)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Lucas
	China	Mr. Wu Haitao
	Egypt	Mr. Moustafa
	France	Mr. Lamek
	Japan	Mr. Okamura
	Malaysia	Mr. Ibrahim
	New Zealand	Mrs. Schwalger
	Russian Federation	Mr. Safronkov
	Spain	Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi
	Ukraine	Mr. Vitrenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Hickey
	United States of America	Ms. Coleman
	Uruguay	Mr. Rosselli
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Mr. Ramírez Carreño

Agenda

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Letter dated 28 October 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/911)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Letter dated 28 October 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/911)

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite His Excellency Mr. João Vale de Almeida, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/911, which contains a letter dated 28 October 2016 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the fiftieth report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I now give the floor to Mr. Inzko.

Mr. Inzko: In my remarks today, I want to talk about two trends that are developing in parallel in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one positive and one quite negative.

To begin with, the open and helping hand extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the European Union (EU) has led to further progress, with the adaptation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and a domestic EU Coordination Mechanism finally agreed. State and entity-level authorities have also continued to make certain progress on economic reforms. Following these steps, on 20 September the EU General Affairs Council invited the European Commission to submit an opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's application for EU membership, which is a truly momentous development. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a member of the EU, and not even a candidate yet, but it has taken a decision about its future. It has taken a decision about its direction. This is wholeheartedly supported by a large majority of the population.

Another positive development took place in June with the publishing of the first post-war census, an essential tool for socioeconomic planning. While arguments over the census soured the political environment, tensions increased significantly, first with the decision by the Republika Srpska National Assembly in July to hold an entity referendum, in defiance of an earlier decision of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitutional Court, and then with the actual holding of the referendum in September, in direct contravention of a second decision suspending the referendum until the Court could decide on disputes concerning its constitutionality.

The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is also annex 4 of the Peace Agreement, states explicitly that decisions of the Constitutional Court, as in our own countries, are final and binding, and that the entities are bound to comply with the decisions of the State authorities. For this reason, I consider the referendum of 25 September to be a grave violation of the Peace Agreement and the rule of law. It was held in contravention of decisions of the Court, including a direct order suspending the referendum.

The positive diplomatic role played by neighbouring Serbia and Croatia during the crisis is worth noting. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić declined to support the referendum — he did so twice, in public — while Prime Minister designate of Croatia Andrej Plenković condemned it outright.

With this unprecedented step, the authorities of Republika Srpska established that they do not consider themselves bound by Constitutional Court decisions with which they do not agree, effectively opting out of the country's judicial system. For example, the President told media that he would also order Republika Srpska institutions not to follow a final decision of another institution, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a case related to the ownership of military property. Similarly, the President publicly rejected a summons to give a statement to the State Prosecutor regarding the referendum.

In addition to being a fundamental challenge to the State's sovereignty, the constitutional order and the rule of law, the September referendum should be seen in the context of the long-standing policy of the ruling party in the Republika Srpska, and its President in particular, to deny the authority of the common State institutions and to advocate openly for the dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In their public statements during the reporting period, the Republika Srpska President and other officials of his party clearly linked the referendum with possible future secession, describing it as the first in a series, to possibly include referendums against the State institutions or NATO, on the status of the Republika Srpska, and on independence. Would we tolerate similar moves for secession in our own countries?

However, in recent weeks we have witnessed another staggering development in the Republika Srpska. This was the move by the Republika Srpska National Assembly and its speaker Nedeljko Čubrilović to decorate a number of convicted war criminals, including Radovan Karadžić, who was sentenced by a United Nations tribunal in the first instance to 40 years' imprisonment for genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. This deeply offended the survivors of ethnic cleansing and many others. This act of officially decorating and glorifying war criminals who have been sentenced by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is unprecedented in modern and civilized history. For me, those who have initiated the decoration of those internationally convicted war criminals, and who are thereby glorifying genocide, are barbarians and outside the orbit of civilized society. They do not belong to it any longer. They are on the wrong side of history.

On 2 October, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted in the country's sixth local elections since the war. Unfortunately, parties that focused on polarizing rhetoric and ethnic division generally saw the greatest gains at the ballot box. While the conduct of elections was largely peaceful, electoral irregularities and unrest in the southern town of Stolac resulted in a suspension of the vote, which will need to be repeated as soon as possible.

In Srebrenica, a place of genocide in 1995, as confirmed by two United Nations tribunals, legal challenges still dominate the media. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the mayor of Srebrenica be a mayor working in the interests of all citizens of the town. In Mostar, citizens were again unable to participate in elections due to the failure of political parties to agree on needed changes to the election law. The fact that the citizens of Mostar have not elected local representatives since 2008 is a stain on democracy and another demonstration of how the rule of law continues to deteriorate. Compounding these political difficulties, some prominent Croat leaders more persistently advocated for internal territorial changes during the reporting period, calling for federalization or the creation of a third entity, which did little to help the overall political environment.

As I mentioned earlier, we as the international community need to take an honest look at two trends developing in parallel in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first is one of positive steps taken by the Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina towards reforms aimed at EU integration — which I wholeheartedly support — culminating in the truly significant fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina has now taken a decisive step towards candidacy status with the European Union. This is a truly historic act that is seen only once in a lifetime. This positive trend cannot be denied, and I believe that it is the duty of all of us gathered here today to fully embrace it.

The second trend, however, is the tendency of some political actors to return to the divisive and destructive agendas of the past and, in the case of the Republika Srpska referendum, to assert that neither the Dayton Peace Agreement nor the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina can limit their actions. With this referendum, I believe that we as the international community, need to ask ourselves how long these two dynamics can be sustained before the second overwhelms the first. Or to put it another way, can we accept that some of the country's leaders work for European Union integration and the internal disintegration of the country at the same time? Can we accept that some speak about European values but at the same time glorify war criminals and thus genocide?

Moving forward, I believe that the answer for us as an international community is to send a strong message to those authorities and leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina who openly reject the rule of law and seek to reopen the wounds of the past that they will not lead their constituencies to prosperity or integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. Instead, they will lead themselves into isolation. The leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina — with the help and guidance of the

international community — must recommit to making Bosnia and Herzegovina a peaceful, stable, functional and multi-ethnic country that is fully and irreversibly integrated into European structures.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Inzko for his briefing.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2016/935, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Angola, China, Egypt, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

The President (*spoke in French*): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2315 (2016).

I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

Mr. Hickey (United Kingdom): I would like to begin by welcoming Mr. Inzko back to the Security Council and by thanking him for his report (S/2016/911, annex) and for his briefing just now. As High Representative, he has the United Kingdom's full and continuous support in his efforts to help Bosnian authorities overcome the challenges that they face.

As penholder for the Western Balkans this month, the United Kingdom warmly welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2315 (2016) today. The deterrence and security provided by the European Union-led stabilization force (EUFOR ALTHEA) are fundamental during this period of reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The united show of support for the continuation of the Mission is a clear message to the people and the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina relaying the Council's commitment to the country's stability, security and territorial integrity. Such a message comes at an important time. The past 12 months have been eventful, both for reform and the country's future in the European Union and for political upheaval, the persistence of divisive rhetoric and, sadly, challenges to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That was most clearly seen in the decision by the Republika Srpska authorities to hold a referendum in September, in clear violation of the ruling of the Constitutional Court. At heart, that decision was not about a national day. It was instead a direct challenge to an integral part of the Framework Agreement. As set out in annex 4, the Constitutional Court is vital to the Agreement's implementation, and, as also set out in annex 4, the Court's decisions are final and binding. Therefore, when a decision is ignored, the legitimacy of the Dayton institutions is threatened. Such attacks are unacceptable and destabilizing, and I strongly condemn them in this Chamber today.

However, it is important to note that the challenge posed by the referendum went far beyond what is set out in the Framework Agreement. It evoked dark and divisive sentiments that have not been seen or heard for many years, but that are clearly still lingering just below the surface. It evoked words of war, hatred and division that have no place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I therefore call on political leaders of all sides and on all parties to refrain from such divisive nationalist rhetoric. It only distracts from the real issues, where progress is so desperately needed.

Take Mostar, for example: for over eight years the people of that town have been unable to elect their own representatives. Instead, they have existed in a frozen stalemate where progress has been held hostage by division. Let us call on all the relevant parties to reach an agreement to allow elections to be held. I also hope that the authorities can quickly resolve the issues in Stolac, so as to allow the failed elections there to take place as soon as possible. Elsewhere, we hope that, following the election in Srebrenica, the new mayor will work for the benefit of all communities. It is crucial to see a renewed focus on reconciliation and the local economy, so that all citizens see a future in that municipality. For all the challenges of the past 12 months, the leaders of the country have also made reforms aimed at moving away from the rhetoric and the division. In February, Bosnia and Herzegovina applied formally to join the European Union, and in September we saw all 28 European Union Foreign Ministers agreeing to task the

Commission to review that membership application. Those are significant steps forward.

We should all welcome the progress made on the reform agenda. It shows what Bosnian leaders can do when they work together. Let us all encourage Bosnia and Herzegovina's leadership to continue making progress on that agenda, so that all of their citizens can benefit from the prosperity and security afforded by Euro-Atlantic integration. In that effort, they will have no stronger supporter than the United Kingdom.

However, in order to make progress, further efforts are required with regard to registering defence property, which is needed for the activation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Membership Action Plan and for progress on the 5+2 agenda. Nevertheless, until those efforts bear fruit, we remain committed to the continuing role of the High Representative and his Office.

Mr. Inzko continues to have our full support as the final authority in-theatre regarding the civilian implementation of the General Framework Agreement, which includes supporting the use of his Bonn powers, if the situation requires. That is because as High Representative, together with EUFOR ALTHEA, he has a vital role to play in Bosnia and Herzegovina until stability and security are firmly entrenched.

Mr. Moustafa (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to extend our thanks and appreciation to Mr. Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia and Hercegovina, for his thorough briefing before the Council on the latest developments in the implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Egypt expresses its full support to him in carrying out his mandate.

Egypt welcomes the positive political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the past period, particularly the European Union's approval of the official application presented by Bosnian authorities to join the European Union. That shows the Bosnian Government's persistence in pressing ahead with carrying out the requisite reforms with a view to achieving integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions in a manner that fosters the stability of the country and contributes to the efforts to achieve the comprehensive development aspired to by the Bosnian people.

At the same time, Egypt expresses its grave concern about the deterioration in the overall political climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in the wake of the decision by the Republika Srpska to organize a plebiscite to commemorate "Republika Srpska Day", in contravention of two decisions by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

That was described by the High Representative today in his report (S/2016/911, annex) as constituting a grave violation by the Republika Srpska of its obligations under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Constitution of the country. That came in addition to further intimations by Republika Srpska officials about the possibility of organizing further referendums, including one on the status of the region.

The insistence by Bosnian Serb officials not to respect the decisions of courts in general demonstrates a failure to apply the rule of law and negatively affects the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was accompanied by a launch of nationalistic calls from certain political parties in Republika Srpska for the secession of the Serbian entity from Bosnia and Herzegovina, in addition to other calls to redemarcate the internal borders of the federal Republic. That constitutes a serious threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia. That fallout will affect not only Bosnia and Herzegovina but also the entire Balkan region. Hence, we call upon all of the political leaders to place the joint interests of the Bosnian people over the narrow ethnic political interests of any particular ethnic group, which would only thwart progress and stability.

We wish to state that if those challenges are not addressed in a serious, comprehensive and consensual framework, with the participation of all Bosnian political parties, the political achievements made since the signing of the Dayton Agreement will be undermined. That Agreement remains the prevailing reference point for the region and the main guarantee of its stability. In that connection, Egypt would like to highlight the need for all parties to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, national Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the decisions issued by the country's judiciary.

Once again, we emphasize our full backing for the efforts of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in confronting the dangers of terrorism. We are ready to extend all forms of support to efforts to confront extremists and aberrant ideologies, particularly efforts

aimed at fighting violent religious speech and at rectifying flawed religious concepts.

In conclusion, Egypt reasserts the need to intensify efforts aimed at implementing the 5+2 agenda in full, as well as the need for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to earnestly emphasize the concepts of sociopolitical coexistence, and, concomitantly, to press ahead with the cause of peace and action, which also requires sincere international and regional backing for those efforts.

Ms. Coleman (United States of America): I thank High Representative Inzko for his service in representing the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for his stewardship of the Office of the High Representative.

The United States welcomes the unanimous adoption today of resolution 2315 (2016). Among its provisions, the resolution authorizes the extension of a Chapter VII mandate for the EUFOR ALTHEA mission and the NATO presence for an additional year. It reaffirms the final authority of the High Representative in the interpretation of civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement and reaffirms that any amendments to Bosnia and Herzegovina's Constitution must be made in accordance with the amendment procedures set out therein. The resolution demonstrates the unity of the Security Council in its support for the agreements reached in Dayton, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as support for those who seek to protect those fundamental rights, including High Representative Inzko.

The High Representative's role, while always pivotal, has been particularly important this year, as certain elements have worked against the unity that Bosnia and Herzegovina has striven for over the past 20 years. His briefing today underscores why the Council must remain vigilant against those who seek to undermine the constitutional order in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Republika Srpska's decision to hold its referendum in September, in contravention of a Constitutional Court order, made it clear that Republika Srpska President Dodik and other politicians are systematically attempting to erode the competencies of State-level institutions. As the High Representative highlighted in his report (S/2016/911, annex), the direct rejection of the Constitutional Court by the Republika Srpska means that it has effectively opted out of the judicial system, out of the State, and has thereby fundamentally rejected the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the High Representative goes on to say in the report, the referendum is viewed by observers on both sides as a possible prelude to further referendums on status questions regarding the Republika Srpska. Such purposeful destabilization is unacceptable and threatens to send the country down a fractious path.

The United States looks forward to the day when Bosnia and Herzegovina meets the objectives and conditions established by the Peace Implementation Council for the closure of the Office of the High Representative, and to the day when we can say with absolute confidence that Bosnia and Herzegovina has reached full compliance with the Dayton Agreement and has become a peaceful, viable State, irreversibly on course for European integration. But that day has still not arrived — delayed, in part, because divisive rhetoric and destabilizing actions on the part of certain elements within Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to erode and degrade the vital institutions necessary for progress.

Further progress for Bosnia and Herzegovina on political and socioeconomic reforms, on European Union and NATO membership and on ensuring basic rights for its people, such as the right to vote in Mostar, requires commitment from all sides. The United States commends the continued work of EUFOR ALTHEA and of NATO, through its headquarters in Sarajevo, and wholeheartedly supports the renewal of their mandates. We are pleased that Bosnia and Herzegovina's defence review is advancing, and we look forward to that document, which will further reforms in the defence sector. However, that progress cannot overshadow the fact that the registration of defence properties in the Republika Srpska continues to be blocked. We call on Republika Srpska President Dodik to ease his unhelpful rhetoric and inaction on that issue.

Finally, we welcome Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress in the European Union membership process this year, as well as the Government's dedication to its reform agenda. Continuing down that path will require vision, political will and real follow through on commitments and, most important, compromise and unity.

Mr. Ibrahim (Malaysia): I thank High Representative Valentin Inzko for his briefing and for his comprehensive report (S/2016/911, annex) to the

Security Council, including the special report on the referendum in the Republika Srpska.

Based on the briefing and the reports, my delegation is deeply concerned about the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the reporting period and about the direction in which the country is heading. Of particular concern to us is the viability of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the Agreement is being increasingly challenged and violated. We can trace the various political contentions in the country to its ethnic fault lines, from the dispute over the 2013 census results, the referendum on the Republika Srpska National Day, the continuing failure to implement the ruling of the Constitutional Court on the electoral system for Mostar, to the secessionist agenda of some quarters in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In that context, we recognize the crucial need for the Council to send a united message via resolution 2315 (2016) to urge the parties to abide by the commitment to cooperate fully with all institutions involved in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and to reaffirm the existence of two entities under the Peace Agreement, as upheld by the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The holding of the referendum by the Republika Srpska on 25 September was carried out in complete disregard of final and binding decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It represents the latest act of defiance by the Republika Srpska on the judicial institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in violation of the Framework Agreement. We have seen persistent challenges by the Republika Srpska to the State's judicial system in the past, including its disregard of the Bosnian Constitutional Court's decisions on the registration of defence property. More recently, the President of the Republika Srpska chose to ignore the summons by the State Prosecutor's Office relating to the referendum of 25 September. It is simply unacceptable for the Republika Srpska to pick and choose which decisions of the State's judicial system it is willing to obey. Such actions are in violation of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the State's Constitution. They also constitute a dangerous precedent, especially in the context of divisive secessionist rhetoric and increasing attacks on the authority of the High Representative. Self-serving and divisive politics is a dangerous game that gets played at the expense of the future of the country, especially given its traumatic history. We therefore urge all parties to renounce their divisive politics and secessionist agendas and to abide by the State's Constitution, the various relevant Security Council resolutions and the Dayton Peace Agreement for the sake of peace and stability in the region.

Malaysia is encouraged by some positive developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the reporting period. We particularly welcome the progress made by the country towards integration into the European Union (EU), which remains central to the aspirations of its people. Malaysia also welcomes the increase in foreign direct investments in the first quarter of 2016. The Government must remain steadfast in implementing its reform agenda, particularly in addressing youth unemployment, fighting corruption, instilling good governance and strengthening the rule of law. It needs to remain focused on economic growth and development and the creation of a promising future for all. We also commend the ongoing commitment of Bosnia and Herzegovina to countering violent extremism, as can be seen in the recent sentencing of seven individuals for joining or attempting to join the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as foreign terrorist fighters.

On the issue of the return of refugees and displaced persons, we wish to see further progress by the authorities in order to create conducive political, economic and social conditions for their voluntary return and harmonious reintegration and reconciliation.

Malaysia reiterates the need to intensify efforts to fully implement the 5+2 agenda as a condition for the closure of the Office of the High Representative. That agenda seeks to promote collaboration among the political actors and stakeholders, and not adversarial politics. Until then, Malaysia reaffirms its strong support for the Office of the High Representative, as laid out in the Dayton Peace Agreement and as upheld in various Council resolutions. We condemn the intimidation and death threats levelled against the High Representative and call for their prompt and thorough investigation in conformity with the rule of law.

We also recognize the important stabilizing role played by the EU-led multinational stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We therefore welcome the renewal of its mandate and the Council's unity in adopting resolution 2315 (2016).

In conclusion, Malaysia reaffirms its commitment to the independence, sovereignty, national unity and

territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have long supported the country in its reconstruction efforts after the war and will continue to do so with a view to strengthening the country's nation-building, inclusive democracy, reconciliation and economic progress.

Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): Many thanks to Ambassador Valentin Inzko for his presentation of his biannual report (S/2016/911, annex) and, more important, many thanks for the special report on the referendum held on 25 September in the Republika Srpska.

I also wish to express our appreciation for the adoption of resolution 2315 (2016), which once again points to the multinational commitment to stabilization on the part of the European Union, which has played a positive and commendable role in supporting the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

By way of a preliminary remark, I wish to endorse the contents of the statement to be delivered by the observer of the EU.

The year 2016 has been a major year for Bosnia and Herzegovina, marked by a series of landmark events. I wish to point to one of those events — 15 February, which is when Bosnia and Herzegovina's candidacy for integration into the European Union was presented — which points to the beginning of a path that will not be easy, a path that Spain knows well. I can affirm that, in the end, it is a path towards progress and stability. Bosnia and Herzegovina has already taken the first important steps on that path towards the European Union. I will highlight three steps.

The first step is the implementation of the reform agenda. The second step is the adaption of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. The third step is the adoption, on 23 Augus,t of the coordination mechanism for European Union matters. We welcome those steps, but in order to continue along the positive path, it is absolutely necessary that all actors and relevant political forces address and come up with a solution to those issues that are of the greatest concern to the population. I think that one of the greatest concerns has to do with respect for the rule of law, which is an irreplaceable and essential pillar of any State and which is the foundation of the European Union. It is for that reason that I most lament those cases where we have seen actions against the rule of law, against established legislation, against the authority of institutions and in particular against the authority of the Bosnian Constitutional Court with respect to its decision of 17 September on the convening and holding of a referendum in the Republika Srpska.

Spain calls on all institutional and political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be guided in all their conduct by the need to fulfil legal requirements. We also want to see, once and for all, an end to divisive rhetoric, and we unequivocally condemn any incitement to hatred. The political leaders of the three communities are especially responsible for seeking reconciliation and ensuring that everyone can live peacefully together.

I cannot conclude without reiterating Spain's support for the work carried out by the High Representative. It is our desire to see necessary progress made as soon as possible in order to ensure that the five objectives are met and the two conditions for the conclusion of his mandate. I also wish to recall my previous statement (see S/PV.7688) on this issue here in the Security Council in which I expressed the unequivocal support of Spain for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as our conviction that the stability of the region as a whole is inseparable from the political stability and progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. Okamura (Japan): I wish to express my gratitude to Ambassador Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzogovina, for his informative briefing. Japan appreciates the High Representative's ongoing contribution to peace and stability in the country. We also welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2315 (2016), which supports the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

The Dayton Agreement was the best and wisest choice available to the international community in 1995. I remember being struck by what I saw when I visited Sarajevo as the Chief Political Officer for United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo in 1999. In addition to the ravages of war, I saw a total lack of communication, five years following the Agreement. The town of Pale in the Republika Srpska — just 13 kilometres away from Sarajevo, on the other side of the mountain — had no interaction at all with Sarajevo. I recall hoping that the ethnic tensions would be resolved over time through efforts by all sides to overcome the very difficult matter of ethnic tension.

As a member of the Peace Implementation Council, Japan has contributed to the implementation of the Peace Agreement by emphasizing mutuality among

different ethnic groups. Since the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, ethnic tensions have continued to affect the Balkans. When I was in Kosovo, the prevailing perspective was that the Dayton Agreement had sowed interim stability, and it was our belief that in the long term, Kosovo's borders would become unnecessary and meaningless in tandem with its regional integration within the European Union (EU). Japan therefore welcomes the decision by the EU General Affairs Council to accept the application of Bosnia and Herzegovina for membership in the EU. We also welcome the approval of the Extended Fund Facility to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, which will enhance economic stability.

It is nonetheless disappointing to see actions that foment ethnically based divisions and run contrary to the vision of the Dayton Agreement. Japan is particularly concerned about the impact on the stability of the country of the referendum in the Republika Srpska. The referendum was held against the orders of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As it has done for the past quarter century, the international community must continue to provide the vision to resolve the ethnic tensions that have plagued the region. The future is in reconciliation, not in confrontation. The future is in integration, including market integration, not in secession. Member States should bolster reconciliation and avoid fanning ethnic tensions. The Security Council must speak with one voice in urging dialogue among the various ethnic groups.

The Office of the High Representative continues to be vital for the peace and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Japan will continue to fully support Ambassador Inzko and his Office to that end.

Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I thank the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Inzko, for his briefing.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important country in the Balkans. It is in the interests of the international community in general, and of regional States in particular, that it maintain peace and stability, advance coordinated socioeconomic development and achieve harmonious coexistence among all ethnic groups. The international community should take a balanced and prudent approach on the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina and pay attention to and heed the views and concerns of all parties concerned.

China welcomes the achievement by Bosnia and Herzegovina in advancing national reconciliation, promoting economic development and strengthening the rule of law. We have noted that the country is still faced by difficulties and challenges in its pursuit of national stability and development. We hope that Bosnian people of all ethnicities will work actively to consolidate the results of the political process, engage in dialogue to settle their differences, comprehensively implement the Dayton Peace Agreement and continue to strive for greater progress in all areas so that Bosnian people of all ethnicities can share in the peace dividend.

China respects the independence, sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We respect the choice made by the Bosnian people with regard to the future of their country, and we support Bosnian people of all ethnicities in living harmoniously and seeking development together. We welcome the efforts by High Representative Inzko to promote the political process of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We hope that, according to his mandate, he will continue to play a positive role in promoting the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

China welcomes the adoption of resolution 2315 (2016), which extends the mandate of EUFOR ALTHEA, the EU-led peacekeeping force. We hope that EUFOR ALTHEA will continue to maintain close cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina and play a constructive role in maintaining the peace and stability of the country. China is willing to work with the international community and continue to contribute to the realization of the lasting peace, stability and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. Lucas (Angola): We welcome Mr. Valentin Inzko, High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thank him for the fiftieth report (S/2016/911, annex) of the High Representative to the Security Council. We commend his work in support of the implementation of the General Framework Agreement and for the consolidation of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2315 (2016), which extends the mandate of the multinational stabilization force EUFOR ALTHEA for an additional 12-month period, focused on capacity-building and

training and to contribute to Bosnia and Herzegovina's authorities' deterrence capacity.

Angola is fully committed to respecting and supporting the unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the General Framework Agreement for Peace. In our statement, we will basically focus on three issues: the general political environment, challenges to the General Framework Agreement and the lack of cooperation with the High Representative.

We are concerned about the political environment prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The holding of a referendum in September by the Republika Srpska authorities is in violation of ruling of the Constitutional Court that stipulates that any referendum must be consistent with the country's Constitution and the General Framework Agreement. The Republika Srpska authorities must abide by the Constitutional Court's decisions and avoid, by all means, unilateral elections that might undermine peace and stability in the country.

We welcome the holding of peaceful local elections in October as an important step for the consolidation of peace and democratic institutions in the country. Although they were peaceful in general, the elections were marked by inter-ethnic incidents, irregularities and unrest in some polling stations. The electoral process should be completed and voting held where it has not taken place. We urge the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to create political and socioeconomic conditions conducive to the voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons in their territories and communities of origin, while strengthening reconciliation and social cohesion so as to consolidate peace, healing and forgiveness.

Regarding the challenges to the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we are very worried by the statements made by high officials that challenge the country's territorial integrity. The provocations by the Republika Srpska authorities, such as offering congratulations to war criminals, should be universally condemned. Such statements and actions threaten the General Framework Agreement and Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. They help to undermine a multi-ethnic society's cohesion and the country's unity and national reconciliation. In line with resolution 2315 (2016), we reaffirm that Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities by virtue of its Constitution, and that any change to the Constitution must be made in accordance with the procedure it prescribes.

Regarding the lack of cooperation with the High Representative, we reject the decision of the Republika Srpska authorities to deny him access to information and documents, as required under annex 10 of the General Framework Agreement, and we call on them to allow him access, as requested by his Office, that will enable him to carry out his mandated duties accordingly.

In conclusion, we commend the European Union for its support to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the security and defence sectors and in the implementation of socioeconomic, rule-of-law and public administration reforms. We call on the European Union to continue helping the country to overcome its remaining challenges and to implement the reforms. Today's adoption of resolution 2315 (2016) gives expression to that commitment. Lastly, we call on the international community, and the United Nations in particular, to continue supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina in fully implementing the Peace Agreement, which is key to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina's attainment of stability, peace and security and well-being, as well as in the Balkans as a whole.

Mr. Safronkov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): First of all, we are grateful to our United Kingdom colleagues for their constructive approach during the consultations and willingness to take our chief concerns into consideration, enabling us to support today's Security Council resolution 2015 (2016) on extending Operation Althea of the European Union-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

After thoroughly studying the reports of Mr. Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, we are compelled to conclude that, like similar previous reports, they do not attempt to assess what is happening in the country objectively. We regret the fact that despite our frequent appeals and warnings, the High Representative, in his actions and public comments, is clearly not giving enough attention to the basic tasks of encouraging intra-Bosnian dialogue and strengthening inter-ethnic trust. We are getting the distinct impression that Mr. Inzko's guiding principle has become an anti-Serbian credo, thereby creating artificial ruptures between the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when his main objective should be to unite them.

Instead of pursuing these seemingly obvious priorities, the High Representative is increasingly sliding into politicized polemic, with the focus on personal sympathies and antipathies. From now on, we repeat that what we want to see in his reports is not a flood of emotion dictated by the current environment, but at least an attempt at impartial analysis of the situation, something that we are firmly believe would be very useful to every member of the Security Council.

With regard to the documents Mr. Inzko presented to the Council, we cannot agree with the tendentious interpretations, taken out of context, of the Republika Srpska referendum held on 25 September on the entity's main holiday, Republika Srpska Day. We believe that a plebiscite held on an issue within the Republika Srpska's constitutional remit in no way threatens the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no need to create artificial problems. Moreover, the steps taken on 25 October by the Republika Srpska authorities, following up on the expression of the electorate's opinion by enacting a new law on Republika Srpska Day, testify unambiguously to Banja Luka's readiness to affirm the holiday's secular and non-discriminatory nature.

Security Council members can acquaint themselves with those and other useful facts in the substantive report of the Republika Srpska Government, which, by tradition, we recommend that our colleagues read and note as a helpful guide to a more objective understanding of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly since for some reason the High Representative's reports purposely do not touch on those Republika Srpska actions. And the abuses of the independent Government's central judicial organs are simply way out of line.

The credibility of the Bosnian State-level justice authorities should be built solely on improving their professionalism, impartiality and effectiveness and ending the process of withdrawing foreign specialists from the staff of the higher judicial authorities, which by definition should be national and independent. The key to that is carrying out thorough reform of the judicial and prosecutorial system on the best possible foundations, which should be developed collectively by Bosnians themselves without any pressure, imposition of ready-made schemes or interference from outside.

We believe that the principle of transferring responsibility for all the country's processes to the Bosnian authorities should define the international community's approach to the other issues that Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently dealing with, whether they concern the publication of the census results, the implementation of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on the well-known *Sejdić and Finci* case or the holding of municipal elections in Mostar. That is why we have consistently advocated for shutting down as soon as possible the remaining elements of the international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as represented by the High Representative and the Bonn powers, which have outlived their usefulness.

We should recall that in his recent reports the High Representative pays lip service to caring about the importance of respecting the decisions of the Bosnian State structures, but he was not always so scrupulous. In 2011, for the sake of short-term ambitions, he suspended the implementation of the decision of the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in a significant blow to its positions as a crucial body for the functioning of democracy in the country. And we are all familiar with the lamentable consequences of that step. That voluntarism vis-à-vis the law proved to be ineffective five years ago and would be all the more inappropriate in the future.

We would once again like to draw attention to the fact that both in his reports and in practice, Mr. Inzko gives too little space to the implementation of the 5+2 plan, adopted almost 10 years ago as one of the conditions for closing the Office of the High Representative. We believe that he should turn his attention back to implementing that programme. And the subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina's relations with the European Union and NATO, which has nothing to do with the High Representative's Dayton mandate and diverts his Office's limited resources, should on the contrary be immediately dispensed with. We are fundamentally opposed to any attempts to use external channels to influence the sovereign choice of the independent State that Bosnia and Herzegovina unquestionably is.

We note that after a series of persistent reminders, the High Representative's reports have begun to touch on the counter-terrorism situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, we hope that future reports will reflect the subject appropriately because Islamic terrorism poses a real threat to the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina and neighbouring countries, unlike something that is occupying much of Mr. Inzko's attention — the anti-Serbian demagoguery. Mr. Inzko

has said that this demagoguery has reached its apogee. Furthermore, in an interview on 1 November with a correspondent of the *Wall Street Journal* he suggested that the Western community needed to rethink the current President. He said:

(*spoke in English*)

> "He was the hope of the West... Dodik is building his own empire... The Western community should think about removing him."

(*spoke in Russian*)

But can an international official of such rank, whose gold standard should be objectivity, neutrality and impartiality, make such a comment? We do not believe the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be as bleak as it is being depicted. In that vein, we would note the municipal elections held on 2 October, which were by and large held normally, as an example; and we wish every success to those representatives who will be taking office at the local level.

The Russian Federation, as a guarantor of the 1995 the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, will continue to help its steadfast implementation, including by guaranteeing genuine equality for all three constituent peoples and the defence of broad authorities of the entities, as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement. We will continue to consolidate a beneficial partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina at all levels of authority.

Mr. Lamek (France) (*spoke in French*): I begin by thanking the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina for his briefing and aligning myself with the statement to be delivered by the observer of the European Union shortly.

France welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2315 (2016), which shows that all members of the Council share the same guiding principles with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina: support for the presence of the European Union-led peacekeeping force (EUFOR Althea) while awaiting the strategic review that will be carried out next autumn by the European External Action Service; respect for the aspirationa of all factions in the country that favour a European outlook; and the absolute necessity that all must respect the principles and institutions set forth in the Paris Dayton accords.

The unity of the Council around such a common base sends a message of peace to the region. It recalls that the international community is in agreement in supporting the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which should not be challenged by any of its entities, and in respecting the country's choices, provided that they are in line with international law and the framework established by the peace agreements.

More than 20 years after its signature, the Dayton accords remain the cornerstone of institutional stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that regard, and as many have done before me, we can only deplore the decision made by the authorities of the Republika Srpska to hold a referendum in September on the issue of Republika Srpska Day, in contravention of its suspension by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and hence of the Constitution, which is an integral part of the peace agreements that stipulates that the Court's rulings are final and binding. That decision has led to an unnecessary spiral of tensions between communities and has revived memories of past divisions. We also regret the fact that the local elections on 2 October were not held in Mostar because of a lack of agreement on its status. The inhabitants of Mostar cannot continue to be deprived of their right to choose their own representatives, as they have been for eight years now.

France does not rule out the possibility of a debate being held among the entities on the definition of national holidays or the aspirations of some to improve the functioning of the central State. It nonetheless recalls that any viable solution must come by way of dialogue in good faith among the different stakeholders of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina — the central State and the entities — while respecting constitutional rules. We also call on all the parties to cooperate with the institutions mentioned in the peace agreement, in particular the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the High Representative. The latter has a crucial role to play in promoting peaceful dialogue among the different communities and the entities. Political decision-makers must also fulfil their responsibilities, and we call on them to abandon divisive rhetoric.

Having said that, despite such fragilities we remain convinced that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is today heading in the right direction, towards normalization. Our objective for years to come remains,

without challenging the principles of the Paris Dayton accords, to fully adapt the international presence to current realities.

France welcomes the fact that a European outlook is the main driver of development and consolidation in the country. Last February, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its candidacy for accession to the European Union, reflecting the broad support for such an outlook within the country. In that new context, the European Union shall continue more than ever to assist the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in implementing reforms that respond to the economic and social aspirations of the population. The Reform Agenda adopted last year is, in that regard, critical. We welcome the fact that it is already bearing concrete results, such as the adoption of new labour legislation at the entity level. We encourage Bosnian authorities at all levels to intensify their reform efforts to the benefit of the people of the country and in the context of moving Bosnia and Herzegovina closer to Europe.

The European Union mission EUFOR Althea will also pursue its efforts to enable the security forces of Bosnia to operate in an independent fashion and to thereby participate in building a peaceful society looking towards the future. Next autumn, this will be subject of a strategic review within the European Union, as I have already said, that will allow for the drawing up of options for its development in the years to come, taking into account the progress Bosnia and Herzegovina has made towards European rapprochement.

Twenty years after the horror of war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is today advancing in the right direction, with the support of the European Union and its other partners. The responsibility of the international community, and especially the Council, is to encourage it in that direction. The unanimity with which we have adopted resolution 2315 (2016) this morning will undoubtedly contribute to that.

Mr. Vitrenko (Ukraine): Ukraine joins the other Council members in welcoming the unanimous adoption of resolution 2315 (2016). We are grateful to the United Kingdom delegation for preparing the text and are ready for further active engagement on the issue, including as a member of the relevant Coordination and Drafting Group.

Ukraine also aligns itself with the statement to be delivered on behalf of the European Union.

I wish to express my delegation's appreciation to High Representative Valentin Inzko for his leadership of the Office of the High Representative and for his contribution to the implementation of the Peace Agreement. I wish to stress that, despite the attempts of one Council member to question the authorities, under the provisions of the Peace Agreement as was already mentioned, the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the said Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement.

We are alarmed at the fact that the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has deteriorated. Serious disagreements between the parties persist on many important issues. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina was unable to meet the requirements of the 5+2 agenda necessary for the closure of the Office of the High Representative.

At the previous Security Council meeting on the subject, in May (see S/PV. 7688), the majority of the Council members, including my delegation, expressed concerns over the statements made by Republika Srpska authorities on possible referendums. My delegation then underscored that any referendum that contradicts the provisions of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Dayton Agreement is illegitimate. Unfortunately, appeals by Council members fell on deaf ears. Ukraine strongly condemns the holding of a referendum by the authorities of Republika Srpska in clear contravention of two final and binding decisions of the Constitutional Court.

I fully agree with the High Representative that that move causes unnecessary tensions and poses a grave challenge to the rule of law. It has serious implications for peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We also fully share the High Representative's concern regarding the decoration of a number of war criminals sentenced by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The referendum is the continuation of the policy of Republika Srpska aimed at challenging the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by threats of separation.

In that light, it is unfortunate that despite the obvious fact that the referendum is an exceptionally dangerous development for the region, one Council member defends this decision and supports the Bosnian Serb leaders in their defiance of the authority of the central bodies of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact,

the authorities of Republika Srpska abuse the special status granted to their entity by the Dayton Agreement. Instead of full compliance with the Peace Agreement to everybody's benefit, they actually undermine the common State, thus blocking Bosnia's political and economic development.

That is a very irresponsible policy — irresponsible towards the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the people of Republika Srpska, who have found themselves living in self-imposed isolation. Just imagine — a new generation has grown up in the country since 1995, and many of them have never been outside Republika Srpska. There are several famous bridges in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the old Mostar bridge and the bridge on the Drina in Višegrad, the very one to which Ivo Andrić referred in his book *The Bridge on the Drina*:

> "Of everything that man erects and builds in his urge for living, nothing is in my eyes better or more valuable than bridges. They are more important than houses, more sacred than shrines. Belonging to everyone and being equal to everyone, useful, always built with a sense, on the spot where most human needs are crossing, they are more durable than other buildings and they do not serve anything secret or bad".

With this message from Ivo Andrić in mind, I believe it is more important to build new bridges in Bosnia and Herzegovina than to burn existing ones.

I would like to remind the Republika Srpska authorities that any referendum must be conducted in a way that is consistent with the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and cannot violate the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Ukraine would also like to reaffirm its strong commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and urges the parties to avoid further statements and actions that could make the situation even more difficult.

Now, on a positive note, Ukraine welcomes the progress achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina's European Union (EU) integration process, which is reflected in the European Council conclusions of 20 September 2016. We consider the EU decision to submit an opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's application for new membership as an important step towards Bosnia and Herzegovina's European integration. It is vital to continue efforts to implement the Reform Agenda, which includes socioeconomic issues, the rule of law and public administration reforms. It is also important to demonstrate progress in the functioning of the judiciary and in the fight against corruption and organized crime, and the fight against radicalization and terrorism.

Ukraine welcomes the EU's readiness, as confirmed in the conclusions of the EU Foreign Ministers on 17 October, to continue to play an executive military role in supporting the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities in the maintenance of a safe and secure environment under a new Security Council mandate. In that respect, we also positively note the EU's request that the High Representative present a strategic review in autumn 2017 as the basis for a discussion on options for the future of the operation. It is extremely important to intensify efforts and fully implement the 5+2 agenda.

In the meantime, it is vital to support the actions and reforms needed to reach that milestone and to provide all necessary support to the High Representative as he fulfils his mandate.

Mr. Rosselli (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): First of all, I would like to thank the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Valentin Inzko, for his briefing this morning.

I would like to begin by highlighting Uruguay's adherence to the principle of the territorial integrity of States, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Uruguay reaffirms its support for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the consolidation of its unity and in the exercise of its sovereignty.

Respect for institutions and legality is the path towards a stable Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the communities that compose it live together in harmony. In that context, Uruguay attaches the highest value to the rule of law and to the authority of the institutions established by the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore deems it essential to maintain the commitment to fully comply with the 1995 Dayton Agreement. We urge all parties, including the international community, to support any and all efforts to promote peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will also have an impact on stability in the entire region.

Here I would make a special plea to the political players in Bosnia and Herzegovina to conduct themselves responsibly and to engage in a constructive dialogue that will enable them to overcome their differences and focus on national reconciliation and on achieving common objectives, so as to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes a solid and prosperous nation.

The report of the High Representative (S/2016/911, annex) indicates scant progress in achieving the remaining five objectives and two conditions established by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council for the closure of the Office of the High Representative. For that reason, I would point once again to the importance of continuing efforts and maintaining progress in taking forward the 5+2 agenda.

Despite the lack of progress in some areas, Bosnia and Herzegovina has progressed in others, which must be highlighted. I wish in particular to note the climate of security and stability that prevailed during the period despite the inflammatory rhetoric and enabled the peaceful holding of local elections of October.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has made progress in implementing its Reform Agenda, adopted in July 2015, which focuses on the socioeconomic issues that directly affect its citizens, and has taken a number of steps towards European Union (EU) integration through its signing of the Protocol on the adaptation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the adoption of the EU coordination mechanism.

The international community must continue to support the process of consolidating the peace agreements. We are especially grateful for the work of the European Union-led peacekeeping force Operation Althea, which represents a guarantee of the political and social stability of the country. It is vital that the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to cooperate with the Office of the High Representative until the end of his mandate, once the 5+2 programme has been completed.

I reiterate Uruguay's commitment and our desire to see a stable and sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina that embraces all of its citizens and focuses on their common welfare.

Mr. Ramírez Carreño (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): First and foremost, we would like to thank the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Valentin Inzko, for his briefing and to reiterate our full support for his work on the matter.

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela once again reaffirms its full support and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given that that is one of the fundamental elements of the Charter of the United Nations, we believe that it is a principle that cannot be violated under any circumstances. We believe that the international community must continue to support the implementation of the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace as a way to contribute to a peaceful solution of the differences among the stakeholders concerned.

Today more than ever, at a moment when tensions in the region have increased, we wish to highlight the importance of unequivocal and clear compliance with the Dayton Agreement. Moreover, we must bear in mind that it is incumbent upon the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to lead the efforts related to the future of their country. As part of that process, the ethnic groups must continue to work together in the framework of dialogue that fosters peace, human rights, cooperation and social and economic development, setting aside, once and for all, the tensions and confrontations that tormented the region during the 1990s.

In that context, and on the basis of the principles of impartiality, transparency and constructive work, the High Representative must continue to play a supporting role to promote such efforts and find common ground among the parties through dialogue based on balanced and prudent approaches and with a constructive vision, leaving behind the criticisms that exacerbate animosities, and in which the opinions and views of all stakeholders are reflected.

The European Union's multinational stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina has carried out its work within the framework of the mandate assigned to it, in collaboration with the authorities, to ensure a safe environment for all the ethnic communities. Our country therefore welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2315 (2016), which renews its mandate for a further 12 months.

With regard to the fight against terrorism, it is worth mentioning that the report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/501)refers to the issue of foreign terrorist fighters and the sentences given to several citizens accused of joining or attempting to join the Islamic

State in Iraq and the Levant. Our country supports the efforts aimed at preventing and fighting terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, which must be accompanied by effective strategies against social exclusion, poverty, violence and intolerant ideologies, with a view to curbing radicalization, with particular emphasis on young people. Furthermore, we must work to effectively implement Security Council and General Assembly resolutions that prohibit the financing, training and transfer of weapons to such groups.

With regard to fighting impunity, we support the work of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which was set up to try those responsible for the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that were committed during the armed conflict in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, we reiterate our solidarity with, and support for, Bosnia and Herzegovina for its firm commitment to foster peace and stability in the country for the benefit of its citizens.We are convinced that respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence is essential to achieving those objectives.

Finally, we call on all parties to redouble their efforts to build confidence and work together in the framework of international law, which is necessary for a just and lasting solution that redounds to the benefit of the parties and the entire region.

Mrs. Schwalger (New Zealand): I too welcome High Representative Inzko and the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We are pleased that the Council has today reauthorized the European Union (EU) military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EU-led mission continues to play an important role in supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina's efforts to maintain a safe and secure environment. The mission also offers capacity-building that helps to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina has the tools it needs to respond to security threats.

As we heard this morning, Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued to make significant progress toward its goal of EU membership since the Council last discussed the situation in the country (see S/PV.7688). In September, another milestone was reached when the European Commission was asked to conduct an assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina's membership application. While there is a long road ahead, it is another sign of what Bosnia and Herzegovina can achieve when its leaders unite around a common purpose. We wish the country well as it pursues this path of integration in the months and years to come.

We welcome the progress Bosnia and Herzegovina has made on its reform agenda. That agenda provides a road map for strengthening public administration and improving socioeconomic conditions. However, maintaining momentum in the implementation of the agenda will require persistence and determination in the face of difficult decisions.

As Bosnia and Herzegovina pursues EU membership, we look forward to regional and international partners supporting the implementation of the reform agenda for the benefit of all of its citizens. We also hope to see accelerated progress on the five objectives and two conditions that are necessary for the closure of the Office of the High Representative.

As we have heard today, the High Representative has reported actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina that directly challenge the authority of the State judicial institutions and the General Framework Agreement for Peace, including the holding of a referendum in contravention of a ruling of the Constitutional Court. Those activities are destabilizing and undermine the rule of law. We urge all political actors to respect State institutions and constitutional order. Disagreements should be dealt with through dialogue. We hope that divisive and inflammatory actions will be left behind and that leaders will choose to focus on what can be achieved by working together constructively. Divisive rhetoric also serves to undermine reconciliation efforts. More than two decades after the Dayton Peace Accords brought an end to a devastating conflict, true reconciliation remains an unfinished project.

We hope that all political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina can move beyond their points of difference and focus on fulfilling the aspiration of all of its citizens for stability and prosperity. An inclusive and united society will ultimately make the country stronger and more stable and will improve the welfare of all of its peoples. That is the future we wish to see for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Senegal.

At the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the detailed briefing he has just given. The Senegalese

delegation welcome the unanimous adoption of resolution 2315 (2016). More than 20 years have passed since the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement. Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the persistence of some pitfalls, is continuing its inexorable march towards reunification and nation-building. The Senegalese delegation's statement will concentrate — as it did six months ago here in the Chamber (see S/PV.7688) — on all the political, economic, institutional and security dimensions of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the political level, progress has certainly been made. On the one hand, we have seen the publication, on 30 June, of the results of the population census that had been under way since 2013. On the other hand, on 2 October, local elections were held across the territory, except, unfortunately, in the city of Mostar. We must recognize that the past six months have also been marked by a resurgence in some tension among Bosnian, Croat and Serb communities.

The Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement, which ended one of the most terrible wars in the very heart of Europe, today seem fragile, not to say jeopardized, by the referendum organized on 25 September by the Republika Srpska. We warned against that referendum. The holding of the referendum constitutes an additional challenge with regard to carrying out the threats of secession proclaimed by the Republika Srpska — which, we remind the Council, had already called into question the competence of the Constitutional Court and the Office of the Prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the competence and the decisions of the High Representative.

My delegation is of the view that such a step undermines the work on the national construction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which instead requires renewed commitments to strengthen the institutional architecture outlined in the Dayton-Paris accords, a calm atmosphere and frank dialogue among all the components of the State, all while respecting the Constitution and laws.

During the period under review, Bosnia and Herzegovina saw encouraging economic progress. In July, there was the adoption of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, followed on 23 August by the adoption of the Coordination Mechanism of the European Union. The country has also benefitted from support and assistance from the International Monetary Fund, which decided to earmark €553 million for a period of three years. There was also a notable increase in economic activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the first seven months of 2016, when compared with the same period in 2015. The unemployment rate fell by 4.2 per cent, compared with the same months of 2015. At the same time, the trade deficit saw a downturn of 4.1 per cent, and industrial production increased by 4 per cent, compared with 2015. That progress has been consolidated with the ongoing assistance of the international community, prioritizing harmonious development, stability and the welfare of the population in order to contribute to mitigating the fragility of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the region.

At the institutional level, the Senegalese delegation reaffirms its support for the High Representative and encourages all parties to cooperate with him. This has to do with the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as guaranteed by the General Framework Agreement for Peace, by the country's Constitution and by international law. It is in that spirit that the Senegalese delegation call on all three ethnic groups to collaborate more closely and to further cultivate a common will to guarantee a stable, strong and prosperous State that can take its rightful place among the world's nations.

It is in that spirit that my delegation commends the Council's decision to extend by 12 months the mandate of the European Union-led multinational stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR ALTHEA. As underscored by the report (S/2016/911, annex) of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the presence in the country of European Union military mission, which has an executive mandate, is still important in that it allows his Office and other participants from the international community to discharge their respective mandates and to reassure citizens from all ethnic groups regarding the safety and security of their environment.

The fight against terrorism is a challenge that Bosnia and Herzegovina must handle with discernment, in a context of the return of foreign fighters and complex migratory flows that constitute an additional risk for the security of the country and the whole region. It goes without saying that tangible results cannot be achieved and maintained in the struggle without the indispensible reinforcement, at all levels, of cooperation and dialogue

among the authorities of the different components of the State.

Senegal calls on the international community to continue supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina's efforts for greater resilience in the face of socioeconomic difficulties, support which should also involve capacity-building of the police force and the defence of the country so that they may overcome the strategic and operational shortcomings in a context where the terrorist threat remains pressing.

Finally, I would like to encourage the international community, and first and foremost the Council, to maintain its commitment and its current level of cooperation in its approach to the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to assist the country in the positive trend it has demonstrated during the past two decades.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Mr. Vukašinović (Bosnia and Herzegovina): At the outset, let me congratulate you, Mr. President, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of November and to wish you and your delegation every success. We welcome Mr. Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and have taken note of his report (S/2016/911, annex) on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, covering the period from 16 April to 21 October 2016.

Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomes the adoption of resolution 2315 (2016), which extends the mandate of the European Union-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR ALTHEA, for an additional 12 months. It is important to emphasize that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a host country, has had respectable and fruitful cooperation with EUFOR ALTHEA, particularly in capacity-building and training of its armed forces, which has contributed to strengthening national ownership.

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been peaceful and calm for a long period of time. That has been regularly reflected in the reports of the EUFOR ALTHEA mission, as well as in the relevant Security Council resolutions. The EUFOR ALTHEA mission is mandated to support the implementation of military aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the Agreement. Over the past few years the EUFOR ALTHEA mission has been reconfigured so as to correspond to the situation on the ground, while the primary focus of the mission has shifted from deterrence and activities providing a safe and secure environment to capacity-building and training.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has come a long way from a security consumer to a troop-contributing country to United Nations peacekeeping missions and, accordingly, a security provider to international peace and security. Today, military and police personnel from Bosnia and Herzegovina participate in United Nations peacekeeping missions worldwide.

On 2 October, democratic and credible local elections were held in a peaceful atmosphere in the country. Citizens throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina exercised their democratic rights and elected members of municipal councils and city assemblies, as well as mayors. Voter turnout was relatively high. Around 54 per cent of eligible citizens exercised their right to cast a vote.

With regard to the economic situation, it is important to underscore that Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy, like other economies in the region, has been affected by the global economic slowdown. However, macroeconomic data also show steady growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy in the first half of 2016. Compared with the first half of 2015, the economy grew by more than 2 per cent. At the same time, exports increased by 3 per cent.

During the reporting period, Bosnia and Herzegovina made notable progress in the implementation of the Reform Agenda and continued its robust efforts aimed at achieving socioeconomic reforms, in particular, those necessary for integration into the European Union (EU). Bosnia and Herzegovina's authorities at all levels have coordinated their efforts to ensure that the legal and fiscal framework is conducive to foreign investment, which is crucial for economic growth and new job creation.

With the backing of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Commission and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Protocol on the adoption of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Following the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union, the adoption of the Agreement became an

outstanding issue for Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of its path towards European integration. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a European integration coordination mechanism. More precisely, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Decision on the System of Coordination of the European Integration Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which sets up an institutional and operational system of coordination, as well as modalities for coordination among Bosnia and Herzegovina institutions at various levels in relation to the process of European integration.

We would like to express our appreciation to the EU General Affairs Council decision of 20 September, which asked the European Commission to submit its opinion on the application of Bosnia and Herzegovina for EU membership. This decision represents a major milestone for European integration. Also during the reporting period, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Commission signed the agreement associating Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME) programme. This agreement will enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in the COSME programme and support national efforts aimed at improving the economy and the overall business environment.

Advancing friendly and constructive cooperation among countries of the region in areas of mutual interest is one of Bosnia and Herzegovina's main priorities. The prospect of European integration remains one of the most important factors for regional stability in the Western Balkans, whose States continue, within the framework of the Berlin process, to deepen collaboration in the field of transportation and energy as the most significant areas for economic growth.

Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to prosecute war crimes in its domestic courts. We reiterate that fighting impunity at the local level is vital for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a complex and multinational State. In that regard, implementing the national strategy for prosecuting war crimes, regardless of the national or religious origin of the perpetrators or victims, is essential for reconciliation and long-term stability.

Terrorism, radicalization and violent extremism together constitute one of the main security challenges at the global, regional and national levels. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to fulfil its international obligations with regard to countering terrorism and violent extremism. In accordance with provisions of its amended penal code, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to prosecute individuals involved in fighting on behalf of terrorist and paramilitary organizations as well as those facilitating terrorist-fighter recruitment.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's judicial and security institutions have been implementing its strategy for preventing and combating terrorism. It is important to emphasize that the strategy, together with security measures, includes preventive activities for deradicalization undertaken by national stakeholders, such as religious communities, educational institutions, civil-society organizations and the media. During the reporting period, Bosnia and Herzegovina also made progress in combating organized crime, corruption and money-laundering.

Refugee and migrant flows in the Balkans remain to be a challenge to the States of the region and their institutions. We consider that only extensive and coordinated actions to address underlying causes of migration in the countries of origin at the global level can bring a satisfactory solution to the migrant crisis. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina has not been under direct pressure brought about by a significant migrant movement throughout its territory, I would like to stress that its institutions have undertaken a set of comprehensive measures to respond in case of massive influx of refugees, including measures in the humanitarian and security spheres. Bosnia and Herzegovina has adopted a strategy in the field of migration and asylum as well as a plan of action for the period 2016-2020. These instruments specify Bosnia and Herzegovina's policy in the field of migration and asylum in accordance with the highest European and international standards.

Finally, we would like to express the readiness of Bosnia and Herzegovina's authorities to continue their work to secure a better and prosperous future for its citizens. At same time, we would also like to express our gratitude to international partners for supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina on that path.'

The President (*spoke in French*): I now call on the observer of the European Union.

Mr. Vale de Almeida: I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its 28 member States. The candidate countries Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro

and Albania, as well as Ukraine, align themselves with this statement.

We thank the Security Council for unanimously adopting resolution 2315 (2016) renewing the mandate of the European Union-led peacekeeping force's Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina for one year. I join other speakers in welcoming High Representative Valentin Inzko back to the Council and assure him of the European Union's continued support. I also welcome the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina and thank him for his statement.

The year 2016 is a very important year for Bosnia and Herzegovina's European Union prospects. On 15 February, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted the country's application for EU membership. On 20 September, the EU Council decided to ask for the Commission's opinion on that membership application. This decision marks an important milestone for the European integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It follows the joint efforts of the country's leadership at all levels, demonstrating their commitment to the reforms, answering to citizens' demand for change and moving closer to the European Union.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has demonstrated a serious commitment and readiness to take difficult political decisions in order to meaningfully implement the Reform Agenda, an ambitious set of socioeconomic, rule of law and public administration reforms.

Together with our international partners, including the international financial institutions, we provided clear incentives to move forward with reforms of labour laws, the pension system and banking regulations, as well as long-term improvements of the business climate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy is showing potential for growth in the next three to four years.

It is essential to keep the momentum going regarding both effective reforms and the EU integration process. The next stages will be equally demanding. The Reform Agenda will pass into its second stage, where much remains to be done to improve the political atmosphere in the country, rule of law issues and public administration. The reply of Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities to the comprehensive list of questions prepared by the European Commission will provide the basis for the assessment of the country's membership application and its capacity to meet the criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 and the conditions of the Stabilization and Association process.

This is also an election year for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the local elections of 2 October were generally conducted in an orderly manner, they unfortunately brought to the surface persisting political divisions and challenges that have the potential to undermine stability in the country. The irregularities and isolated violent incidents that occurred should be investigated by the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities without any delay. Once more, elections in Mostar did not take place due to disagreements on the electoral requirements.

The European Union regrets the unlawful holding of an entity-level referendum on Republika Srpska Day, in violation of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitutional Court decision of 17 September. The referendum caused unnecessary tensions and challenged the rule of law. Such action also distracts attention from the social and economic problems that people throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina face on a daily basis. The European Union encourages all political actors and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina to resolve this issue through the established legal processes and constructive dialogue and within the existing constitutional framework. It urges the parties, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, to abide by their commitment to cooperating fully with all institutions involved in the implementation of the peace settlement, as described in the Peace Agreement, including the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also more generally recalls that under the Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of the two entities that exist legally by virtue of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution, which does not allow either entity to secede.

Next year will be an election-free year in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I would like to take this opportunity to encourage all parties to resolve pending issues that present a challenge to the respect of human rights and democratic institutions, and to embark on further and deeper socioeconomic reforms. Beyond the general need to ensure the further implementation of the adopted reforms and to build a solid track record, one area in need of a strong focus in the coming period is the rule of law, including the fight against corruption and organized crime, addressing any outstanding shortcomings of the judiciary and the need for its depoliticization, impartiality and independence, including in the prosecution of war crimes. In that

respect, the European Union is concerned over recent cases of the glorification of persons convicted for the gravest crimes against humanity. All political leaders and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina have a responsibility to assess wartime events honestly, in the interests of truth, reconciliation and a peaceful future.

I would also like to encourage the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to work towards the implementation of the rulings of court institutions, especially of the European Court of Human Rights case of *Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina* and related rulings, as well as of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will be an important factor in moving forward its European agenda and contribute to establishing a democratic and well-functioning society in which the equality of all constituent peoples and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina is warranted.

The European Union reiterates its unequivocal commitment to the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and united country. The European Union will continue to use all available instruments to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's stability and progress. While the overall security situation has remained relatively calm and stable, stability has not been fully entrenched. The European Union welcomes the continued presence of Operation Althea, which retains the capability to contribute to the deterrence capacity of the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities if the situation so requires, while focusing on capacity-building and training. In this regard, as part of the overall EU strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union confirms its readiness at this stage to maintain the executive military role of Operation Althea to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment, under a renewed United Nations mandate.

The European Union invited its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to present a strategic review in autumn next year, as a basis for internal discussion within the EU on options for the future of the Operation, also bearing in mind Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress in its EU integration process and taking into account the security situation on the ground.

As the country's stability continues to strengthen and further progress is achieved in reforms and on the EU path, the European Union looks forward to continuing, in the appropriate forum, the discussion with the international community on the reconfiguration of the international presence. In this regard, the European Union calls on the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet the outstanding objectives and conditions for the closure of the Office of the High Representative.

In conclusion, over the two decades that the Council has been discussing the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have witnessed substantial progress in the country in all fields: stability, democracy, security, economic development and EU integration. Still, much more needs to be accomplished in terms of improving the daily lives of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of reconciliation among citizens, as well as the responsible behaviour of all members of the political leadership in the country. But we believe that the progress the country achieves on its EU integration process will catalyse reconciliation and the resolution of chronic issues, addressing in parallel urgent demands for comprehensive reforms.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Serbia.

Mr. Vujic (Serbia): Regional stability and the development of all-round cooperation with its neighbours continue to be foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Serbia. In this regard, my country perceives Bosnia and Herzegovina as a key bilateral partner in the pursuit of the policy of reconciliation and regional cooperation in the Balkans. The Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are parts of the same process of enlargement of and accession to the European Union (EU), and we welcome and applaud each and every step forward made by our neighbour in that direction, for we consider that the strengthening of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans and South-East Europe in all its aspects is a beeline to membership of the Union. The potentials for such cooperation are multiple and many, all the more so as the policy agendas and visions of the future of the two countries are interchangeable, and sometimes even identical.

The Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the tragic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina some 20 years ago, has been the cornerstone of regional peace and stability. The Republic of Serbia signed the Agreement and is one of its guarantors. Abidance by the letter and spirit of the Agreement is as important today as it has been all these years. After all, it is only by honouring the Agreement and scrupulously implementing its

provisions that we can achieve genuine reconciliation, peace and stability, and, by extension, a better life for the people in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Republic of Serbia.

Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States is among the most important principles of international law and is a standard feature of international relations. In a region that had the ill-fortune of being riven by war, ethnic strife and political upheaval in its not-so-distant past, such principles and the future are of particular importance. A next-door neighbour and partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Serbia has therefore been staunchly committed to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, scrupulously strengthened and promoted close cooperation and worked consistently on establishing the bonds of friendship and building mutual confidence, which will not only benefit the relations between the two countries, but will also bring us closer to the family of European nations: integration and membership of the European Union.

But not every voyage is always unobstructed plain sailing. In recent months, political winds lifted the ship of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and messages that we believe belong in the past were sent. Relations among Bosnia and Herzegovina constituent peoples and its entities were unnecessarily disrupted and the constructive approach that we had all come to expect was not visible. Yet, just as it always has in the past, the Republic of Serbia made every effort to stabilize the situation, calm political passions and overcome differences by agreement, with one all-important goal in mind — that of maintaining peace, bringing progress and ensuring a better future for the people of the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It did so by scrupulously respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbour and, lest it should slip the Council's attention, the effort was recognized far and wide.

Ever since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, it has been proved time and again that the best way to address and resolve outstanding internal issues and the subjects of disagreements among the constituent peoples and the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina is though dialogue and agreement. In my country's opinion, one such issue is the marking of the Republic of Srpska Day. We therefore support active dialogue as the best way to find acceptable and applicable solutions — a dialogue that implies the readiness of all sides to mutually respect and understand one another. That is in the best interests of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the only way for the country's integration into larger organizations, including the European Union.

As an EU candidate country, the Republic of Serbia has begun the EU membership negotiation process and undertaken relevant reforms. It considers them as policy priorities, yet, all the same, it supports its neighbours in their own activities, in the belief that they will bring about integration in those countries, as well as in the entire region of the Western Balkans, in the European Union. To that end, the Republic of Serbia welcomes the decision of the European Union of 20 September to accept the application of Bosnia and Herzegovina for membership of the European Union, as well as the agreements reached inside the country providing for coordination mechanisms within the process of European integration. We are ready to intensify our cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina in a field in which formal conditions exist, including a relevant memorandum of understanding and an action plan. Let me point out that ongoing cooperation has evolved within the framework of regional programmes financed by the Instrument of Pre-Accession funds.

The Western Balkans has embarked irreversibly on the road to reconciliation, stability and integration, and European integration in particular. Yet what we need now, perhaps more than ever before, is to build mutual confidence among the three constituent peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its two entities. The country is home to a large number of Serbs, and it is our earnest expectation and hope that they will cooperate with their compatriot Bosniacs and Croats ever more closely and intensely. Proceeding from the Dayton Agreement, Serbia maintains, develops and deepens transparent relations with the Republic of Srpska, while all along striving to establish and expand cooperation with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. In that context, building confidence and promoting understanding among the peoples and entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina are of paramount importance for their work together and the taking of joint decisions aimed at bringing about a better life for all of the citizens of that country.

The Republic of Serbia has always worked avidly on establishing better communications and promoting political dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

considering them the basic instruments for the creation of positive relations between the two countries. To that end, many State or Government officials from the Republic of Serbia visited Bosnia and Herzegovina or played host to their respective counterparts.

On 29 May, the President of the Republic of Serbia attended the summit of the Brdo-Brijuni process in Sarajevo and the Summit100 Business Leaders in Southeast Europe the day before. During the visit, the President of the Republic of Serbia reiterated the importance that the Republic of Serbia attaches to the promotion of regional cooperation and relations, particularly with Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the two sides expressed readiness to prepare an official visit of the Serbian President to Sarajevo.

On 20 September, speaking in New York alongside the Mayor of Srebrenica to the panel on reconciliation in the Western Balkans 20 years after the Dayton Agreement, organized by the Clinton Foundation, the Serbian Prime Minister said that we needed each other and that we had to live together, not beside each other. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia added that he would otherwise be concerned about the future of the Western Balkans.

On 25 July, the Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia visited Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Ivica Dačić, led a Serbian delegation to a ministerial meeting of the Central European Initiative in Banja Luka on 16 June. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina also visited Belgrade on 26 July.

Traditionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been one of the Republic of Serbia's most important foreign trade partners. Both countries are very interested in building and rebuilding infrastructure and a bridge over the Drina River between Ljubovija in Serbia, and Bratunac in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in the process of construction, while the work on energy-generating projects on that river is ongoing. Cooperation between Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the field of joint ventures is also being intensified. A meeting of the Trilateral Trade Committee of the Republic of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey and an accompanying business forum were held in Ankara on 25 October, and a joint trade and tourist office of the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina was opened in Istanbul on 26 October.

Bringing people together and linking regions and their economies is the most important task that the Republic of Serbia has undertaken to promote in the Western Balkans. I trust and believe that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Republic of Serbia's other neighbours, are agreed that we need to continue to work on delivering results. We made a commitment to improve regional cooperation and to take measures to realize numerous projects, especially in the fields of infrastructure, transport and energy. Alongside the commitment of my country to peace, reconciliation, stability and cooperation, they will help us strengthen the bonds of friendship and good-neighbourliness and facilitate our journey to regional and transregional integration.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Croatia.

Mr. Drobnjak (Croatia): Let be start by congratulating you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council this month. I also thank the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Inzko, for his important report (S/2016/911, annx) and his valuable work.

Croatia aligns itself with statement delivered by the observer of the European Union (EU) and I would like to make some remarks in its national capacity.

As a signatory to the Dayton Peace Agreement, Croatia bears a special responsibility towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina's first EU neighbour, also bears a special responsibility towards Croats as one of the constituent peoples, whose genuine institutional equality with the other two peoples and all citizens will enable a more functional, viable and efficient, and thus stable, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina are therefore a foreign policy priority and its integration into the European Union and NATO a strategic goal of the Republic of Croatia. This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first country that the new Prime Minister of Croatia visited after taking office. A stable, peaceful and prosperous Bosnia and Herzegovina contributes to the stability of South-East Europe as well as to that of the European Union as a whole.

The European and Euro-Atlantic perspective of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a goal that Croatia will

continue to staunchly support. We see the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the EU and NATO as the best catalyst for addressing internal outstanding issues as well as a safeguard for ensuring further democratization, the strengthening of institutions, freedom of the media and an independent judiciary.

We welcome the September conclusions of the Council of the EU, which tasked the Commission with preparing an opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's application for membership in the EU. This is an important milestone for Bosnia and Herzegovina because it reaffirms its commitment to the process of European integration, including European values and standards. This important development is the result of the hard work and commitment of the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we commend them for that.

Steps forward have been taken on the Reform Agenda-related laws that have been adopted at both the State and entity level. The credibility and sustainability of reforms must be sustained in the interest of all citizens, the State itself and regional stability.

The agreement on the coordination mechanism achieved in July is of great importance for the credible implementation of the Stabilization Association Agreement and, later, the negotiations with the EU. Croatia is looking forward to the finalization of the process of the adaptation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with a swift signing and the provisional application of the Protocol.

We can say that the new EU approach has proved effective and is yielding its initial results. Additionally, it has helped Bosnia and Herzegovina step out of the stalemate and bring the country to the next stage of its relations with the European Union.

We have invested a great deal in Bosnia and Herzegovina's stability and in fostering the EU agenda through all of the EU's instruments, including through the Special Representative and Operation Althea of the European Union-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR). It is important for the EU to remain actively engaged in preserving safety and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina; that is why we support the extension of the executive mandate of EUFOR Althea and its substantial contribution.

In order for Bosnia and Herzegovina successfully to address all of the challenges that it will face at the next stage of the European integration process, all available European tools and policies should be put at its disposal. Croatia will, for its part, make available its expertise and know-how from our accession process.

The progress made on the European path has not been mirrored by internal developments. On the contrary, some of the internal political dynamics are cause for concern. We have said it before and we will say it again: the referendum held in Republika Srpska runs counter to the decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and undermines the stability of the country. Such activities challenge the founding principles of the Dayton Peace Agreement and are unconstitutional and dangerous.

Local elections, while on the whole conducted in a peaceful and orderly way, revealed divisions and mistrust in an environment in which it is crucial to promote tolerance and coexistence. Moreover, the incident that took place in Stolac involved a violent physical assault against a representative of the Central Election Commission. Any violence or election irregularities should be condemned in the clearest possible terms. We trust the local institutions to find institutional solutions to problems as well as to investigate and prosecute unlawful activities.

We also regret the fact that the elections in Mostar were not held together with the local elections in the rest of the country, on 2 October. We encourage the finding of a solution for the implementation of the Constitutional Court ruling on Mostar, so that its citizens are not deprived of their right to vote.

Croatia encourages the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement the *Sejdić and Finci* ruling in order to move forward its European agenda and contribute to establishing a democratic and well-functioning society in which the equality of all constituent peoples and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina is guaranteed and safeguarded.

Finally, the rule of law must be promoted and protected, including the fight against corruption and organized crime, while all outstanding deficiencies of the judiciary must be addressed. In this regard, the need for the depoliticization of the judiciary and for its impartiality and independence, especially in the prosecution of war crimes, should receive strong focus.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, a State with a 1,000-kilometre-long land border with Croatia and the

EU, remains our priority, and we shall spare no effort to help our neighbour on its path towards enhanced stability and long-term prosperity.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.7804

Security Council

Seventy-first year

Provisional

7804th meeting

Wednesday, 9 November 2016, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Seck	(Senegal)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Lucas
	China	Mr. Wu Haitao
	Egypt	Mr. Kandeel
	France	Mr. Delattre
	Japan	Mr. Bessho
	Malaysia	Mrs. Adnin
	New Zealand	Mr. Van Bohemen
	Russian Federation	Mr. Safronkov
	Spain	Mr. Oyarzun Marchesi
	Ukraine	Mr. Vitrenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Wilson
	United States of America	Ms. Sison
	Uruguay	Mr. Rosselli
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Mr. Suárez Moreno

Agenda

The situation concerning Iraq

Twelfth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2016/885)

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016) (S/2016/897)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections* should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).

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The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation concerning Iraq

Twelfth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013) (S/2016/885)

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016) (S/2016/897)

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Iraq to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Ján Kubiš, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/885, which contains the twelfth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013), as well as to document S/2016/897, which contains the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2299 (2016).

I now give the floor to Mr. Kubiš.

Mr. Kubiš: Let me start by congratulating the Iraqi security forces, the Peshmerga, the Popular Mobilization Forces and allied tribal and local volunteers, supported by the international community, on the steady progress in their historic battle to liberate Mosul. We honour the martyrs who have paid the highest sacrifice for a free Iraq. This liberation operation marks the beginning of the end of the so-called Da'esh caliphate in Iraq. Increased support of the civilian population for this and previous liberation operations speaks best about the fact that the liberation of Iraq is a fight of all Iraqis in their unity for the future of their country as the common house of all Iraqi people living together in justice, equality, peace and tolerance.

We are witnessing the birth of a new Iraq. Let us not forget that the people of Iraq also fight on our behalf in defence of human values shared by the whole world against the terrorism and intolerance represented by Da'esh and its underpinning ideology. Today, we also stand here in solidarity with the abducted, abused and violated women and girls, their families and communities. Women and children are the first victims of Da'esh crimes, and we insist on full accountability for the human rights abuses and atrocities perpetrated by Da'esh against civilians. We call for justice for all the victims of these heinous crimes, which may amount to crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide.

Based on lessons learned from the past, the Government of Iraq and the leadership of the Iraqi security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces have prioritized the protection of civilians in an unprecedented way in the planning and conduct of the military operations. Also, the Shia religious leadership, the Marja'iya, has issued strong statements in that regard.

The campaign for Mosul's liberation is in its twenty-fifth day and is progressing well. The progress is planned and controlled in order to avoid excessive risks, notably to the civilian population. The battle has already moved to the city of Mosul. Nevertheless, it is expected that the urban warfare may take some time, well into the harsh winter period. As expected, a desperate Da'esh has increased its terrorist activities throughout the country, mostly against civilians. It has also carried out several complex attacks in Kirkuk and Rutba, and is planning more.

There has been unprecedented cooperation over the planning and conduct of the Mosul liberation operation between the Governments of Baghdad and Erbil. As confirmed during the visit of President Barzani to Baghdad, his first since 2013, and the visit of Prime Minister Al Abadi to Erbil in recent days, this cooperation and dialogue have expanded to also cover a range of political, economic and administrative issues and arrangements on which future Baghdad-Erbil relations will be built. As the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, Nechirvan Barzani, has said, "We need to find a new formula for coexistence in Iraq".

Leaders of all components, communities and groups, including civil society and women, will have to address numerous grievances of the past and find a way

to live together, after Da'esh, in justice and equality for all. Reconciliation at both the community and the national levels is the way to make military victories against Da'esh sustainable and to make Iraq truly peaceful and united.

Encouragingly, the head of the Iraqi National Alliance, Ammar Al-Hakim, recently confirmed that the National Alliance, as the largest parliamentary bloc, is planning to submit

> "an important document for national compromise that considers an important political project to be implemented in conjunction with the liberation of Mosul to unify all Iraqis".

Al-Hakim has called for the building of a country of coexistence where all Iraqis feel compelled to defend the unity of their lands, peoples and democracy. He also stressed that the division of Iraq should be rejected in all circumstances, and emphasized the importance of constitutional obligations.

Credible reports suggest that Da'esh has been forcing tens of thousands of women, children and men from their homes in sub-districts around Mosul and forcibly relocating civilians inside the city itself, effectively using them as human shields. Forced out at gunpoint or killed if they resist or try to flee, these people are reportedly being moved to strategic Da'esh locations, including Tall Afar. Thus far, there have been only a few sporadic reports of violations committed by pro-Government forces, mostly of individuals committing ad hoc acts of revenge against captured Da'esh fighters or persons accused of supporting Da'esh. I am nevertheless concerned about possible vengeful violence, particularly by tribes and minorities who suffered atrocities committed by Da'esh supporters, and also against their own tribal members who joined Da'esh.

Since last December, the presence of Turkish troops in Camp Bashiqa, which is considered by Iraq to be a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, remains unresolved. Although both countries have endeavoured to contain the situation through diplomatic channels and bilateral mechanisms, there has been no visible progress so far. Public exchanges from Baghdad and Ankara continue to escalate. This is even more disturbing now as the Mosul liberation operation is in full swing, with all its risks and complexities. I urge the Governments of Turkey and Iraq to tone down their rhetoric and accelerate their bilateral efforts to find a mutually acceptable resolution of this problem and related issues in a way that will fully respect the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of Iraq, and to ensure that all activities that take place in Iraq are conducted in coordination and with the full agreement of the Government of Iraq, while taking into account the security concerns of both countries.

As of 9 November, up to 42,000 people have been internally displaced as a result of the Mosul operation. At present, more than 20,000 people are being supported at existing camps. The remaining 30 per cent have found shelter in host communities and public facilities. A total of seven emergency sites are ready to receive 40,000 more people. At least 450,000 more spaces are under construction. In July, the humanitarian country team issued a flash appeal requesting $280 million to prepare for Mosul. Close to 80 per cent of the required amount has been received, although most funding came on line only recently, delaying preparations until nearly the start of the operation.

Stabilizing the city of Mosul following its liberation will be a daunting task. Experiences from other liberated cities, notably Ramadi, point to the possibility of widespread destruction. Extensive contamination from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is already reported. The United Nations Development Programme Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization is coordinating with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to conduct rapid threat-impact assessments in key neighbourhoods and expedite clearance of IEDs in the liberated areas. Also, UNMAS is entirely reliant on bilateral contributions to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action. The mine action community will require $112 million in 2017, depending on the rate of at which areas are retaken. This is almost entirely unfunded at the moment.

Allow me to turn now to the twelfth report of the Secretary-General on the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives (S/2016/885). I would like to commend the Government of Iraq, and particularly its Ministry of Defence, for bolstering activities geared towards finding missing persons, injecting much-needed energy and momentum into the file.

A call for witnesses that was broadcast on local and satellite television channels by the Iraqi Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs on 18 September, inviting all those with information pertaining to missing Kuwaiti persons and property to come forward, has resulted in hundreds of phone calls from citizens claiming to know the whereabouts of both. That information is currently being verified.

I would like to highly acknowledge the Government of Kuwait, which has consistently shown support and understanding with regard to the challenges faced by the Government of Iraq over the years.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Kubiš for his briefing.

The representative of Uruguay has asked for the floor to make a statement.

Mr. Rosselli (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): I thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jan Kubis, for his briefing. Uruguay acknowledges his challenging work and that of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, which, working in close coordination with the Iraqi Government, is carrying out the important task of addressing the various crises currently affecting the country.

The plight of the Iraqi people is deteriorating. As mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/897), armed conflicts, acts of violence and terrorism have continued to claim many victims. Iraq continues to face multiple and great humanitarian, political, economic and security challenges, the principal among which is the fight against terrorism. Once again, Uruguay reiterates the urgent need to face the terrorist scourge in an effective manner, within the framework of international law and together with the United Nations. Uruguay supports the efforts of the Iraqi Government, with the help of the international coalition, to combat the grave threat posed by the Islamic State to Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and its civilian population.

Those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and, possibly, genocide committed against the civilian population must sooner or later be held accountable and brought to justice for such atrocities. Like in Syria, we are concerned about new information that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham may have used chemical weapons in its attacks. Uruguay vigorously condemns any use of chemical weapons against civil populations and calls for an in-depth investigation into such claims.

As we have warned for many months, the retaking of Mosul has the potential to become one of the greatest humanitarian crises in recent times. In the great struggle to reclaim Mosul, the Iraqi Government must include the protection of civilians and an immediate response to the humanitarian emergency as part of its military offensives. The reconstruction of civilian infrastructure, the normal provision of services and the gradual return of internally displaced persons to their homes must be priorities for the Government.

We urge the parties to the conflict to respect and protect civilians, including women, children, persons with disabilities and the elderly, respect human rights and allow access of emergency humanitarian aid, according to international humanitarian law. Lastly, we commend the intense efforts being undertaken by humanitarian agencies to protect civilians in Mosul. In that regard, we encourage them to continue their efforts. Nonetheless, it remains clear that military operations alone will not eliminate the terrorist threat in Iraq. Iraqi political leaders must overcome their differences and mutual distrust and reach consensus on a single vision for national reconciliation, without which, it will be very difficult in the future to heal the wounds, caused by so many years of conflict, from which its people continue to bleed.

The President (*spoke in French*): I give to the floor to the representative of Iraq.

Mr. Alhakim (Iraq) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, allow me to congratulate Senegal on presiding over the Security Council this month, its tremendous efforts and the transparent manner in which it conducts the work of the Council. I commend the Russian Federation for its work during the presidency of the Council last month. I thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Mr. Jan Kubiš, for his briefing, the efforts, dedication and excellent work of his team in Baghdad and New York.

On behalf of the people and Government of Iraq, I would like to congratulate the American people on Mr. Trump's election as President-elect of the United States of America. We pledge to work with him and his team. We also thank His Excellency President Barack Obama, Vice-President Biden and President Obama's representative and entire team for their support to Iraq

and assistance in the war on terrorism. We also thank them for their leadership of the international coalition that has supported the Iraqi armed forces so that we could liberate our territories from the clutches of the terrorist gangs of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). We also commend the logistical and financial support, the training of our armed forces and the humanitarian assistance provided by the United States, in addition to fundraising activities that raised more than $2 billion so that we could rebuild the infrastructure in those cities. The United States will remain a strong ally and friend of the Iraqi people and Government. We will work hard with the new Administration to enhance that relationship.

The Iraqi Government provides all of the necessary means to ensure that the efforts of its security forces meet with success as they combat terrorism and work to retake all of the territories under the control of ISIL terrorist gangs. The Prime Minister of Iraq and Commander-in-Chief, Mr. Al Abadi, has directly supervised those operations from day one. He oversees all joint field operations and security sectors with a view to defeating the ISIL terrorist gangs. In the past few weeks, Iraqi forces, with the assistance of the international coalition, have liberated the towns of Al Qayyarah and Sharqat, in addition to other villages in the Ninawa and Salah al-Din governorates, which were under the control of ISIL terrorists.

My Government commends the achievements made in Mosul by the Iraqi army, the Peshmerga, the People's Mobilization Forces and the tribal forces, through the joint operation command and with the assistance of the international coalition. They have been victorious in liberating most villages and towns on the periphery of Mosul and have made incursions into the Left Bank. They have liberated a number of neighbourhoods in the centre of the city, and work assiduously to demine areas in preparation for the return of internally displaced persons.

More than 900,000 Iraqis were able to return to their homes in areas that were liberated from ISIL. That was made possible with financial support from the international coalition. The areas were secured before the return of internally displace persons. That is in addition to providing jobs and services so that normalcy could be restored. In Tikrit, 95 per cent of the population has returned. More than 200,000 citizens have returned to their homes in Ramadi. More than 90,000 citizens have returned to Fallujah.

The Iraqi House of Representatives voted against the incursion of Kurdish forces into Iraq's territory and rejects the presence of any forces on Iraqi territory without the approval of the central Government. It considers the Turkish forces in Camp Bashiqa to be aggressive forces of occupation and has given instructions to have them thrown out of Iraqi territory if they do not heed Iraq's calls. We also rejected the Turkish Parliament's extension of the presence of those forces. Furthermore, we condemn the racist statements of the Turkish Prime Minister, which gave rise to sedition among the Iraqi people. He maliciously attempted to undermine Iraq, which is winning in its fight against the ISIL terrorist gangs, who receive support in the form of logistics, human resources, funding and health care from Ankara, which is trading in our artefacts and oil with with ISIL terrorist groups.

We have called on the Council to take immediate steps to throw the Turkish forces out of our territory. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Al-Jaafari, in his letter dated 14 October 2016, informed the President of the Security Council that we reserve the right to act in self-defence and to apply the rules of engagement with the aggressive Turkish forces in locations that are close to our points of engagement with ISIL.

Iraq rejects the provocative statements made by Turkish leaders against Iraq and their flagrant intervention and occupation of Iraqi territory. Iraq reaffirms the historic links between the peoples of Turkey and Iraq, but we reject these statements, which have become more explicit and clearly indicate the intentions of Ankara officials who claim that the Iraqi cities of Kirkuk and Mosul were once Turkish cities. The Security Council must firmly counter these expansionist expressions of greed against a State that is a founding Member of the United Nations and a country with full sovereignty.

We urge the countries of the world to implement resolutions 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015) and 2253 (2015), in particular with regard to stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters from more than 120 States Members of the United Nations. Efforts must be made to staunch the funding and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters and the logistical support provided to them, including weapons, food and non-food stuff, medical equipment, communication, transportation and weapons, in particular the material used in the manufacturing of improvised explosive devices and landmines from neighbouring countries. The Security

Council sanctions committee should undertake its role to limit the capacities of ISIL terrorist gangs, dry up their sources of funding and monitor the countries that provide funding, support and arms to the ISIL terrorist gangs, which engage in cross-border trade, in particular in Iraqi oil and artefacts.

Iraq is working with its friends and partners to identify possible options for collecting and archiving evidence on ISIL crimes and is strengthening its national capacity in this regard. We value the efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, which have identified the main areas of capacity-building in Iraq in the field of combatting terrorism through their visi, in September 2015 and successive meetings, in particular the meeting held in Baghdad on 25 October, with a view to helping the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and the relevant Iraqi authorities and to assisting and coordinating the efforts of all stakeholders in the area of technical support to Iraq in countering terrorism.

The people and the Government of Iraq thank all countries of the international coalition, in particular the United States of America, the countries of the European Union and others that are not part of the international coalition. They have combatted terrorism and provided military and logistical support to the Iraqi security forces in the framework of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Iraq and in full cooperation with its security forces. We value their contribution to restoring stability and rebuilding areas that have been liberated from ISIL so that we could alleviate the humanitarian suffering of internally displaced persons through demining activities and the removal of ordinances, in addition to the provision of basic support services.

We call on Member States to fund their programmes in Iraq. We continue to promote our relations with neighbouring and Arab States, in particular the State of Kuwait, Jordan, Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in addition to our continued communication with the Syrian Government.

The Government of Iraq is committed to strive tirelessly for progress on the issue of the missing citizens and archives of Kuwait. The national and joint committees are meeting with witnesses in order to gain a greater understanding of the plight of the missing citizens of Kuwait and other States. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence broadcast on local and satellite television and use other means of media to atttract more witnesses. Field visits are carried out in order to obtain more reliable information and achieve tangible results in locating the burial sites of the missing persons and Kuwaiti prisoners. We have held many joint technical meetings, excavations have been undertaken and witnesses interviewed. From 14 to 18 July, we excavated 120 locations in Karbala, but found no human remains. The plan of the Ministry of Defence of Iraq is to carry out excavations in Khamisiyah, Radwaniyah, Ayn al-Tamr and Sulaymaniyah, as well as in another location in Salman Pak.

With a view to promoting brotherly relations with Kuwait, we have held, in New York from 24 to 28 October, a joint technical workshop on the new maps of the internationally acknowledged boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait. The workshop was held under the supervision of the United Nations. The two delegations have reached an agreement to start an 18-month project for the creation of new maps.

Iraq appreciates the genuine efforts of the United States of America and the Russian Federation to reach a comprehensive solution in Syria for the Syrian people who have suffered for six years from terrorism, destruction, killings and displacement. There must be communication to reach an intra-Syrian solution that is satisfactory to all parties. There must be an end to the terrorist gangs — and the international and regional support they receive — and the recruitment of terrorists. We call on Syria's neighbours to respect their boundaries. They must close the borders to the terrorists and should not provide them with logistical support as such actions would be in violation of Security Council resolutions.

Iraq notes with satisfaction the relocation of the inhabitants of Camp Liberty to other States. In that regard, we value the efforts of Ms. Jane Holl Lute of the United States of America and the Republic of Albania for facilitating that process and carrying it through to its completion.

In conclusion, we thank the Special Representative Mr. Ján Kubiš and his team for their efforts and for the advice they provide to the Iraqi Government. We are also grateful for the activities of United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq for an Iraq that is stable, unified and free from terrorism.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.7805

Security Council

Seventy-first year

Provisional

7805th meeting
Wednesday, 9 November 2016, 3 p.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Seck	(Senegal)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Gimolieca
	China	Mr. Xu Zhongsheng
	Egypt	Mr. Kandeel
	France	Mr. Lamek
	Japan	Mr. Akahori
	Malaysia	Mrs. Adnin
	New Zealand	Mr. Walbridge
	Russian Federation	Mr. Zagaynov
	Spain	Mr. Gasso Matoses
	Ukraine	Mr. Fesko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Ms. Mulvein
	United States of America	Ms. Sison
	Uruguay	Mr. Rosselli
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Mr. Suárez Moreno

Agenda

The situation in Somalia

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia (S/2016/843)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. *Corrections* should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).

16-37186 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Somalia

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia (S/2016/843)

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Somalia to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2016/939, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay and the United States of America.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/843, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.

The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Angola, China, Egypt, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

The President (*spoke in French*): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2316 (2016).

I give the floor to the representative of Somalia.

Mr. Yusuf (Somalia): I would like begin by congratulating you, Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of November. I would also like to express my thanks and esteem to the outgoing President, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, for his able guidance of the Council's work in the month of October.

Somalia extends its deepest gratitude to the members of the Security Council for their valuable support in Somalia in all areas, including addressing piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. The robust commitment of the international community has resulted in a massive reduction in piracy in recent years, and we particularly welcome the recent release of several long-held hostages and call for the release of all remaining hostages.

We ask Member States and international organizations for continued support to address the root causes of piracy, as the Secretary-General's most recent report notes:

> "The drivers that have triggered piracy remain unchanged since 2005. The lack of economic opportunity has been identified by the Federal Government and international partners as the principal driver of pirate recruitment." (*S/2016/843, para. 8*)

Additionally, we welcome the acknowledgement in the text that the phenomenon of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Somalia's exclusive economic zone results in a loss of revenue and can lead to destabilization in coastal communities. We welcome the adoption of resolution 2316 (2016) and want to assure the Council of our full cooperation on all matters, including piracy.

The meeting rose at 3.10 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.7806

Security Council

Seventy-first year

Provisional

7806th meeting

Wednesday, 9 November 2016, 3.10 p.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Seck	(Senegal)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Gimolieca
	China	Mr. Xu Zhongsheng
	Egypt	Mr. Kandeel
	France	Mr. Lamek
	Japan	Mr. Akahori
	Malaysia	Mrs. Adnin
	New Zealand	Mr. Taula
	Russian Federation	Mr. Zagaynov
	Spain	Mr. Gasso Matoses
	Ukraine	Mr. Vitrenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Ms. Mulvein
	United States of America	Ms. Sison
	Uruguay	Mr. Rosselli
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Mr. Suárez Moreno

Agenda

The situation in Libya

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16-37193 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Libya

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Libya to participate in this meeting.

In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

I now give the floor to Ms. Bensouda.

Ms. Bensouda: I welcome the opportunity to once again engage with this body as I present my Office's twelfth report on the situation in Libya, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1970 (2011).

Allow me at the outset to emphasize that the Office of the Prosecutor is grateful for the support it received during the reporting period in conducting its work on the situation in Libya. My Office has received that critical support from an increasing number of both States parties and non-States parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), including members of the Council. That cooperation has greatly facilitated our work vis-à-vis Libya and must be recognized.

To cite one example, the Council will recall that during my last briefing on 26 May (see S/PV.7698), I reported on my official visit to Cairo and on the positive dialogue and engagement between my Office and the Egyptian authorities on several matters. In conformity with its mandate, my Office continued to pursue issues of mutual interest with the Egyptian authorities, including in relation to the situation in Libya and the challenges facing the region of North Africa, such as the security and destabilizing threats posed by terrorism and extremist groups, such as the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, or Da'esh. Since my visit, my Office has continued to liaise with the Arab Republic of Egypt in order to advance our shared goals of bringing justice to the victims of grave crimes.

I am hopeful that in my next report in May 2017, I will be able to report tangible results of that positive engagement. I am confident that the Arab Republic of Egypt will be a leading example by building on the existing level of cooperation and continuing and strengthening its voluntary cooperation with the Court.

Let me provide a brief update on the Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi and Abdullah al-Senussi cases. Following that update, I will discuss the current situation in Libya and my Office's plans for further investigations.

As the Council will recall, on 26 April, my Office filed a request with the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court for an order directing the Registry to transmit a request to Mr. Al-'Ajami Al-'Atiri for the arrest and surrender of Mr. Al-Qadhafi to the ICC. Mr Al-'Atiri commands the Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq Battalion in Zintan, Libya, and has control of Mr. Al-Qadhafi. On 2 June, the Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the Registry of the Court to communicate with the Libyan authorities as to whether the request for arrest and surrender of Mr. Al-Qadhafi could be served directly on Mr. Al-'Atiri either by the Libyan authorities or the Court. Recently, on 28 October, the Registry filed an update on the progress of the Pre-Trial Chamber's order. That update contained in a confidential annex a reply from the Libyan Attorney-General's Office, dated 29 September. In the update, the Registry sought guidance on what further course of action it should take to communicate with the relevant Libyan authorities. My Office is awaiting the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision on the next steps in relation to that matter.

Also in relation to the Al-Qadhafi case, in July media reports suggested that Mr. Al-Qadhafi had been released from detention in Zintan on the basis of a grant of amnesty. I must report that reliable sources, including the Libyan Prosecutor-General's Office, have confirmed that information to be incorrect. From the information available to the Office, it is clear that Mr. Al-Qadhafi remains in Zintan and is still outside the custody and control of the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord. My Office again calls on the Libyan authorities to ensure that they do everything possible to have Mr. Al-Qadhafi transferred to the ICC without any further delay, in keeping with their obligations under the Rome Statute.

Regarding the Al-Senussi case, my Office awaits the full report of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya on the conduct of the domestic trial and will study

it carefully when it is available. At this stage, my Office remains of the view that no new facts have arisen that negate the basis on which the Pre-Trial Chamber found Mr. Al-Senussi's case inadmissible before the Court. As I have repeatedly stated, including before the Council, my Office will continue to review its assessment on the matter as and when new information becomes available in accordance with article 19 (10) of the Rome Statute.

Allow me to offer a few words about the current challenging situation in Libya. In short, the situation continues to deteriorate and innocent civilians continue to bear the brunt of the fighting between the warring factions vying for control of Libyan territory. The current state of affairs in which civilians are victimized is completely unacceptable. As stated in my Office's twelfth report to the Council, multiple conflicts across Libya consume the country and parties to the conflict allegedly continue to commit serious crimes.

The Council has repeatedly condemned crimes allegedly committed by Da'esh, Ansar Al-Sharia and other parties to the conflict in Libya. Executions, including allegedly by Da'esh, reportedly account for the largest numbers of killings during the reporting period. Reports of mass graves are on the rise. There are also multiple reports of civilian deaths from indiscriminate air strikes, shelling and gunfire. Abductions and unlawful detentions continue. The number of internally displaced persons in Libya is believed to number approximately 350,000. Finally, Libya is a major hub for the illegal migration trade, which I will discuss in more detail shortly.

I must also take this opportunity to join the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and others in strongly condemning the attempt in October to seize the headquarters of the High Council of State in Tripoli. I share the view reflected in the 25 October joint communiqué issued by the League of Arab States, the African Union and UNSMIL that such actions are detrimental to the stability and security of the country. The persistent instability and armed conflict prevent my Office from conducting investigations within Libyan territory in relation to both existing and potential new cases. Nevertheless, my Office continuously analyses the security situation through a variety of sources in order to identify opportunities to investigate in situ in Libya. The Office will continue to work in partnership with the Libyan Prosecutor-General's office to find a solution to safely conduct investigations in Libya as soon as possible.

In relation to those efforts, my Office notes resolution 2291 (2016), and in particular the Council's request to all parties to cooperate with UNSMIL and ensure the security of United Nations and associated personnel in Libya. I urge the Council to expressly extend the request to include ICC personnel conducting investigations in Libya. Doing so will help facilitate one of my Office's major goals of ensuring that our investigators return to their work inside Libya as soon as possible. My Office is committed to intensifying its efforts to deter the current climate of impunity in Libya. Notwithstanding the many difficulties posed by the investigations of the Libya situation, including in particular resource challenges, my Office will do all it can to significantly expand investigations in 2017. The new investigations will consider bringing charges for recent and current instances of alleged serious criminal activity falling under the Court's jurisdiction, which could potentially include alleged crimes committed by Da'esh and affiliated groups.

My commitment to making Libya a priority situation in 2017 is compelled by a number of factors, including the widespread violence, lawlessness and impunity that currently prevail in many parts of the country; a desire to provide justice for victims of Rome Statute crimes and alleviate the suffering of those civilians who continue to endure the tragic consequences of the conflict in Libya; and, finally, the opportunities for further investigation that the Office has identified. Furthermore, my Office's ongoing efforts in regard to the arrest of an additional suspect or suspects have advanced significantly. I can report to the Council that my Office intends to apply for new warrants of arrest under seal as soon as practicable and hopes to have new arrest warrants served in the near future. The timely execution of the new arrest warrants will be crucial, require coordinated efforts by States and may also require support from the Council.

My Office cannot accomplish its goals in Libya acting alone. Addressing the widespread criminal activity that continues to beset Libya requires a coordinated approach and joint efforts by all concerned. It is with that in mind that my Office continues its efforts of working with our partners to develop coordinated investigative and prosecutorial strategies to close the impunity gap for ICC crimes in Libya. Pursuant to its Strategic Goal 9, the Office convened a two-day operational level meeting in The Hague in October, bringing together judicial and investigative agencies

from several States. The productive meeting resulted in agreement in principle that the Office would work collectively with the States with a view to augmenting their respective, independent investigative efforts.

In particular, the Office is engaging with those agencies investigating individuals involved in organized crime and facilitating and financing illegal migration through Libya. The importance of investigating alleged crimes related to illegal migration is reflected in resolution 2312 (2016), adopted by the Council on 6 October. In 2017, my Office intends to step up its cooperation with States in relation to that issue and will continue to study the feasibility of opening an investigation into alleged criminal acts against refugees and migrants in Libya, including any alleged acts of sexual violence or crimes against children that fall under the Court's jurisdiction.

In discussing collaboration, I must also acknowledge with gratitude that the Office's investigative efforts have greatly benefitted from the operational investigative support and cooperation that it continues to receive from the Libyan Prosecutor-General's office. Regional States, including in particular the Republic of Tunisia and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, have also continued to cooperate with my Office in its investigations in Libya, for which my Office is grateful. Exceptionally, certain States have proved far less cooperative, and I take this opportunity to urge all States that have not responded to our requests for assistance to do so without further delay.

Despite the challenges Libya that currently faces, certain initiatives demonstrate that peaceful negotiated outcomes to conflicts are achievable and must be supported. One commendable example is the 31 August Misrata-Tawergha Agreement on the Return of the Displaced and Compensation of those Affected. My Office encourages other such initiatives aimed at improving the lives of the people of Libya. My Office continues to receive many delegations from various parts of Libya, who represent civilians adversely affected by the conflict. I welcome the opportunity to meet with those delegations and hear directly about the experiences of the Libyan civilians whom they represent.

In the same vein, the Office also continues to receive, from nongovernmental organizations, private citizens and other sources, information and potential evidence of acts that have allegedly caused grave harm to civilian populations. In particular, those include attacks that may adversely impact the civilian population, preventing them from fleeing violence and obtaining access to food, medicine and other basic needs. As a case in point, my Office followed with concern the recent 6 October statement regarding the residential district of Ganfouda in Benghazi, made by Martin Kobler, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL. In particular, Special Representative Kobler indicated that he is deeply disturbed by reports that civilians in Benghazi's Ganfouda neighbourhood continue to be caught in the cross-fire of fighting and suffer shortages of food, water and medicines. Special Representative Kobler indicated that UNSMIL has been working to support the Libyan mediation process in order to minimize the suffering in Ganfouda. I understand that an evacuation plan has been discussed. My Office welcomes that important development and will continue to closely scrutinize the situation in Ganfouda and the actions of all parties to the conflict in accordance with the Rome Statute criteria.

To conclude, the Council referred the situation in Libya to my Office. By definition, the referral carries great responsibility to seek justice for the countless civilians who have been victims of the widespread crimes in Libya since 15 February 2011. Compelled by this responsibility, I have decided to allocate additional resources from within my Office's overall budget to the Libya situation. I have no choice if further concrete progress is to be made in our investigations. Without the Council's support, that allocation will necessarily come at the expense of investigations of other crimes in other situations. I appeal to the Council to recognize the collective responsibility arising out of its referral and to support United Nations financial assistance for my Office's Libya investigations in 2017. The Libyan people deserve no less.

Atrocity crimes demand unequivocal and universal condemnation and accountability. In adopting the Rome Statute, States recognized not only that reality but also the intrinsic link between accountability for atrocity crimes and sustainable peace and security. The Court remains fully committed to its mandate to help end impunity for the world's gravest crimes, and in doing so to contribute to preventing future atrocities. In that essential mission, we count on the principled support of this body and the States parties and non-State parties to the Rome Statute — indeed, of the international

community writ large — to realize the full potential of the Rome Statute system in Libya and elsewhere. That is a must if we are to fully respond to the plight of victims by dispensing justice and to strengthen the international rule of law.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. Bensouda for her briefing.

I now give the floor to the members of the Security Council.

Ms. Mulvein (United Kingdom): I would like to begin by welcoming the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) back to the Council and thanking her for her briefing today. The United Kingdom is grateful for her twelfth report, and I thank her and her Office for their continuing investigation of the situation in Libya.

Whether in Libya or any other country, the ICC has a vital role to play in challenging impunity and ensuring the accountability of those who bear the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes of international concern. Sadly, such crimes continue to this day in Libya. We are deeply concerned about the fact that civilians continue to suffer inexcusably from the conflict and are subjected to violations and abuses perpetrated by the parties to it. Civilian and residential areas have been besieged, restricting people's access to food, medical supplies and sometimes water and electricity. More than 400,000 people have been displaced by the conflict.

The spread of Da'esh is further exacerbating the crisis. The group poses a serious threat to all Libyans and the wider region. We condemn its barbaric crimes and call for their perpetrators to be held to account. The global campaign to bring Da'esh to justice — launched during the general debate of the General Assembly in September by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq and Mr. Didier Reynders, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium — will help to ensure that there is no impunity for those responsible.

We fully understand the Office of the Prosecutor's determination to prioritize her investigations in Libya in 2017, but we remain concerned about the possibility that the security situation will continue to prevent her from undertaking full investigative activities at this time. Without a unified and accountable security structure across the country to enforce law and order and protect civilians, supported by an independent judiciary, crimes falling within the Court's jurisdiction may continue to occur. The rule of law must apply throughout Libya and, ultimately, all perpetrators must be held to account and tried in court in a transparent and open manner. The United Kingdom will continue to work with international partners to provide Libya with the support it needs to meet the challenges it faces.

We have taken note of the Office of the Prosecutor's request for assistance through the Security Council regarding applications for new arrest warrants for additional suspects. We thank the Prosecutor for her briefing on the cases against Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi. The United Kingdom calls on Libya to take steps to enable the handover of Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi to the ICC without delay, and to consult with the Court in order to address any problems that might impede his transfer to The Hague.

We thank the Prosecutor's Office for continuing to monitor allegations of torture and similar abuses in Al-Hadba prison, and we note with concern the unconfirmed report that an individual previously suspected of torture has returned to the prison and holds a position of authority there. We support the steps that the Prosecutor's Office has taken to enhance cooperation with additional national law-enforcement agencies that are also working on Libya-related investigations. We commend the Libyan Prosecutor General and Libya's representative to the Court for their continued positive and constructive engagement with the Office of the Prosecutor. Cooperation between the Office and the Libyan authorities is vital if they are to tackle impunity for atrocity crimes. We would also like to take this opportunity to thank the Tunisian and Jordanian authorities for facilitating the Prosecutor's investigations.

In conclusion, we recognize the additional financial constraints that the Office of the Prosecutor faces. We respect her independence in deciding on the best use of those resources. As the United Kingdom, we are working for a budget outcome that both meets the needs of the Court and is aligned with the means available.

Mr. Lamek (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank Prosecutor Bensouda for her twelfth report and her briefing. I would like to reaffirm France's support for the Prosecutor and the International Criminal Court as a whole, and also to commend her on her successful implementation of resolution 1970 (2011),

which referred the situation in Libya to the Court. The resolution also reflects the Council's support of an institution with the most important of missions — to ensure that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community, as the preamble to the Rome Statute has it, do not go unpunished.

Thanks to the reports, we are pleased to note the efforts made by the Office of the Prosecutor, working closely with the Libyan judicial authorities. Once again, we are well aware that insecurity and instability make the task of conducting ongoing and future investigations a particularly delicate one. The security threats must be carefully evaluated in order to decide whether investigations on the ground are possible. In view of the fact that the security conditions required for conducting investigations on the ground cannot always be met, France backs the Office's efforts to do so remotely to the extent possible. In that regard, we fully support initiatives and programmes designed to facilitate the collection of evidence and testimony via secure channels.

There can be no question that much remains to be done to end impunity in Libya. That is why we believe it is more essential than ever to ensure that the Council continues to support the Court and mediation under the auspices of the United Nations, including by Mr. Martin Kobler, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. We also offer our full support to the Presidential Council, led by Mr. Fayez Al-Sarraj, in order to help him deal with the challenges he is facing.

Besides those general comments, I would like to make three more specific ones.

First, France recalls that the Office's ability to conduct investigations requires the full cooperation of all stakeholders. And for that cooperation to be effective, it must take an integrated approach and function at various levels, giving priority to the principle of complementarity.

Secondly, France supports the assertion in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the report that close cooperation with the Libyan authorities is essential to conducting investigations securely, as mandated by Rome Statute of the Court and by the Council. The memorandum of understanding of November 2013, on the sharing of responsibilities with the Libyan authorities, provides a framework for that. Similarly, we welcome the valuable document transmission and operational support provided by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Libya, which is also working in particularly difficult conditions. We are pleased that the meetings that took place in October explored new opportunities for mutual support.

With regard to the adoption of resolution 2291 (2016), of 13 June, which extended the mandate of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya to 15 December, France notes the appeal of the Office of the Prosecutor for all parties to cooperate and ensure the security of United Nations and associated personnel to also apply to officials of the International Criminal Court who are leading investigations in Libya.

Furthermore, as recalled in the report, the Security Council, in paragraph 5 of resolution 1970 (2011), urged all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor. France therefore considers it crucial to strengthen cooperation with all States, whether or not they are parties to the Rome Statute, so that requests made by the Office be responded to in the most efficient and timely manner. This required collaboration with the States of the region and beyond is all the more essential in the case of highly complex and transnational investigations, which require a coordinated strategy. The cooperation of the Jordanian and Tunisian authorities is particularly appreciated in this regard.

Our second comment concerns the elements of the report relating to ongoing investigations. France considers it crucial that Mr. Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi be delivered promptly to the Court, pursuant to the request of its judges. France urges Libya to do everything it can to honour this obligation and put an end to the breach it is committing. Furthermore, in the case brought against Mr. Abdullah Al-Senussi, France notes that the Office, pending the full report of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya on the trial proceedings before a national court, continues to believe that no new facts cripple the evidence on which the Pre-Trial Chamber I relied to declare the inadmissibility of the case before the Court. Finally, France notes the Office's intention to file applications for additional arrest warrants shortly.

Thirdly and finally, France would like to review the future plans outlined by the Office of the Prosecutor in the report. We note the Office's wish to make Libya a priority in 2017 and significantly expand its investigations into crimes committed in Libya since

2011, including crimes alleged committed in Libya by Da'esh, Ansar Al-Sharia and other terrorist groups.

What we see in Libya shows how the absence of justice breeds violence and makes reconciliation more difficult. This is reality that we must keep in mind. It forces us all to find ways to arrive at concrete responses. France, which cooperates with the Court without reservation, considers that this requirement can be met only with the Court's effective functioning and the support of the Security Council in the event of non-cooperation.

Mr. Kandeel (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to extend my thanks to Ms. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), for her briefing today and for introducing her twelfth report pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011). The report sets out a number of important observations and challenges relating to the performance of the Court in relation to the situation in Libya. In this regard, I would like to emphasize the following points.

First, the Libyan Government needs to consult with the Court with respect to the application to surrender Mr. Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi to the Court. We emphasize the need to extend all forms of assistance to the Libyan Government in a manner that enables it to fulfil its obligations to the Court on this matter.

Secondly, all crimes of torture and inhuman acts perpetrated in Libya need to be stopped, and the international community should support the Government of National Accord in the preparation of a comprehensive strategy to tackle the brutal crimes committed in the country. In addition, assistance should be extended to the Libyan authorities to help them administer justice to the defendants, including by supplying the Government with the weapons it has requested and implementing relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2214 (2015).

Thirdly, we underline the importance stated in the report of the Office of the Prosecutor undertaking investigations in Libya during 2017 as a matter of priority, in particular in the light of the crimes perpetrated by Da'esh and Ansar Al-Sharia. Accordingly, the Court must abide by international law and the principle of complementarity between national jurisdictions and that of the ICC, taking into account the fact that the work of the Court is part of a broader action of the international community aimed at bringing terrorists to justice and guaranteeing their accountability for the crimes they have perpetrated.

Fourthly, we emphasize the need for all States as well as the relevant regional and international organizations to cooperate with the Court and the Prosecutor to the greatest extent possible.

Fifthly, there is a need to welcome cooperation and assistance received by the Prosecutor's Office from the Office of the Libyan Prosecutor General, particularly with regard to the submission of information and evidence, continuing the implementation of the memorandum of understanding concluded in November 2013 on burden-sharing in the investigation of former Al-Qadhafi officials and their prosecution.

In conclusion, I would like to voice our appreciation for the important work and great efforts deployed by Ms. Bensouda, the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, and her Office, in pursuit of justice and accountability. We are determined to continue our cooperation with her in that regard.

Mr. Gasso Matoses (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): It is an honour for us to see Ms. Bensouda in the Security Council once again. I am very grateful for the updated information she has given us.

In my statement, I shall focus first on two specific aspects of Ms. Bensouda's briefing, namely, the situation of Mr. Al-Qadhafi and on the situation of torture in the prison of Al-Hadba, before continuing with some reflections on the limitations of the Court in the performance of its work.

First, we note that the warrant for the arrest and surrender of Mr. Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi has not been executed. Spain fully understands that the instability prevailing in the country makes it difficult for Libya to deliver the accused. But it should not be forgotten that it still has the obligation to cooperate with the Court and the Prosecution. It is an obligation imposed by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011) and it remains fully in force. This obligation therefore requires the Government of National Accord to proceed, at the moment where circumstances allow it, to the immediate arrest of the accused and to turn him over to the Court without further delay.

Secondly, we would like to thank Ms. Bensouda for the information she has provided about the investigation into allegations of torture in Al-Hadba prison. We would echo what was said by the representative of the

United Kingdom and state our concern at the fact that one of the alleged perpetrators has been able to take up his post once again. We are waiting for this information to be confirmed and in the meantime wish to remind the Libyan authorities of the responsibility to investigate and prosecute such actions, which cannot be tolerated.

We deplore the fact that the continuing insecurity in Libya is still hampering the Court in carrying out its investigations in the field. We encourage it, despite the circumstances, to pursue its task. It is necessary to create conditions conducive to allowing the Prosecutor to visit Libyan territory in complete safety. We therefore support Ms. Bensouda's request that the Security Council call on all parties in Libya to cooperate fully with the ICC and to guarantee the safety of its staff.

Furthermore, we would like to recall that the work carried out in Libya by the Office of the Prosecutor, which was mandated by the Security Council, has a financial cost that continues to be borne exclusively by the States parties and which requires that resources be diverted from other investigations or prosecutions.

In Libya, as in other situations with which it is concerned, the ICC depends on the cooperation of all, first and foremost that of the Security Council, but also on that of all States, whether or not they are parties to the Rome Statute. We are encouraged by the information that Ms. Bensouda has provided us about the support given by many of those countries, particularly Tunisia and Jordan, as she noted in her report, and by Egypt, as she mentioned in her briefing. Spain calls on all those countries that have not yet responded to her request to do so as quickly as possible.

The requests made touch also on the work of the Libyan judicial institutions. We reiterate once again our appreciation to the Office of the Prosecutor-General, which, despite the serious situation prevailing in the country, has maintained an active level of cooperation with the Court, which is proof of its commitment to the cause of justice.

Nonetheless, this is not enough. An unacceptable climate of impunity continues to prevail in Libya, with persistent allegations of extrajudicial executions, kidnappings, torture, attacks on journalists and other activists, and attacks on immigrants. Of course, the political circumstances do not help things. The ongoing fragmentation of the country is an increasing source of concern. We take this opportunity to reiterate our appeal to all political actors in Libya to join the dialogue and support the efforts of the Presidency Council as it seeks to establish the Government of National Accord. We also call upon the Governments in the region to continue working together so as to facilitate the reunification of the country and the advent of peace.

Finally, I should like to make a very brief comment, taking advantage of Ms. Bensouda's presence with us today, that is more general in scope with respect to the ICC and not focusing just on Libya. For several weeks now, the ICC has found itself treading on delicate ground following the decision of a handful of African States to begin the process of withdrawing from the Rome Statute. This is not good news. I should like to take the opportunity of Ms. Bensouda's presence here to reiterate to her my country's resolute support for the Court. Spain stands ready to contribute in a constructive manner and in a spirit of dialogue to the quest for solutions that, with due respect for the independence of the Court and the integrity of the Rome Statute, would allow us to overcome the differences cited by those countries in communicating their decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute.

In any case, we should not give in to defeatism. There are grounds for optimism. This year may be the most fruitful year yet for the ICC, and it is important that we remember this. The Court keeps alive the hopes of thousands of victims, demonstrating that with the requisite will and resources, justice is possible. On that note, I convey to Ms. Bensouda the full support and gratitude of Spain.

Mr. Akahori (Japan) (*spoke in French*): I should like to thank Prosecutor Bensouda for her report and her briefing.

Japan emphasizes its belief that the perpetrators of serious crimes must be held accountable for their actions. Japan also commends the accomplishments of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to date. Japan has consistently supported the ICC so that it can function effectively and sustainably in promoting the rule of law, with the support of the international community.

Japan strongly believes that more States should join the ICC so as to ensure that the Court can effectively promote the rule of law. In the long run, the ICC should aim to become a truly universal criminal Court and gain stronger support for its work. In this regard, we are worried, as is Spain, by the recent decisions taken by some African States to withdraw from the ICC. In order to secure support and cooperation from a greater

number of States, the ICC and its States parties should listen to the concerns expressed by some as to its role.

Allow me now to turn to the issue of Libya. Japan welcomes the fact that the Libyan Prosecutor-General's Office has been cooperative with the ICC on many issues. We encourage the Libyan Government of National Accord and all countries concerned to cooperate with the Court pursuant to resolutions 1970 (2011) and 2259 (2015). We are aware of the current political and security situation in Libya and the serious difficulties that its authorities are facing. Under these circumstances, Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi has not yet been handed over to the Court.

Japan hopes that with the improvement of the situation, the cooperation between the Libyan authorities and the Court will be strengthened and that this will enable the ICC to play a greater role in the fight against impunity.

With regard to violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Libya, Japan notes with particular interest that the Prosecutor's report mentions her hope that additional arrest warrants will be obtained. We hope to hear detailed updates on this matter.

Japan reiterates the importance of forming a representative, united Libyan Government. The Presidency Council should work swiftly to submit a revised list of Cabinet members to the House of Representatives. The House of Representative should in turn give due consideration to the list. It is essential that all parties uphold their obligations under the Libyan Political Agreement.

Japan continues to support the ongoing efforts made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Martin Kobler; the United Nations Support Mission in Libya; and the Government of National Accord to promote the political process.

Japan fully supports the activities of the ICC, including those of the Office of the Prosecutor. My delegation looks forward to hearing of tangible progress on the issue we are considering today.

Mr. Gimolieca (Angola): We thank Ms. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), for her presentation of the twelfth report, as mandated by resolution 1970 (2011).

The political and security situation in Libya remained critical during the reporting period despite the efforts of the Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord. We reiterate our appeal to all political actors in Libya to pool their efforts in a constructive fashion with determination, courage and goodwill in connection with the efforts being made by the Government of National Accord. The political impasse has weakened the efforts of the Government to face the chaotic security situation, the economic crisis and the growing impunity of terrorist groups and armed militias against the civilian population.

We take note with concern of the information regarding Libya presented on 27 September by the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. Kate Gilmore, during the thirty-third session of the Human Rights Council, in which she outlined that heavy weapons continued to be transferred to residential areas throughout the country, armed groups were acting with total impunity and thousands of people were brutally being kept in detention centres. Furthermore, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are arbitrarily being detained, with various reports indicating abuse perpetrated against those groups — such as summary executions, torture and other mistreatment, sexual abuse, extortion and forced labour. That situation constitutes a flagrant violation of human rights and international humanitarian law.

However, the institutional and political context of Libya does not offer the necessary conditions to investigate and persecute the authors of those atrocious crimes, which, according to the Statute of the ICC, fall under national jurisdiction. We believe that conditions in Libya to apply the necessary judicial process are currently non-existent. In that regard, we consider the ICC to be highly important in Libya.

We welcome the information contained in the report of the Ombudsperson of the ICC, by which on 31 August the Misrata-Tawergha accord was signed. That led to the return of displaced people and compensation for affected communities. It is highly commendable that the signatories to the accord expressed their desire to achieve peace, justice and reparations and to establish the rule of law and contribute to efforts that seek to avoid the repetition of past mistakes for future generations. We strongly encourage other initiatives of the kind to improve the lives of the population of Libya.

To conclude, we reiterate our view that only in an environment of peace and stability can a functioning judicial system and institutions be established. Therefore, we reiterate our support for the United Nations and the international community in the implementation, together with the relevant actors, of Libya's Government of National Accord for the sake of establishing lasting peace as well as accountability for all those responsible for perpetrating violent crimes and human rights violations.

Mr. Zagaynov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): In the six months since the previous briefing (see S/PV.7698), significant changes for the better in the political-military situation in Libya have not occurred. The main issue remains the fragmentation of the country and its governmental institutions, despite attempts by the Presidency Council in Tripoli to consolidate its authority. The composition of the Government of National Accord has not yet been confirmed by the House of Representatives in accordance with the procedure set out by the Skhirat Agreement. We see no alternative to continuing the intra-Libyan dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations, and with the participation of all active political forces in the country.

The continuing terrorist threat emanating from Libya continues to keep tensions high for its neighbours. Fighting this threat, in particular against the backdrop of a failure to unite security structures, has been done haphazardly. Localized successes are not a substitute for a large-scale counter-terrorist campaign under unified command. Possible foreign assistance in that respect should not contribute to preserving internal divisions in Libya, as otherwise the tragic mistakes of the 2011 intervention will continue to weigh on this long-suffering country.

We take note of the twelfth report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) regarding the situation in Libya. We note that it was submitted to the Security Council on the eve of today's meeting. For reasons we cannot fathom, that seems to be becoming the standard practice. We believe that a full-fledged discussion of a document by delegations requires preparation. That is why such a late circulation of the report raises doubts regarding the ICC's desire for serious dialogue with the Security Council.

On the basis of the report, we are forced to note the lack of progress on the main issues of the Libyan dossier, such as the forced displacement of the Tuareg people, torture, illegal detentions and abductions. The Office of the Prosecutor continues to remove itself from consideration of the issue of civilian deaths resulting from NATO's 2011 bombings. We see no real steps towards organizing the prosecution of the insurgents for their alleged crimes: not a single case was initiated in five years. The Office of the Prosecutor has adopted a similar stance regarding Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant terrorists, who, by the way, for some reason are referred to simply as "Islamists" in the report. In that context, once again, there is nothing more than an abstract intention to revisit possible proceedings in the future.

In the light of repeated attempts to present the Libyan dossier as a type of burden dropped upon the Security Council, I should like to remind members that in 2011 the main proponents of the idea of referring the situation in Libya to the ICC were certain States parties to the Rome Statute and the Office of the Prosecutor. They should have recognized the financial and other consequences of that step for the Court. That is why the report's requests for the ICC to be materially supported by the United Nations appears to be illogical.

By way of conclusion, we would like to again note that the ICC's experience in Libya cannot in any way be qualified as successful, whether in the administration of justice and the prevention of new crimes or in terms of contributing to national reconciliation. The situation and the process of withdrawal from the Rome Statute by a number of States deepens our doubts regarding the usefulness of involving the ICC in any new cases.

Mrs. Adnin (Malaysia): I thank Ms. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), for presenting her twelfth report to the Security Council as requested under resolution 1970 (2011).

The current political and security situation in Libya continues to present tremendous challenges and hampers ongoing efforts by the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord to restore peace and stability to the country, including ending impunity for crimes of serious concern to the international community. Malaysia continues to believe that the formation of an effective and credible Government of National Accord is crucial in bolstering Libya's commitment and capabnility to promote and restore the rule of law, to address impunity and to bring all perpetrators of such crimes to justice. We call upon

all parties in Libya to redouble their efforts to bridge differences, find common ground and work closely together towards the swift and full implementation of the Libyan political agreement.

Despite the significant security challenges in the country, we are encouraged by the continuing efforts and commitment of the Libyan authorities to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as the ongoing cooperation rendered by the Libyan Prosecutor-General's Office. That is a good foundation on which to further build upon.

The widespread violence and impunity in Libya, particularly by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which continues to be the most prolific perpetrator of grave crimes and violations of international law in the country, alongside other violent extremist groups, remains of concern. We reaffirm the Security Council's strong condemnation of such atrocities and reassert the call for accountability. At the same time, allegations of such crimes being perpetrated against civilians by other parties to the conflict should also be a matter of concern. Those allegations must be thoroughly investigated and accountability must be pursued so that impunity is addressed, with a view to building trust and confidence and towards promoting national reconciliation.

This will be Malaysia's last opportunity to engage on the important issue of addressing impunity and accountability for the most serious crimes in Libya before ending our term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Since joining the Council some 22 months ago, we have been fully invested in the United Nations-led facilitation efforts for a Libyan-owned and Libyan-led process to restore peace, stability and security to the country. Despite the enormous challenges that continue to plague the country, there have been some positive developments and milestones achieved in that regard. Those gains must be preserved and built upon if Libya and its people are to progress beyond the current situation.

In concluding, I wish to reaffirm Malaysia's full support for the efforts of the United Nations and the international community to assist Libya to prevail over adversity and achieve a lasting political settlement and stability. Looking beyond our term in the Council, we wish to also reaffirm our continuing support for the people and the Government of Libya.

Mr. Xu Zhongsheng (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I would like to thank Ms. Bensouda for her briefing.

China has been closely following the developments in Libya and supports its process of political transition that is being mediated by the United Nations. We welcome the Libyan political dialogue meeting that will be used as a forum for Libyan political dialogue, to be held in Malta, and we hope that it will facilitate the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement by all parties.

We also hope that all parties in Libya will remain committed to an inclusive, Libyan-led political process, put their national interests before any other matter, abide by Security Council resolutions, effectively implement the Libyan Political Agreement and resolve their differences through negotiation and consultation, so as to restore security and stability in the country. That is the prerequisite and basis for Libya to achieve judicial justice.

China's position on the international judicial organ remains unchanged.

Ms. Sison (United States of America): I thank the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for her report and for her continued engagement with the Security Council on the importance of accountability for atrocity crimes committed in Libya.

Libya's ongoing crisis provides a climate of impunity for such crimes. More broadly, it has impeded the ability of the Libyan people to see the hope of their country's revolution translated into an enduring foundation for peace, stability and prosperity. The next step towards a solution is a stable, unified and inclusive Government. The international community must therefore help Prime Minister Serraj to consolidate progress towards implementing the Libyan Political Agreement and strengthen Libya's institutions.

To that end, we urge Libyans on all sides to make progress towards national reconciliation. The Presidency Council should present an inclusive new Cabinet proposal, and the House of Representatives must fulfil its duty to allow a free and fair vote on that Cabinet. The Libyan Political Agreement is of course a transitional framework. We urge the constitutional drafting assembly to complete its work as quickly as possible and, in 2017, Libya should hold a referendum on a new Constitution and elect a new Government.

Nothing could more clearly emphasize the human stakes of making political progress than the reports of civilian suffering that the Security Council continues to receive. Violations and abuses continue to be committed against people from a broad range of vulnerable populations, ranging from civilians who are subject to indiscriminate or even deliberate attacks, to captured combatants who have been tortured and killed, to migrants who have sought to pass through Libya and have been inhumanely detained, extorted, sexually assaulted and otherwise exploited by smugglers and traffickers. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya has reported that there is "total impunity" for serious abuses that are committed by armed groups. Those violations and abuses are appalling in their own right. Furthermore, they create grievances that sustain the broader political crisis, and therefore work against our common efforts to achieve a lasting peace. We call on all parties to refrain from unlawfully targeting civilians, and we urge that those responsible for serious crimes be held accountable. Much more must be done to establish a functioning justice system that is capable of addressing that problem.

We are encouraged by the progress of the forces aligned with the Government of National Accord in retaking the city of Sirte. We look forward to seeing that progress further consolidated in the coming days and weeks.

The presence of Da'esh is a threat to Libya's future and to regional security. Its eventual military defeat must be reinforced with progress towards reconciliation, dialogue and the rule of law. In that vein, the atrocities allegedly committed in the last days of the Al-Qadhafi regime may seem far removed from today's conflict, but we believe that promoting accountability for those acts remains a key element of the broader effort to re-establish the rule of law in Libya. The ICC investigation has helped to ensure that the Al-Qadhafi regime's acts in early 2011 were seen as the crimes that they are, and that those responsible for such acts could not count on impunity.

We remain encouraged by the reports of continued cooperation between Libya's judicial authorities and the Office of the Prosecutor. While we recognize that Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi is not in the Libyan Government's custody, we continue to urge the Government of National Accord to take the appropriate steps to seek his transfer to the International Criminal Court, consistent with Libya's obligations under resolution 1970 (2011) and the repeated calls of the Security Council for Libya to cooperate fully with the ICC and the Prosecutor. To the extent that other actors continue to frustrate that process, we encourage the Council to add its voice to the call for Mr. Al-Qadhafi to be transferred to The Hague and face charges there for the crimes against humanity that he has alleged to have committed. We appreciate the Prosecutor's efforts to help ensure that the victims of such atrocities do not escape our continued focus.

The Libyan people face an array of challenges, and only they can take the steps needed to resolve their country's crisis. However, they should know that they do not stand alone. We are encouraged by the agreement reached in August between representatives from Misrata and Tawergha, cities that fought bitterly in 2011 but have now agreed to compensate the victims of abuses and allow the return of the internally displaced, a process that was assisted by the good offices of the United Nations Mission. We appreciate the continued work of Special Representative of the Secretary-General Martin Kobler and the attention of the Council and of the Human Rights Council to the situation. The United States will continue to work with our partners in pursuit of a lasting peace for Libya.

Mr. Taula (New Zealand): We thank Prosecutor Bensouda for her briefing.

Our experience on the Council over the past two years has reinforced to us the need for an effective international accountability framework. The International Criminal Court (ICC) plays an important role in that framework. Its existence sends a clear message that the international community has the tools to ensure that serious international crimes will not go unpunished. The Security Council's ability to make referrals to the ICC is an important part of that framework. However, as we have stressed numerous times, the Council must remain scrupulous in avoiding perceptions that it is using referrals as a political tool, particularly in the midst of a conflict. Such actions risk politicizing the Court and can prolong both the conflicts concerned and the process of seeking accountability. Furthermore, the Council should not make referrals unless it is also prepared to follow up on their implementation. Sustained non-compliance with resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations calls into question the very credibility of the Council and the authority of its resolutions.

In our view, costs incurred by the ICC as a result of decisions by United Nations organs should be attributed to, and accounted from, the United Nations budget. At the very least, Council members should not obstruct open discussions on the issue, but should defer to the General Assembly, which has the prerogative and mandate to determine funding issues.

Developments in Libya have not yet paved the way for re-establishing effective Government authority, restoring the rule of law, protecting basic human rights and providing justice for past violations. The situation remains extremely fragile. As a result, the environment for the ICC in taking forward the Council's Libya referral remains extremely challenging.

The current security environment makes it almost impossible for ICC staff to undertake investigations on the ground. Moreover, Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi remains in detention in an area outside the custody and control of the Government of National Accord. We nevertheless commend the Office of the Prosecutor for its continued efforts, and we welcome the ongoing cooperation provided by Libyan Prosecutor-General's Office.

The ICC is of course a court of last resort. It was never intended to take the place of national justice systems, but rather to complement them. However, Libya's current domestic judicial options remain significantly constrained, especially its investigative and judicial capacities. We believe the international community, including the ICC, has a role to play in helping to build Libyan capacities in this area. The ICC's interactions with Libya have given it useful practical knowledge of Libya's circumstances and needs in that regard.

We note the Prosecutor's active efforts to encourage the development of coordinated investigative and prosecutorial strategies with regard to Libya-related cases in order to help to close the impunity gap for ICC crimes. We welcome the agreement in principle at the recent meeting convened by the ICC with judicial and investigative agencies from Libya and various interested States to work collectively and in a coordinated manner.

While we remain supportive of the Prosecutor's efforts in Libya, we cannot pretend that this referral is currently the most pressing issue facing either Libya or the Court. Moreover, we must be cognizant of the broader political context in which this work is being undertaken. The ICC is currently facing an unprecedented situation in its relationships with some of its African members. None of us should be surprised. That situation has been brewing for some time. There are genuine substantive concerns, and they need to be thoroughly discussed. But we also need to get much better at listening to, and engaging with, African States on issues of concern to them.

New Zealand has tried to play its part in facilitating such a dialogue in the ICC context as well as in the General Assembly and here in the Security Council. We were disappointed that the meeting between the Council and the African Union ministerial committee on the ICC, which we scheduled during our September presidency, did not proceed. We need to see greater willingness to prioritize such engagement. The recent announcement by three African States that they intend to withdraw from the Rome Statute should concern us all. African States were among the earliest and strongest ICC supporters, and we do not believe it is in anybody's interests to now see them walk away.

Now is the time for an open, honest and respectful dialogue between the Council, the ICC and its African members, aimed at finding a way through the current crisis that best serves our common goal of ending impunity. As a friend of both the Court and of Africa, New Zealand is committed to playing its part.

Mr. Rosselli (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): We again welcome the presence of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Ms. Fatou Bensouda, and express our appreciation for her briefing on the twelfth annual report on the situation in Libya in accordance with resolution 1970 (2011).

We reiterate the full support of Uruguay for the work of the Prosecutor and for the role of the International Criminal Court in strengthening the rule of law at the international level by the establishment of judicial processes for those responsible for serious crimes against humanity as defined in article 5 of the Rome Statute. In order to make that work more effective, we call on all Member States that are not yet parties to the Rome Statute to adhere to it with the objective of fighting impunity and defending all inhabitants of the planet against atrocity crimes that pose a serious threat to the peace and security of humankind.

On the other hand, my delegation's message will not be directed solely to those that are not parties to the Rome Statute, but also to those States that recently decided to reject it. It is important to safeguard and strengthen the International Criminal Court, which has

shown itself to be an effective instrument in providing justice when when national courts are incapable of doing so.

With regard to Libya, the latest report does not provide very encouraging signs. The authority of the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord continues to be challenged at the national level, and the blockade imposed by the Tobruk House of Representatives has not allowed for the Cabinet to be established. The multiple challenges facing Libya five years after the civil war require swift and efficient responses from its new authorities, who face the threat of Islamist terrorism, a persistent migrant crisis and a severe economic crisis, among other problems.

It is necessary to achieve progress in the reunification and reconciliation of the country, while avoiding further bloodshed among the population and putting end the institutional crisis and the military conflict that has ravaged the country during the past five years. It is necessary to advance towards the goal of a genuine democratic transition and lasting peace and stability, as a basis for more effectively investigating the atrocities committed in the country and to avoid a continuation of the situation of widespread violence and impunity.

We trust the new Libyan authorities will fulfil their commitment to bring justice to the victims of these crimes, in cooperation with the Prosecutor of the Court in order to identify the perpetrators, no matter who they are. In particular, we encourage the new Libyan Government to make Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi available to the Court and to ensure that Abdullah Al-Senussi and other individuals receive trials that include full international safeguards.

We are concerned that the Prosecutor will have to face budgetary limitations next year in order to be able to expand her investigation into the crimes taking place in Libya, which the report identifies as one of the Prosecutor's priorities for 2017. For that reason, we support her request to access the necessary resources to be able to comply with her, and we call on States parties able to provide the necessary financing to do so.

Finally, we reiterate our recognition of the work of the Prosecutor in her investigations into crimes committed in Libya, which will undoubtedly contribute to strengthening the rule of law and the establishment in Libya of a more just and inclusive society where there is full respect for basic rights and guarantees for all citizens, who have seen those rights violated for years.

Mr. Vitrenko (Ukraine): I would like to start by joining other Council members in thanking the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ms. Fatou Bensouda, for her briefing.

We must acknowledge that, since our last discussion in the Council on this matter (see S/PV.7698), the overall picture fundamentally remains the same. More than five years after the adoption of resolution 1970 (2011), the perpetrators of the major crimes against humanity referred to the ICC have not been held accountable. However, it is not a result of the unwillingness of the Libyan authorities to cooperate with the Court. On the contrary, as highlighted in the twelfth report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011), the Government of National Accord is truly committed to implementing the 2013 memorandum of understanding on burden-sharing and the Libyan General Prosecutor's Office continues to cooperate with the ICC.

We take note of the continuation of the Court's examination of crimes committed in the territory of Libya and the collection of respective evidence. In our view, a particular focus during such activities should be given to atrocities committed by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Ansar Al-Sharia and other non-State actors in Libya. In that respect, Ukraine strongly condemns attacks against civilians, abductions and assassinations of Government officials and judges, as well as the shelling of hospitals and looting of property, which, regrettably, are still a common occurrence across the country.

We consider that much more could be done to ensure accountability for such crimes if the ICC personnel were able to conduct investigations within the territory of Libya. We fully agree that this will require the stabilization of the security situation as well as the provision of meaningful financial resources and assurances with regard to the security of ICC staff. In conclusion, I would like to stress that the Court will be able to deliver justice to victims, only with the full backing of the Council and the relevant United Nations entities, including the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and the States parties to the Rome Statute.

Mr. Suárez Moreno (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): We thank the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ms. Fatou

Bensouda, for her briefing, and once again express full support for her work.

As a State party to this legal instrument, our country fully supports strengthening the Court's institutional structure and enhancing the effective work of the International Criminal Court. In that regard, we encourage the countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute to accede to that instrument with a view to achieving its universality. The fight against impunity for internationally defined atrocity crimes, such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, inter alia, can be achieved only with international cooperation. That is a key aspect in achieving the Court's objectives. The Court requires the full support of all States in order to enforce its rulings and to carry out its work. The strengthening of the international criminal system established through the creation of the ICC requires States parties to abstain from measures that would weaken the important functions of the ICC as it combats impunity. With that understanding, it is essential for us to preserve and uphold the independence and impartiality of the Court and free it from the meddling of specific interests that would only hamper its effectiveness.

The unstable political situation following the collapse of the Libyan regime's institutions, caused by the NATO military intervention in 2011, continues to have an adverse impact on the rule of law, and in particular on the legal system in Libya. The aftermath of that intervention is still being felt today. The institutional collapse and the clashes between the various factions seeking to wrest control of the country, make it difficult for the State and its institutions to function properly. In the light of that situation, Libya must be supported in crafting a robust legal system that would guarantee due process and respect for the human rights of perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Libya is a country that is submerged in widespread chaos and violence, which Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham, Al-Qaida and Ansar Al-Sharia have exploited in order to carry out their terrorist activities.

Violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law perpetrated by those groups should also be investigated by the International Criminal Court in order to determine the persons responsible for such abuses. We welcome the ongoing cooperation between the Libyan Public Prosecutor and the ICC, as mentioned in the twelfth report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011). Nonetheless, we urge the Libyan authorities to coordinate efforts to a greater extent with the Office of the Prosecutor and to engage in the consultations to properly address issues such as the handing over of Saif al-Islam Al-Qadhafi, so that he can be tried fairly and in accordance with due process, in line with resolution 1970 (2011). His transfer to the ICC should be facilitated by the militia in Zintan.

We are also concerned that individuals who have been accused of engaging in acts of torture against members of the Qaddafi family and members of the Government of former President Muammar Al-Qadhafi have not been detained or properly tried by the Libyan justice system. We have also heard reports that one individual accused of torture in a prison in Libya was not only discharged but allowed to return to the same prison, in which he had carried out those human rights violations.

Finally, the Libyan Government is currently facing various major challenges. We urge the Libyan authorities not to lose heart in their struggle to establish the rule of law with robust legal institutions which would serve as a bedrock for the promotion of human rights and the respect thereof, including the international principles of due process, the right to defence and the presumption of innocence, as judicial guarantees that are deeply entrenched.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Senegal.

First of all, I would like to sincerely thank the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for her briefing on the twelfth report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) and to warmly commend the dedication and the professionalism with which she discharges her duty. That duty, we should recall, is to dispense justice for the millions of innocent victims of mass atrocities. I take this opportunity to reiterate Senegal's support for the Rome Statute and reaffirm my country's commitment to the effective implementation of resolution 1970 (2011), unanimously adopted on 26 February 2011.

The review of the twelfth report allows us to affirm that, despite an unstable international security environment and ongoing budgetary constraints, the Office of the Prosecutor has managed to make

progress on investigations in the cases involving Saif Al-Islam Al-Qadhafi and Abdullah Al-Senoussi. In addition, it was able to provide judicious follow-up to the proceedings regarding allegations of torture and ill-treatment in the Al-Hadba prison and issue additional arrest warrants to apprehend other suspects. That is an eloquent expression of the desire of the Prosecutor to conduct criminal investigations under the November 2013 memorandum of understanding on burden-sharing with the Libyan authorities through sound cooperation and exemplary understanding with the Office.

My delegation encourages the Prosecutor to continue along that path and encourages the Libyan authorities to continue sharing information and cooperating with the Office of the Prosecutor, with a view to building a credible and effective judicial system. After all, it is up to the Libyan authorities to guarantee respect for the rule of law in their own country. To that end, the support of the international community for Libya, through its Presidency Council, remains vital to restoring stability and security throughout the country. Such stability and security require the unification and reconstruction of all national institutions, including political institutions and security and defence forces. That is why my delegation would like to reiterate its support for United Nations mediation, led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of United Nations Support Mission in Libya, Mr. Martin Kobler.

This is an issue around which we must forge a strong consensus. When the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, it is simple logic that it should ensure that the Court has the necessary cooperation of Member States, and in particular it must grant the Court the means necessary to the success of its mission. The perfect convergence between the values and ideals of the Rome Statute, on the one hand, and the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, on the other, demand that the Security Council and the ICC cooperate increasingly closely in their common fight against impunity for a world of justice, peace and security.

It was not only to put an end to impunity and prevent major crimes, but also to respond to the feelings of frustration and outrage evoked by humanitarian tragedies that have caused so much suffering to the peoples of the world, that 120 States met in Rome 18 years ago to set up the ICC, whose jurisdiction encompasses the crimes considered to be the most serious by the international community. Unfortunately, we are forced to note that atrocities continue to be perpetrated against innocent victims on a daily basis, and the overwhelming majority of them still await justice. That is why my delegation urges the international community to step up its work to promote the successful functioning of the ICC and the universality of the Rome Statute.

We must recall that the ICC remains today the only recourse for victims where the right to justice is not upheld *in situ*. That is why the Senegalese delegation cherishes the hope that the States that have withdrawn from the Rome Statute will heed the call of the President of the Assembly of States Parties and reconsider their positions, and that those States that have not yet withdrawn from the Rome Statute will adhere to it.

We firmly believe that a positive perception of the Court and the promotion of peaceful relations marked by mutual trust between Africa and the ICC, as well as the efficient and effective addressing of everyone's concerns, necessarily require dialogue and cooperation. We therefore invite all States parties to commit themselves to a unified policy of consensus and solidarity to restore the confidence and enthusiasm that people and Governments demonstrated during the creation of the Court. Given the gravity of certain crimes that shock our collective conscience, we have a moral duty to remain united and act together.

I resume my functions as President of the Council.

I now give the floor to the representative of Libya.

Mr. Elmajerbi (Libya) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council this month. I wish you luck and success in your endeavours. I would also like to thank the Russian Federation for presiding over the Council during the past month.

I would like to express our thanks and appreciation to Ms. Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, for her briefing on the twelfth report on the situation in Libya. I would also like to commend her efforts in carrying out her task in my country, pursuant to the relevant Security Council resolution. In that regard, I would like to stress that the Government of National Accord will continue to cooperate with her and with her Office, through the Libyan Prosecutor-General's office, in order to put an end to impunity, establish justice and protect civilians in Libya from violations and crimes. Ms. Fatou Bensouda spoke about the cooperation and coordination of the Libyan

Prosecutor-General's office with the national focal point in her report.

In conclusion, we hope that the security situation in Libya will improve in a way that would allow the Prosecutor's Office to communicate directly with the Libyan authorities so that it can pursue its work, establish justice and ensure that the rule of law prevails in my country.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.7807

Security Council

Seventy-first year

Provisional

7807th meeting

Thursday, 10 November 2016, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Seck	(Senegal)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Lucas
	China	Mr. Wu Haitao
	Egypt	Mr. Aboulatta
	France	Mr. Lamek
	Japan	Mr. Bessho
	Malaysia	Mrs. Adnin
	New Zealand	Mr. Walbridge
	Russian Federation	Mr. Iliichev
	Spain	Mr. Gasso Matoses
	Ukraine	Mr. Kyslytsa
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Ms. Coleman
	Uruguay	Mrs. Carrión
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Mr. Ramírez Carreño

Agenda

The situation in Somalia

Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/919)

Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/920)

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16-37493 (E)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Somalia

Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/919)

Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/920)

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia to participate in this meeting.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2016/946, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

I wish to draw the attention of Council members to documents S/2016/919 and S/2016/920, which contains letters dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council.

The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Angola, China, Egypt, Russian Federation and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

The President (*spoke in French*): There were 10 votes in favour, none against and 5 abstentions. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 2317 (2016).

I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom welcomes the adoption of resolution 2317 (2016). This sanctions regime continues to play a vital role in promoting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. In Somalia, it is preventing the flow of illicit arms and cutting off Al-Shabaab's funding. It is preserving natural resources to the benefit of all Somalis and for their economic empowerment, and it is helping to provide better weapons and ammunition management for the Somali security forces.

But renewing the resolution today is just one part of our support to Somalia. A timely and credible electoral process this month is critical to Somalia's future, and we look forward to continuing support of the incoming Federal Government of Somalia over the coming months. One of the key priorities for the new Government will be a political agreement on security sector reform that is affordable, accountable, sustainable and acceptable to federal and regional authorities in Somalia.

Turning to Eritrea, the resolution could have looked very different if the Government of Eritrea had wanted it to, but the continuing lack of cooperation from Eritrea with the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea and the Council left us with no choice. We could not welcome a visit as there has been no invitation. We could not welcome progress because nothing has changed. So we urge Eritrea to take steps to engage constructively and in a sustained manner with the Monitoring Group, as mandated by the Council. We cannot be in the same position next year.

Some Council members have questioned the lack of movement by the Council on sanctions on Eritrea. In the resolution, we have recognized the positive developments. We have welcomed the release in March of four Djiboutian prisoners of war who had been held since 2008. We have recognized the lack of evidence of Eritrean support for Al-Shabaab, and we have expressed an intention to review the measures on Eritrea in six

months' time. But without the cooperation of Eritrea, in compliance with the resolutions of the Council, our hands are tied. Council members that regret the lack of movement on this sanctions regime should look to only one place — Eritrea.

The resolution has regional implications, and as penholder we took extensive steps to engage with all of the relevant regional stakeholders so that we could balance the views of the Council and of the region. It is therefore particularly disappointing that some Council members felt that they could not support it, despite those extensive efforts.

Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China has been closely following the situation in the Horn of Africa and welcomes the progress made by the Federal Government of Somalia in promoting the political process and reconstruction. We commend the African Union and the countries of the region for their contribution to the fight against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.

We call on the international community to continue to help Somalia in its State-building efforts. We support the African Union Mission in Somalia and the Somali National Army in their efforts to speedily achieve peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. The Horn of Africa is geographically important, and peace and stability there have a direct bearing on the interests of the countries of the region, which should live side by side as neighbours and belong to an interdependent community with a shared future and intertwined interests. They all face the important task of achieving economic development and improving the benefits to their people, which will require a peaceful and stable environment. Harmony benefits the countries of the region, whereas confrontation harms them.

China sincerely hopes that the countries of the region will take into account the bigger picture of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa and the fundamental interests of its peoples, strengthen good-neighbourly relationships, promote unity and cooperation, and reconcile their differences through dialogue and consultation, which are in the common interests of all the countries of the region.

The sanctions set out in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council are not conducive to achieving the aforementioned objectives. China hopes that the Security Council will take the changes on the ground into account, continuously revisit the relevant content of its resolutions, and make timely adjustments. China also hopes that the relevant country will adhere to the principle of maintaining friendly relations with its neighbours, heed their legitimate concerns and adopt practical measures to improve relations with its neighbours so as to achieve common security, mutual benefits and win-win outcomes.

China is ready to continue to play its constructive role in achieving peace, stability and development in the Horn of Africa.

Mr. Lucas (Angola): Today, the Security Council has adopted resolution 2317 (2016), renewing the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. Angola supports the Monitoring Group and welcomes its tireless efforts to engage with all the parties and contribute to the improvement of the security situation in the region and to the compliance of United Nations Member States with the sanctions regime imposed on Somalia and Eritrea.

And yet, Angola abstained in the voting today. We would like to outline the reasons for our vote.

Regarding Somalia, the activities of the Monitoring Group have contributed significantly to improving the security situation in the country, as mandated by the Council. Regarding Eritrea, it should be noted that, for the third consecutive year, the Monitoring Group has found no evidence of Eritrean support to the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab. The sanctions regime has proven to be fruitful, but it must be terminated when the reasons for its establishment no longer exist. That should be done through a process in which the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea continues to inform the Security Council on the situation and support the international community's efforts to bring stability to the Horn of Africa.

A constructive proposal has been put forward for the establishment of a road map conducive to changing the sanctions regime, based on conditions to be agreed by the Security Council. That proposal would be an additional encouragement to the Government of Eritrea to engage further with the international community. The proposal has not been given due consideration, which we deeply regret. We take note of the efforts of the penholder to bring more balance to the text. We hope that in future, more constructive engagement among members of the Security Council will achieve the necessary unity among all its members.

Ms. Coleman (United States of America): The United States strongly supports resolution 2317 (2016), which targets many of the most serious causes of instability in the Horn of Africa and mandates the United Nations Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group to continue its crucial work. Renewing that mandate reflects the Security Council's understanding that sanctions regimes are an important part of the international community's comprehensive response to the situation in the Horn of Africa.

First, on Eritrea, I would like to point out that, while Eritrea calls for the lifting of United Nations sanctions, as have several members of the Council, the lack of engagement by Eritrea with the United Nations Monitoring Group — under a Security Council Chapter VII mandate — is not the path to lifting sanctions. Eritrea has not been forthcoming with information with regard to its support to regional armed groups. And, while the Monitoring Group has not found evidence of Eritrea's support to Al-Shabaab, it is difficult to corroborate that information, because the Monitoring Group has not been allowed to visit the country in five years. While Eritrea has released some Djiboutian prisoners of war, it has not been forthcoming with information on any remaining such prisoners. That lack of cooperation must change if the Council is to take seriously Eritrea's calls to lift sanctions.

Turning to Somalia, during the 21 September high-level meeting on Somalia, Council members widely affirmed that Somalia had transitioned from State failure to State-building. Today Somalia stands at a critical junction to solidify its political and security gains. That is why the United States strongly supported language in the resolution that reflects the Security Council's commitment to eliminate all sources of funding for Al-Shabaab, a group that continues to attack innocent civilians and to threaten the peace and stability of both Somalia and the region. The resolution also supports the Government's efforts at security-sector reform, including developing a professional army.

We also support the resolution because it acknowledges several of the Government's goals, including its intention to seek greater international recognition and support for its efforts to address extensive illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in waters where it has jurisdiction. It also makes clear that the mismanagement of public funds in Somalia will undercut the credibility of governance, the gains made in the country and its prospects for future growth in Somalia. By supporting the full implementation reflected in today's resolution, Member States would help to promote the long-term peace and stability of the broader region.

In conclusion, Somalis are laying the foundation for a more stable, representative and inclusive Government. The United States stands by Somalia and the international community. The Council must remain engaged to ensure that Somalia and the region achieve a more peaceful future. We thank Council members for joining with us in sending that strong message today.

Mr. Iliichev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): Like other members of the Security Council, we would love to see the swift establishment of solid peace and stability in Somalia and Eritrea and throughout the entire Horn of Africa. However, we were forced to abstain in the voting on resolution 2317 (2016) for the following reasons.

Support by Eritrea to the Al-Shabaab terrorist group and the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea were the main criteria for imposing restrictive measures on Asmara in 2009. Since then, however, the situation on the ground has changed significantly. In its reports three years in a row, the Monitoring Group concluded that there was no evidence of Eritrea providing assistance to Al-Shabaab and that the border dispute with Djibouti has been settled through Qatar's mediation. Allegations that Eritrea is allegedly supporting regional armed groups are uncorroborated. It therefore looks as if the reasons that led to the need to impose sanctions simply no longer exist. The sanctions regime against Eritrea has not taken that into account, and they have remained unchanged. In that regard, perhaps the time has come to draw up a road map for the gradual lifting of sanctions against Eritrea, as suggested by a number of delegations in the course of work on the resolution.

Mr. Aboulatta (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like briefly to explain the reasons that prompted my delegation to abstain in the voting on resolution 2317 (2016), concerning extending the sanctions regime on Somalia and Eritrea and on prolonging the mandate of the Monitoring Group.

We would have liked the wording used in the resolution to be more balanced in the light of the information contained in the Monitoring Group's report, namely, the lack of any evidence of Eritrea's support to Al-Shabaab, as well as the positive developments

with regard to Djibouti prisoners. We think that clearer criteria should be used when the Security Council takes the necessary steps to review the sanctions imposed against Eritrea — criteria that could encourage the country to cooperate with the Council by showing a clear commitment to uphold its various obligations under Council resolutions. That should be done with a view to promoting peace and security and stability in the Horn of Africa, as well as to resolve all the concerns of the countries of the region, in particular with regard to the humanitarian aspect. In that regard, priority should be accorded to providing information on the fate of the Djibouti soldiers who disappeared during military operations.

Allow me to state that our abstaining in the voting is fully in line with our constant position on the issue of sanctions. Sanctions must be used not as an end in and of themselves, but as a necessary temporary measure with clear limits used to achieve a political goal. It is unacceptable for sanctions to continue endlessly and without any time-bound criteria. It is also important that we deal with sanctions in a sufficiently flexible manner so that they can be reviewed in line with new information on the ground.

Despite the efforts made and the flexibility we demonstrated to achieve the compromise we wanted, the resolution presented to the Council today did not include the proposals of some Council members, including my delegation. They included ideas reflecting the trends to which I have just referred. That is why we were unable to vote in favour of the resolution.

With regard to Somalia, my delegation underscores yet again the importance of accepting the provisions set out in the resolution with a view to ending the provision of weapons to terrorist groups and cut off their sources of funding, so as to allow for effective counter-terrorism efforts and restore peace and security in the country.

Mr. Ramírez Carreño (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela abstained in the voting on resolution 2317 (2016), for we believe that the part referring to Eritrea, as presented to us, is unfair. As Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, we have been working closely on that issue for almost two years. This is the last time that we will be participating in a vote on this text. We are obliged to say that what is taking place in the Committee is another clear example of how sanctions seem, for some permanent members, to be an end in themselves rather than mechanisms to resolve political problems that arise.

Sanctions ought to be a political instrument that achieve a specific objective. They should not become a mechanism used for the collective punishment of a country. In the case of Eritrea, sanctions should have a clear road map towards a conclusion. By maintaining prolonged sanctions, as we are currently doing, there is no political purpose beyond serving the national interests of members of the Council or of regional situations that, as bilateral issues between countries, cannot be addressed as a multilateral issue to which we apply sanctions with a specific objective in mind.

We are concerned that in most cases, the Sanctions Committee uses the opinions and observations of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea at their whim. In some cases, when the Group says that something warrants sanctions, even without objective evidence, the Sanctions Committee immediately accepts the Group's opinion as valid, rather than one they need to consider more closely before taking action. We think it is the opposite. The Group submits a professional opinion — and I take this opportunity to acknowledge and express appreciation for the Monitoring Group — indicating that we ought to lift sanctions against Eritrea. However, neither the penholder nor some of the members of the Sanctions Committee wish to heed the recommendations coming from the Monitoring Group because they believe that they are insufficient. There seems to a be double standard with which we deal with the opinions of the Monitoring Group. Sometimes we accept its opinions when it suits the penholder countries to maintain sanctions against a country, yet whenever it presents an opinion contrary to the interest of those countries, as in the case of Eritrea, suddenly that opinion is insufficient.

In the final report of the Monitoring Group, it was very clear in the case of Eritrea that for the third consecutive year there was no evidence whatsoever that Eritrea was collaborating with or lending any support to Al-Shabaab. It was clearly stated that there was no evidence. The Committee has always received information related to groups in various countries of the region, but it does not take such information into account. That is the first, very important element of the Monitoring Group. I do not know what else we want to receive from the Monitoring Group, but it seems clear

that there is no cooperation between Al-Shabaab and Eritrea, which was the original cause of the sanctions.

Furthermore, in our final report we recognized the cooperation of the State of Qatar. Here we wish to thank the Permanent Representative of Qatar, Ambassador Al-Thani, for his efforts to mediate between Djibouti and Eritrea, both to resolve the issue of the border dispute, which is in a signed agreement between the countries, as well as to obtain the release of prisoners of war, which we welcome. That was a positive development in the Committee. The Ambassador of Qatar promised that Qatar would continue to mediate effectively and directly in an ongoing manner with those countries. In any normal situation, those elements would have been enough, not to lift the sanctions because it would need a road map but to at least establish a mechanism that would eventually lead to the lifting of the sanctions following an assessment.

We have been very concerned and have always expressed those concerns in debates about the Monitoring Group's methodology and transparency. What is the road map that ensures that a country can have a sanctions regime against it lifted? Here we only seek to come up with a mechanism. The delegation of China offered a very significant proposal that laid out a time frame during which we could work towards lifting sanctions against Eritrea. We believe that we should lift sanctions against Eritrea if we can draw up a road map. The proposal of China garnered the support of five countries, which is a sign important number. The penholder seems to believe that the proposal is not appropriate and that there is not sufficient reason to do so, and therefore the adoption of that balanced proposal did not take place.

Even though the draft was not adopted, it was at least the beginning of steps in the right direction. That is why we decided to abstain in the voting on resolution 2317 (2016). Until there is something new to give us reason to believe that we can extricate ourselves from the situation we cannot offer our support. We lament the situation and do not see how the issues at hand can be resolved within the framework of the mandate of the Sanctions Committee. We have always said that the Sanctions Committees have had to have an immediate political aim. They cannot always be used way of delivering collective punishment.

It does not seem to matter much in the decision on the resolution or in the Committee what Eritrea does regarding its positive steps forward or the report of the Monitoring Group. It does not make sense — the meetings, the initiatives and so on and so forth. Eventually, the decision comes down to one or a few permanent members. That is something we need to review.

With respect to the issue of Somalia and Eritrea, we support elements of resolution 2317 (2016) because we believe that Somalia continues to need all the support of the Sanctions Committee in order to take on its upcoming challenges. In the case of Eritrea, it seems to us that the Sanctions Committee and the Security Council must demonstrate sufficient flexibility and political capacity to understand that the situation in the Horn of Africa is changing rapidly and that there are huge dangers facing the entire region. The fundamental danger in that area is the threat of expansion of terrorism. That is not just a threat to the Horn of Africa. It is also a threat to the global North and the Middle East. We call on the Council to constructively set about resolving that type of issue and to ensure that the reports or the work of the Sanctions Committees do not become mere red tape. At the end of the day, only one or two permanent members will have their way. It signals defeat because it means that the penholder could not achieve consensus on the subject. We did not vote against the resolution because a regional situation exists that must resolved. In addition, there was only one minor mention — albeit important — about the issue of evaluating the lifting of sanctions.

I would also like to remember here Ambassador Girma Asmerom Tesfay — a good friend and an Ambassador who represented his country's interests well — who regrettably died without seeing his country freed from an issue that caused him so much concern. Once again, I would like to extend our condolences to the delegation of Eritrea and make an appeal in the interest of all the countries of Africa so that the continent can have greater tangible support from the Security Council to resolve its problems. Seventy per cent of the sanctions committees are against African countries and, in the majority of cases, the former colonial Powers are heading those sanctions committees against Africa. We should think about that. We in Latin and South America will continue working in line with our capacities to achieve political solutions to all of the terrible conflicts that affect our brother countries.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Eritrea.

Mr. Giorgio (Eritrea): I would like to thank you, Sir, for giving my delegation this opportunity to address the Security Council. Allow me to also congratulate Senegal on assuming the presidency of the Council for the month of November.

Eritrea believes that, once again, the Security Council has committed a grave injustice against the people of Eritrea by extending the unjustified sanctions. There is no reason to maintain sanctions against Eritrea, as the justification for them being imposed has long been proved non-existent, a fact that has been asserted by the Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Group. In four of its reports, including during its present mandate, the Monitoring Group affirmed that there is no evidence of Eritrean support to Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

With regard to Djibouti, Eritrea remains committed to the mediation by the State of Qatar, which resulted in the release of all Djiboutian prisoners of war last March. The report (see S/2016/920) of the Monitoring Group makes it clear that all its interlocutors mention only seven prisoners of war in Eritrea, who are all accounted for. For its part, Eritrea has confirmed that there are no more Djiboutian prisoners on its hands. In the light of the reports of the Monitoring Group and serious developments in the region, it is incumbent upon the Security Council to lift the unfair, unjust and counterproductive sanctions on Eritrea without further delay.

Eritrea is keenly aware that, failing to find any substantive argument to continue the sanctions, some members of the Council have resorted to procedural matters, such as, in particular, the inability of the Monitoring Group to visit Eritrea. Truth be told, that is not the real reason for their determination to keep the sanctions in place. In fact, some of them have made it clear that even if the Group were to visit Eritrea, they would still not support the lifting of the sanctions.

The sanctions, which have been in place for the past seven years, have been detrimental not only to Eritrea but also to the Horn of Africa region. It has encouraged zero-sum approaches and imparted a sense of impunity to some countries and emboldened them to violate international law as well as to externalize their problems instead of cooperating with their neighbours to address the serious challenges of regional peace and security. Unfortunately, once again, the Security Council has missed an opportunity to contribute positively to regional peace, stability and amity, by maintaining the sanctions on Eritrea. For its part, Eritrea will continue making its positive contribution to regional peace, stability and security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea regions.

In conclusion, Eritrea wishes to sincerely thank those delegations that advocated for the immediate lifting of the sanctions and those who have dissociated themselves from today's unfair and unwarranted resolution 2017 (2016).

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Djibouti.

Mr. Doualeh (Djibouti): At the outset, Djibouti wishes to express its profound gratitude to the members of the Council for this opportunity to offer Djibouti's perspective on the status of the mediation between Djibouti and Eritrea and to share some recent negative developments that constitute a violation of the Security Council's repeated demand that Eritrea cease arming, training and equipping armed grounds, including Al-Shabaab.

Djibouti feels compelled to make this contribution today because Eritrea has often offered a misleading and deceptive account of the progress made on the implementation of the 2010 mediation agreement signed by Djibouti and Qatar, in an unconvincing attempt to justify a call for the rescinding of the sanctions imposed on Eritrea by resolutions 1907 (2009), 2023 (2011), 2044 (2012) and 2317 (2016), just adopted today.

In various forums, Eritrea has often cynically characterized the border dispute with Djibouti as one of the pretexts under which the sanctions were justified and invoked the 10 June mediation agreement facilitated by His Highness the Emir of Qatar as a purported basis for rescinding sanctions. But it would be no exaggeration to state that the assertion that Eritrea is fully committed to Qatari mediation process is dishonest and not proved by the facts.

With respect to prisoners of war, the mediation agreement includes a single provision that each State promptly provide a list of names and identification numbers of all prisoners of war and other missing persons held in its custody. Djibouti did just that. Nearly six years have passed and Eritrea still refuses to provide the list or otherwise account for the remaining Djiboutians it has in its custody, incommunicado, and in the most inhuman and degrading conditions for the past eight years. Djibouti was hopeful that the release

of four prisoners of war earlier this year would signal a radical departure from past practices and induce a change in the behaviour of the State of Eritrea. Denial, obfuscation and procrastination belong to the past. The Secretary-General, and indeed the international community as a whole, welcomed that development as positive and expressed hope that tangible progress would be made — but that hope quickly vanished.

Instead of honouring its international obligations and commitments, Eritrea has continued to conduct activities aimed at destabilizing the region and inciting violent strife in Djibouti, as documented in the report (see S/2016/920) of the Somalia/Eritrea Monitoring Group, but has also provided weapons and ammunition to Al-Shabaab in Somalia. We have provided evidence of that to the Monitoring Group and the members of the Security Council and we stand ready to provide additional information. It is in violation of Security Council resolutions and runs counter to our collective efforts. That justifies the strengthening of sanctions, not rescinding them.

In its most recent open debate (see S/PV.7802), the Security Council carefully analysed the magnitude of the threats posed by asymmetrical attacks by terrorists and other armed groups targeting peacekeepers. Once again, Djibouti just recently lost soldiers to such attacks in Somalia. But, of course, we will continue to support our brothers and sisters in Somalia at this critical juncture of the political process.

We all face competing priorities as developing countries. One wonders why a developing country with so many challenges would divert precious funds destined for its development efforts to undertake activities that aim at undermining peace in the region.

In conclusion, allow me to thank the members of the Security Council for their continued vigilance and support for the legitimate goals pursued by Djibouti, in particular the settlement of the border dispute with Eritrea and the release of all 13 prisoners of war.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.7808

Security Council

Seventy-first year

Provisional

7808th meeting

Thursday, 10 November 2016, 10.55 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Seck	(Senegal)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Lucas
	China	Mr. Wu Haitao
	Egypt	Mr. Kandeel
	France	Mr. Lamek
	Japan	Mr. Bessho
	Malaysia	Mrs. Adnin
	New Zealand	Mr. Walbridge
	Russian Federation	Mr. Iliichev
	Spain	Mr. Gasso Matoses
	Ukraine	Mr. Vitrenko
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Rycroft
	United States of America	Ms. Power
	Uruguay	Mrs. Carrión
	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Mr. Ramirez Carreño

Agenda

United Nations peacekeeping operations

Police Commissioners

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

United Nations peacekeeping operations

Police Commissioners

The President (*spoke in French*): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Mr. Bruce Munyambo, Police Commissioner of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan; Ms. Priscilla Makotose, Police Commissioner of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur; Mr. Georges-Pierre Monchotte, Police Commissioner of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti; and Mr. Issoufou Yacouba, Police Commissioner of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The intention is for this meeting to be as interactive as possible, along the lines of the briefing held last November (see S/PV.7558) and our dialogues with the Force Commanders. We look forward to questions from Council members to the Commissioners and from the Commissioners to the Council.

I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Mr. Ladsous (*spoke in French*): I wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the Senegalese presidency for this fresh opportunity for dialogue with police officials as part of the annual week for United Nations police in New York — a week that is always, and perhaps even more so this year, an opportunity to discuss all the challenges our police forces face and what must be done to improve our tools. This meeting comes two years after the very important adoption of resolution 2185 (2014), which was the first of its kind in the history of the Security Council, as it was the first time that the Council recognized the central role of Blue Helmets in peacekeeping operations.

Today, we have chosen what we have found useful in the current context in our various theatres of operations — four aspects represented by the presence of four of our Police Commissioners on the ground: the protection of civilians; the integration of a gender perspective; building police capacities; and personnel security, behaviour and discipline. I will therefore be very brief, since the Council is here to listen to them rather than me.

First, with regard to the protection of civilians, it is clear that we are dealing with enormous challenges on the ground. We see it every day in South Sudan, and Commissioner Munyambo will be discussing that. I would like to remind the Council, as I have done before, that the protection of civilians we have been managing in South Sudan is not something we should be cutting back on, since the 200,000 displaced persons in the camps owe the fact that they are still alive to the United Nations, and to the United Nations police in particular. Were it not for that, many of them would not be here. At the same time, however, that creates an enormous organization problem when it comes to running the camps in South Sudan's current chaotic environment. Regardless, that compels us to consider how to improve the situation on the protection front and what tools, techniques and talents we need in order to optimize the joint functioning of the civilian and military components.

Secondly, we have the issue of ensuring full gender integration. That is extremely important to us, and Commissioner Makotose will be discussing it, for the reasons we are well aware of — first, because women, like children, are particularly at risk in most of the situations on the ground, and we have to take that into account — and also because we need to have more women in posts. We have in fact reached a level where 20 per cent of our individual police officers are women, in accordance with the goal established by the Secretary-General, but we have to do better, just as we have to do much better with female formed police units. I have seen them on the ground in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti, and that is responding to a genuine need, but women make up only 7 per cent of formed police units. That is not enough, because we need them not only for conducting dialogue but also for sharing information on the ground, which women are especially equipped to do.

Thirdly, capacity-building is crucial to enabling us to support political processes, redeployment and the re-establishment of the Government on the ground. Those who have heard this before will have to forgive me for quoting myself yet again, but, as we say in

French, in many situations good behaviour starts with a healthy fear of the police. When the people see police out there, they say there you are, the Government is back and functioning. And that is all about the rule of law. We will be hearing from Commissioner Monchotte, who sees that routinely in Haiti. By the way, the Office of Internal Oversight Services recently carried out an assessment that recommended making efforts to better align the goals mandated for our police officers and to improve the level of resources available to them. I think that is the case in Haiti, where there is no question that we need to create a post for a deputy chief of police, among other things. We have to monitor things carefully in order to ensure that all these demands are properly aligned within a realistic time frame.

Fourthly, there is the security of our personnel, especially in areas where that is an issue, such as in Mali, about which Commissioner Yacouba will be sharing his experiences of operating in an area where the threats come on a daily basis. We are unfortunately seeing victims of this all too often, and the human costs for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali are far too high. That is all because we are dealing there on the ground with a terrible combination of criminal networks, extremist groups and political stakeholders who are not always very transparent about what they are doing. Those are four illustrations of what we have to deal with, and while they are to some extent dictated by current events, any issue can be tackled within the framework they represent.

I would like to take a moment to emphasize the importance of taking better account of the constraints that our police are dealing with on the ground in terms of their welfare. We continue to see considerable disparities between the working conditions of various types of personnel, even when they are doing pretty much the same jobs. Some are treated very differently from others, and that cannot help having an impact on morale and therefore to some extent on performance, particularly for those serving in very problematic areas, such as Libya and Somalia. We therefore have to revisit our approach to mission subsistence allowances and allowances for service in dangerous conditions. That is a real issue; we are working on it, and the Secretary-General has been made aware of it.

I have one last comment on conduct and discipline. As the Council knows, our police officers spare no effort to implement resolution 2272 (2016), which the Council adopted in March, and all the measures discussed in the Secretary-General's report on sexual conduct (A/70/729), an area where the police have a specific role to play regarding punishment as well as prevention and, especially, assistance to victims.

In conclusion, the Secretary-General will shortly be issuing his second report on United Nations policing, and in that context, we will be relying the support of the Security Council more than ever to enable us to implement the report's recommendations as effectively and efficiently as possible. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank and pay tribute to our policemen and -women for their untiring efforts in the field to save lives and contribute to stability — sadly, work that is not without considerable risk but which they do with commendable courage and determination.

The President *(spoke in French)*: I thank Mr. Ladsous for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Munyambo.

Mr. Munyambo: One year ago, when the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) last briefed the Security Council on its policing contribution (see S/PV.7558), South Sudan found itself at a crossroads. The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan had been signed only a few months earlier. Regrettably, despite the initial progress on ending the fighting and starting the complex task of implementing the Agreement, the July outbreak of fighting in Juba between the Sudan People's Liberation Army and the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition dealt a major setback to that progress. During the year, UNMISS has faced some very significant challenges in its work of protecting civilians and engaging communities in South Sudan. Today I would like to focus on the unique experiences of the United Nations police (UNPOL) in South Sudan by outlining the challenges we continue to face and the priorities we have identified for creating the conditions necessary for peace in a very complex peacekeeping context.

The protection of civilians is at the core of the UNMISS mandate. Since the beginning of this conflict, in 2013, close to 2.6 million people have been forced to flee their homes, including more than 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). Some 200,000 of these IDPs have sought refuge in United Nations protection-of-civilian sites. New clashes of a varied nature in multiple locations since July have left even greater numbers of people displaced. Sadly, more than

16,000 children have reportedly been recruited by armed actors. UNMISS has received several reports of serious human rights violations and abuses, including reports of the rape and gang rape of women and girls, particularly in Juba and Wau, perpetrated by armed men in uniform.

In this context, UNPOL is in the forefront of the Mission's efforts to protect civilians in the UNMISS protection-of-civilians sites in Juba, Bentiu, Malakal, Bor and Wau, and those that are vulnerable outside our sites. UNPOL operations include maintaining order and a protective environment in those sites through a permanent presence, regular cordon and search operations for contraband, including weapons, access control, and crowd control. These operations have necessitated the establishment of holding facilities in Malakal, Bentiu and Juba, which, in the absence of an executive mandate and Government cooperation, has presented unique challenges for UNMISS, with some people subjected to long-term detention for as long as up to two years.

A key enabling factor underpinning all UNPOL activities in South Sudan is community engagement. For example, in Juba, UNPOL conducts joint patrols with the UNMISS force and other Mission components outside the protection-of-civilians sites in order to extend protection through a forward-leaning posture and presence. This enables greater interaction with the communities and has had positive effects in building trust among the population and gathering information that enhances policing. A recent innovative measure is the establishment of a 200-metre weapon-free zone around the protection-of-civilians sites in Juba, where the Mission conducts confidence-building patrols and regular search operations to get rid of weapons and prevent armed elements from entering into the sites.

Despite our best efforts to proactively engage the communities both within and outside the protection-of-civilians sites, the security context in South Sudan is placing significant demands on UNPOL. We are working systematically to increase police numbers so as to expeditiously reach the mandated ceiling. Importantly, we are also working closely with the Secretariat and Member States to attract police officers with the requisite skill sets. In the current context, we need highly skilled officers in the areas of information-gathering and analysis, crime prevention and specialized issues such as combating sexual-violence-related crimes.

Another priority for UNMISS is to improve UNPOL's ability to address the potential future crises that could result from South Sudan's political situation. During 2016, UNMISS experienced several major crises, beginning with the attack on the Malakal protection-of-civilians site in February, followed by the violence in Wau in June, and the heavy fighting in Juba in July. These crises placed unprecedented demands on UNPOL. In Wau, 32 individual police officers, together with their military and civilian colleagues, successfully managed to receive and protect more than 20,000 IDPs who within a few days had assembled outside the UNMISS base. Recognizing the scale of the escalating situation, the Mission reinforced our police presence in Wau with 60 formed police units from Bentiu. The fact that less than 100 United Nations police personnel have been able to maintain order in the Wau protection-of-civilians site, which now houses close to 25,000 IDPs, speaks to the professionalism, dedication and hard work of our police officers.

The crises in Malakal and Juba, where the protection-of-civilians sites and UNMISS premises were either directly attacked or caught in heavy crossfire, tested UNPOL. One lesson I have derived from these experiences is the importance of ensuring that all police officers have not only the relevant skill sets but also the right mindset to respond quickly and appropriately to a crisis situation. This requires strong leadership, regular scenario-based training with other Mission counterparts, and accountability. Since July, UNMISS has taken several steps to improve the ability of the force and UNPOL to respond robustly when fighting erupts. We have adopted a new standard operating procedure mandating formed police units to respond both inside and outside protection-of-civilians sites. We are regularly conducting joint scenario-based training with the Force and the Department of Safety and Security.

Despite our attention to improving performance, much more can be done, in close partnership with the Secretariat and Member States. Allow me to outline three priorities for UNPOL that would help it better to respond to the significant challenges I have presented here today.

First, in order to improve UNPOL's operational capacity, we are trying to attract more officers who are trained to respond to protection needs, in addition to formed police units with contingent-owned equipment, including vehicles suitable for the terrain and security

threats, and sniffer dogs to assist with weapon searches. This will significantly enhance UNMISS management of protection-of-civilians sites, including crowd management, access control, patrols and 24-hour police post activities.

The second priority is aimed at enhancing community outreach inside and outside protection-of-civilians sites. With improved operational capacity, more officers can be dedicated to enhancing communities' ability to identify and respond to threats. If the security situation improves and more IDPs express an interest in returning to their homes, UNPOL will resume its pre-crisis plans to conduct confidence- and trust-building patrols in identified areas for returnees.

Both of these areas will also be enhanced by the third priority, which is to sensitize the local police force to identify and respond to human rights violations. UNPOL recognizes that the national authorities have primary responsibility for the protection of civilians, to investigate violations and to ensure that perpetrators are held to account. Their role could be enhanced by a strengthened national police presence in key areas affected by the conflict, as stipulated by the peace agreement, as well as working in a collaborative and coordinated manner with UNMISS.

In conclusion, as we meet here today, South Sudan finds itself yet again at a crossroads where the peace process is very fragile. It is our sincere hope that the collective efforts of the United Nations, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the rest of the international community will assist South Sudan in returning to an inclusive peace process, which is a prerequisite for creating a peaceful, safe and secure environment in the country.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Munyambo for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Ms. Makotose.

Ms. Makotose: In 2016, the situation in Darfur was characterized by three factors. First, despite the continuing negotiations, the Government and the armed movements have yet to reach a comprehensive political solution to the conflict.

Secondly, the conflict between Government forces and the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid began with intense clashes during the first half of the year, followed by continued intermittent fighting in Jebel Marra. More than 80,000 civilians were confirmed displaced as a result, while an additional 117,000 have not been verified due to a denial of access to conflict areas.

Thirdly, while the mediation efforts of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in the more proactive role of State Governments contributed to a decrease in the overall number of intercommunal clashes, the root causes remained largely unaddressed. Incidents of violence against the civilian population, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), continued to be commonplace. UNAMID and humanitarian actors continued to face challenges in implementing their mandates.

In line with the strategic priorities of the Mission, the police component prioritizes its resources and activities to support the physical protection of civilians, thereby creating a protective environment through the development of community-oriented policing. As illustrated in the police-to-task review in April and the special report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (see S/2016/510), gender-sensitive policing is essential to fulfil those tasks. Currently, UNAMID has the greatest number of female police officers among all United Nations peacekeeping missions. Two hundred and sixty-seven, or 19 per cent, of UNAMID's individual police officers are women. Women hold 17 key positions. Four are professional or higher ranking positions, including my own. Thirteen female officers also hold commanding and supervisory positions at Headquarters. Female officers are encouraged to apply for senior positions, and special consideration is given in granting them extensions to their tour of duty.

That is not only important with regard to gender balancing but also contributes to the effective implementation of mandated tasks. Female officers participate in all activities, including patrols, family and child protection, gender-awareness and community-oriented policing. They also act as role models, inspiring Darfuri women and girls to advocate for and defend their rights. In particular, female officers contribute to greater and wider access to vulnerable groups. Interaction with communities is critical for information gathering and analysis and enhances early warning. UNAMID police collate information on security and receive reports of criminal incidents including sexual and gender-based violence and other human rights violations. The information is verified and shared with other Mission components, the police

of the host State and the local population in line with the do-no-harm principle. Furthermore, UNAMID police, in collaboration with the military, conduct targeted patrols that focus on areas in which violations perpetrated against women and children occur most frequently, such as water points, firewood-collection areas and markets.

To effectively meet the security needs of IDPs, primarily focusing on women and children at risk, UNAMID police have fully embraced gender sensitivity policing practices. Notably, UNAMID has ensured that UNAMID women police officers are deployed at every team site. UNAMID police also support the recruitment and training of women in both the Government of the Sudanese police force and the community policing volunteers among IDPs. The current strength of the Sudanese police in Darfur stands at approximately 14,000, 4 per cent of whom are women. Gender balance is critical to building confidence in communities and encouraging victims to report abuses to Sudanese police officers of their choosing. Given that women are disproportionately affected by sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, an increased female police presence across Darfur will ensure more access to justice for the victims.

Through outreach initiatives in communities, UNAMID police encourages Darfuri women, including IDPs, to enlist in the police force. In parallel, UNAMID police's interactions with the senior leadership of the Government of the Sudanese police force focus on increasing the number of women and transforming it into an increasingly representative police force. More specifically, the UNAMID Police Women's Network supported the establishment of seven family- and child-protection units in the Government of Sudan's police force across the five States. While continuing sensitization on gender mainstreaming and sexual and gender-based violence, they also work towards empowering female officers in the Sudanese police by supporting the founding and operationalization of the Sudanese Police Women's Network.

UNAMID police have also strengthened community-oriented policing practices through the recruitment and training of 3,529 community policing volunteers, 29 per cent of whom are women. As part of the operationalization of the United Nations police gender toolkit, UNAMID has developed a guideline on gender mainstreaming, as well as a community policing framework to guide the selection and qualification process of community policing volunteers. The community policing volunteer system has contributed increasingly to the safety and security in IDP camps through their joint efforts with UNAMID police and in some cases with the Sudanese police. That has contributed to a reduction of crime and enhanced the sense of security in communities. Information sharing with the Government of the Sudan's police has improved and helped speed up investigations. It has also assisted in improving trust and promoting partnership between communities and the Sudanese police on security coordination matters.

UNAMID police fully adhere to and implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse. That extends to addressing other forms of misconduct through preventative measures. The conduct of United Nations police personnel is key to ensuring that our efforts are sustainable and not in vain. More specifically, I have issued a directive to ensure that all members of the police component are to be briefed on the United Nations policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

As role models, police commanders and team leaders are trained to strictly comply with the Secretary-General's directives on sexual exploitation and abuse. A communication strategy has been developed and is being implemented to ensure that information materials on sexual exploitation and abuse are available at all team sites. Furthermore, UNAMID police play a vital role in facilitating the outreach of the Conduct and Discipline Team of the Mission to increase awareness of sexual exploitation and abuse and other forms of misconduct, as well as available reporting mechanisms. UNAMID police have also actively participated in the Mission's task force on sexual exploitation and abuse and contributed to improved reporting and swift investigations by the Immediate Response Team. UNAMID police have recorded no substantial case of sexual exploitation and abuse. As the only female Police Commissioner out of all United Nations peacekeeping missions, I have been and remain fully committed to that important and ongoing effort.

Finally, allow me to reiterate, Sir, our commitment to Member States and the people in Darfur. As we all know, there are many challenges that UNAMID police face in implementing its mandate. However, United Nations police officers are the daily interface between Darfuris, the United Nations and the African Union. I appeal for the continued support from the Security

Council in our endeavour and would like to express my sincere gratitude for the opportunity to present our gender mainstreaming efforts to you.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Ms. Makotose for her briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Monchotte.

Mr. Monchotte: Before I begin today, I would like to thank the Security Council for this opportunity to speak on how the police component of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) helps develop the policing capacities of the Haitian National Police (HNP).

On behalf of all MINUSTAH police personnel and colleagues, let me also express gratitude to the Security Council and the police-contributing countries for their continued support for Haiti's ongoing stabilization efforts and their solidarity with the people of Haiti, following the tragic loss of life and destruction inflicted by Hurricane Matthew.

In 2004, when MINUSTAH was established with a mandate to contribute to the restructuring and reform of the HNP and to create a secure and stable environment, the HNP was only nine years old and had an inadequate budget. The security situation in Haiti was a cause for concern, with only approximately 6,300 insufficiently equipped and trained police officers, who were not able to maintain law and order. The majority of the HNP's facilities were damaged or destroyed during the fighting and looting experienced in the early months of 2004. Key branches of the HNP and other institutions were dysfunctional or did not exist, including the General Inspectorate and the National Police Academy. Armed gangs competed for control over areas in Port-au-Prince. High homicide and kidnapping rates aggravated social instability, and the population's confidence in the HNP was very low.

Originally, MINUSTAH was authorized to have 6,700 military and 1,622 police personnel. Changing political and security circumstances and the capacity-building requirements of the HNP resulted in the progressive reversal of the military-to-police ratio, with the police component currently having an authorized strength of 2,601 police personnel while the military component has an authorized strength of 2,370 troops.

Following the earthquake in January 2010, MINUSTAH, including its police component, redirected significant amounts of resources to supporting the emergency and recovery efforts of Haiti. For 18 months, capacity-building activities were partially suspended.

Throughout MINUSTAH's existence, the police component carefully tailored its assistance in key policing areas to the priorities of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the HNP, specifically professionalizing the HNP, strengthening its operational capacity, developing its institutional capacity and reinforcing the national and international institutional relationships of the HNP. This approach resulted in the sustained development and implementation of several five-year plans, namely, the HNP Reform Plan, covering 2006 to 2011, and the HNP Development Plan 2012-2016, which will expire next month. In June, the HNP initiated the development of a strategic plan for the period 2017-2021, and its adoption is expected in the coming months. The plan sets a direction for long-term HNP institution-building goals to create an effective response capacity for addressing the variety of threats Haiti faces.

The co-location of MINUSTAH police officers, together with close coordination with national and international partners that have generously contributed to training, logistical support and the reconstruction of facilities, has resulted in visible progress in a number of areas, such as an increase in the police-to-population ratio, strengthened human-resources management, improved practices related to strategic planning and community-oriented policing through training at all police levels, augmented capacity of the judicial police and increased prevention of crime and violence.

Allow me to elaborate with a few examples. The HNP's presence throughout the country has expanded through the construction and reconstruction of police facilities and an increasing quantity and quality of officers deployed nationwide. At present, the HNP has an overall strength of about 13,100 officers, of whom 9 per cent are women, meaning a police-to-population ratio of around 1.3 officers per 1,000 inhabitants. This ratio has increased from 0.6 per thousand citizens, which was the level in 2004, and will gradually increase with the graduation of the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth classes of recruits scheduled for February and November 2017, respectively. With these graduating classes, the HNP will reach a minimum force of around 15,000 officers.

The recruitment and training system has been strengthened, including through the implementation

of a seven-month curriculum deployed in 2009, which is in line with international policing and human-rights standards. The system replaced the four-month training programme that had been used since 1995.

With respect to improving capacities, the HNP has made tremendous efforts to implement a vetting process and strengthen the General Inspectorate, which is responsible for the competence and integrity of HNP officers and removes those who have committed crimes or are involved in human-rights violations or corruption. Moreover, the HNP has increasingly been able to tackle the kidnapping phenomenon and reduce the number of homicides by dismantling existing or emerging criminal groups, even though the adoption of a national crime-prevention strategy to ensure sustainability is still awaiting adoption. The HNP has also assumed greater responsibility and leadership in securing recent elections.

Since 2004, the HNP has increased its capacity to maintain law and order, including through augmented territorial coverage, good crowd-control practices and anti-kidnapping and anti-narcotics operations. Nevertheless, challenges remain. They include, but are not limited to, capacities to maintain and repair assets, police intelligence and organized crime, firearms control, institutional policies, budget execution and strategic planning, as well as civil protection and community-oriented policing. The promotion and implementation of justice and corrections reforms in parallel to police reform is essential to ensuring access to justice, inclusiveness and, ultimately, sustainable development. The recent Office of Internal Oversight Services evaluation recognized the positive impact MINUSTAH police have had on strengthening PNH capacities, matching mandated tasks with available resources and time frames and taking into account external constraints, all of which were highlighted as indispensable elements for success.

It is critical for Haiti's long-term stability that capacity-building of the PNH remain a priority for the international community until the PNH can provide security for all Haitians. Efforts should follow a comprehensive rule-of-law strategy and lessons reflected in the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping. They should also be based on community engagement and build on security sector reform principles and human rights norms.

In the meantime, MINUSTAH needs the sustained support of police-contributing countries to attain qualified male and female individual police officers and formed police units, including as much as possible francophone and, of course, when possible, Haitian Creole skills.

Once again, I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this briefing and affording me an opportunity to address the Security Council today.

(*spoke in French*)

I thank the Council for its attention and once again express my gratitude for the efforts carried out those contributing to Haiti.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Monchotte for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Mr. Yacouba.

Mr. Yacouba (*spoke in French*): I would first like to express my gratitude for this opportunity to address the Security Council on various security aspects of the police of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

For reasons relating to the complexity and mulitdimensional nature of the crisis in Mali, the implementation process for the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation faces some serious challenges. Alliances between armed groups that are signatories to the agreement and/or non-signatory groups, as well as terrorist and criminal networks, are formed and disbanded at the will and in the interests of various players. That results in systematic attacks again i MINUSMA and Malian and Operation Barkhane forces, which demonstrate the determination of those groups to hamper the implementation of the Agreement.

Recurring armed rebellions in the north of Mali have lead to the emergence of organized crime, putting the authority of the State to the test. The security situation in the subregion, exacerbated by the Libyan crisis, appears to hold little promise, as demonstrated by the recent terrorist attacks in the Niger, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. A short while ago, terrorist acts were concentrated in the north but have now spread to the centre and, more recently, towards the south of the country. We can count at least eight terrorist groups that are officially active, without mentioning the possibility of emerging ceils in surrounding countries, which would also have an impact on Mali.

The figures speak for themselves: from January 2014 to 10 October 2016, 1,013 attacks were recorded against MINUSMA, non-governmental organizations, Mali's defence and security forces and the Malian population. During the same period, 210 incidents of rocket and mortar fire were reported against MINUSMA and Malian forces. In the past month, 66 attacks were perpetrated against MINUSMA, Malian forces and the civilian population in the regions of Gao, Mopti, Ménaka, Timbuktu and Kidal.

Resolution 2295 (2016) provides for responses that address not only the threats linked to organized crime in the Sahel region and its links with terrorism, but also the implementation of security measures set out in the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation, namely, the establishment of reformed defence and security institutions. In that context, Mali must play an active role in the framework of subregional organizations, particularly the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Joint Military Staff Committee. In that connection, the support of partners such as the European Union through the European Union Training Mission and European Union Capacity Building Mission is essential.

A national strategy for the prevention of violent radicalism and combating organized crime and terrorism is currently being developed by the Malian authorities with the support of the United Nations system and some technical partners. Furthermore, Mali has established a national centre for strategic studies on the subject. It is crucial that the legal framework be adopted in line with international legal instruments relating to terrorism and organized crime. The comprehensive strategic vision must take into account all aspects of the phenomenon as well as cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the relevant State and non-State entities in order to prevent threats linked to terrorism at the national, regional and international levels.

Awaiting the adoption of this strategy and so as to mitigate the impact of terrorist activities, MINUSMA has taken some palliative measures. I refer to the setting up of a cell against transnational organized crime; the establishment of a task force on terrorism with a view to developing synergic action and an integrated approach among all United Nations entities; the training of a weapons and intelligence team to deal with improvised explosive devices; and the establishment of a police laboratory to provide technical and scientific support and expertise to the judiciary counter-terrorism centre in Mali. That will be strengthened by the standing up of legal identity units in all investigative judiciary institutions in order to establish a centralized, viable and fully operational system for criminal data. In spite of all of those efforts, it is unfortunate that the specialised judiciary investigation brigade is still not operational.

Mindful that intelligence is the first line of defence against terrorism and organized crime, and pursuant to the current mandate, MINUSMA police have established an intelligence gathering and analysis plan. Forty-nine projects to strengthen the capacity of Mali's defence and security forces have been carried out. Nearly 14,000 personnel were trained in various technical fields. In addition, 302 civil servants serving in specialized units, including 36 women, received specific training. Those services benefit from multifaceted support through the comprehensive and coordinated approach of various MINUSMA sections, including the rule of law and security institutions.

The implementation of resolution 2295 (2016) has been fraught with challenges, particularly in security sector reform, where work has been delayed. The idea of territorial police is too contentious and requires clarification. In the meantime, introducing a neighbourhood policing approach should improve confidence between the Malian security forces and the people. One of the major challenges to the implementation of the mandate and the support of the Malian security forces lies in the deployment of specialized and French-speaking individual police officers. That requires the support of contributing States. Incidentally, such a commitment was undertaken by the representatives of States that participated in the Chiefs of Police Summit. Formed police units play an important role in protecting populations and United Nations personnel and entities through patrols and various operational activities. It is important to note that, in response to the security context, the number of armoured vehicles went from 6 to 10.

I would be remiss were I not to conclude by recalling that of MINUSMA police and other stakeholders support the reform of the Malian security forces. However, the plethora of terrorist attacks and other potential threats, as well as strains on human resources and logistics, are of utmost concern as we carry out our mandate. That is why the MINUSMA police continues to play its role through a comprehensive and integrated approach with a view to maintaining peace in Mali and the subregion.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Yacouba for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the members of the Council.

Mrs. Adnin (Malaysia): Allow me to first thank the President for convening such an important meeting. It is an important follow-up to the implementation of resolution 2185 (2014), which Malaysia fully supports.

I thank Under-Secretary-General Ladsous for his overview and add my voice in welcoming the Police Commissioners of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) to the Council, and in thanking them for their respective briefings, to which we have carefully listened.

It is clear that the majority of United Nations peace operations today are complex and multidimensional, with missions undertaking significantly more tasks that range from assisting political processes, establishing transitional authorities, distributing humanitarian aid and relief and reintegrating former combatants to preventing violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and protecting civilians, among others.

The report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (see S/2015/446) proposed a number of recommendations addressed both to contributing countries and the Secretariat to ensure that United Nations peacekeeping remains relevant and able to meet the increasingly complex demands of peacekeeping. We welcome the initial steps taken by the Secretariat to implement those recommendations. At the same time, we are of the view that there remains room for improvement, including at the mandate design and planning stages. Clear policy guidance and the provision of adequate training would help to ensure the credibility and proficiency of all United Nations police personnel in carrying out the entrusted mandate.

The protection of civilians has become a core component of numerous ongoing peacekeeping missions, for example in South Sudan, the Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic. Civilian protection is the cross-cutting issue that needs to be addressed by military, civilian and policing components, acting in concert with the political components of the missions. In situations where the protection of civilians form part of a mission's mandate, Malaysia stresses the need for clear mandates on the protection of civilians and for agreed benchmarks, processes and procedures for their implementation. We are of the view that a shared understanding of what it takes to keep the peace and protect civilians in outbreaks of violence is key.

We agree with Commissioner Makotose of UNAMID that the United Nations police has and should continue to play an important role in combating sexual and gender-based violence, and in protecting women and girls from such violence. We therefore believe that there is scope to ensure greater female leadership, gender diversity and training within peacekeeping missions, in line with the United Nations Global Effort initiative. We also believe that police personnel need to be fully equipped with the necessary training prior to their deployment, as highlighted by the briefers. We encourage police contributing countries and regional organizations that have established peacekeeping training centres to offer and assist in providing training to United Nations police, including through specialized training. Malaysia intends to do its part through our Malaysian Peacekeeping Training Centre.

Finally, I wish to place on record our utmost appreciation and respect for the commitment, bravery and sacrifice of all United Nations police in the field in discharging the mandates and responsibilities entrusted to them by the United Nations. We have two questions for the briefers.

The first is for Commissioner Munyambo of UNMISS. Can the Commissioner provide an elaboration on the role played by United Nations police in supporting the UNMISS protection of civilians mandate during the outbreak of violence in Juba and other areas last July?

Our second question is for Commissioner Monchotte of MINUSTAH. We have followed the development of the Haitian National Police (HNP) since joining the Council and we commend MINUSTAH police for its supporting role in training and supporting capacity-building for the National Police. Can the Commissioner elaborate on the state of readiness of the HNP to assume more substantial responsibility for safety and security in the country, including in countering organized criminal gangs?

Mr. Lamek (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like to thank Senegal for having organized our debate

today on the role of police. I would also like to thank Mr. Ladsous and the heads of police components with us today for their briefings.

Allow me to address the general approach of improving United Nations police performance. In convening the Chiefs of Police Summit in June for the first time, the United Nations took an important step in that direction, as was the distribution this year of the conclusions on the external review of the functions, structure and capacity of the United Nations police. We must all prioritize the United Nations police's ability to guarantee better protection of civilians and improve the performance of staff deployed in missions. It is in that spirit that I would like to focus on three aspects that we believe to be most important.

First, training is a precondition for a long-term improvement of police capacity, beginning with force generation when we send individual police officers and formed police units that are vetted and well trained, including on the linguistic front, a point to which I will return. Secondly, United Nations police support for capacity-building of the host country's police remains critical. It requires sharing best practices and establishing a full criminal chain in the host country, including the police, the judiciary and penitentiary administration.

The ability to clearly assess the effectiveness of the police is essential to improving its performance. We must take all experience at all levels into account. There is also a need to assess good coordination with the police component with other components of peacekeeping operations, including the military component and the human rights division, which will ensure that the police are part of the comprehensive strategy of the operation. I know that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Police Division are working on the matter of assessment, and we eagerly await those results.

Thirdly, developing neighbourhood police activities within peacekeeping operations should contribute to fostering long-term stability. Within peacekeeping operations, police can help to progressively rebuild confidence between populations and State institutions by keeeping criminals off the streets. Of course, to that end police detachments cannot remain on the sidelines, but must instead be held accountable to the communities they serve. Through its neighbourhood policing activities, the police component of peace operations naturally forges close links with police forces and local gendarmerie. Such cooperation can take on various forms, such as mentoring or joint patrolling, and is therefore crucial to bolstering national capacity.

Allow me now to touch upon three challenges that were addressed in the briefings that we heard this morning from the Police Commissioners.

First, I wish to talk about linguistic challenges. In order to be effective, police forces should be able to become part of local communities, particularly in missions involving the protection of civilians. For that reason, it is essential to deploy police officers and gendarmes who speak the language and know the culture of the host country in order to foster, facilitate and ensure smooth relations with the population. The Paris Ministerial Conference on Peacekeeping in Francophone Environments, which took place in October, identified approaches to be adopted in the area of training. France will of course participate in training efforts regarding the French language through police training activities.

On that topic, I would like to pose a question to each of the Police Commissioners present. The actions undertaken by peacekeeping operations, which include capacity-building in host countries, are of course key to long-term stability. However, daily contact with local forces and the population requires full knowledge of the language of the country. I am therefore wondering if the Police Commissioners of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan and even the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur might provide us with additional information on the challenges their police officers face in the area of language? What measures do they think should be undertaken to address that challenge? Should such measures be taken during force generation, training or during the deployment of a mission?

I will now move on to the second challenge, that of gender. We endorse efforts aimed at deploying more female police officers, who can greatly contribute to the performance of police components, in particular by fostering better interaction with vulnerable populations and with victims of human rights violations, as well as by participating in investigations into particular types of violence, including sexual violence. We must combat

sexual abuse and exploitation by ensuring that all receive equal treatment before the law. Protecting victims and identifying and punishing perpetrators requires greater communication between United Nations agencies and organizations, on the one hand, and civil, military and judicial authorities in the countries involved in peacekeeping missions, on the other.

The third and last challenge that we believe to be key is the use of modern technology by police components, which involve the activities of the police in general, as well as, for example, the gathering of evidence. That requires police officers within peacekeeping operations to be properly equipped, and better cooperation with international organizations, access to databases and the use of modern techniques for investigation. All such measures allow the police force to better protect people and to prevent violations of human rights.

Mr. Ramírez Carreño (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): We thank you, Sir, for convening this debate. We thank the briefers, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Hervé Ladsous, and the Police Commissioners of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. We also acknowledge the extraordinary work carried out by each of those missions and welcome the various official groups that are present today in the Chamber.

This debate highlights the importance of police components in United Nations peacekeeping operations in achieving stability on the ground, generally following armed conflict, and in developing and creating capacities to strengthen police services in host States. Host States must take ownership of their own peace processes and rebuild their institutional and social fabrics, which is an important objective.

With respect to developing police services, we must bear in mind that a national police force that enjoys legitimacy within society is a key element to sustaining peace in societies that have been divided by conflict. Likewise, we believe that the creation or reform of solid police institutions is a complex undertaking that requires continued efforts over time. The process goes beyond police training, which is key, to include the development of relevant institutions that are able to provide political support, guidance, oversight, budgets and the required legal framework for police work. Furthermore, building operational capacity also requires a wide range of managerial and administrative roles in the police force. Police contingents must also be given due social and political protection, as well as incentives and recognition for their work in protecting the population and enforcing the law.

However, United Nations reports on peacekeeping operations point to the fact that United Nations police are not always in a position to develop or reform police institutions, as reflected, among other things, in the fact that the United Nations police recruitment model does not meet the requirements for the institutional development of host States. Such reports recommend that the recruitment of United Nations police officers must be based on the mandate agreed by the Security Council, which means that those missions with stabilization and protection mandates must recruit numerous police officers accompanied by protection officers. Those contingents that are geared towards reforming the police institutions of host States must recruit fewer numbers of specialized personnel that enjoy backing of civilian staff who work in institutional development. However, it would seem that all recruitment models continue to be based on the legacy of huge contingents inherited from the models of peacekeeping operations. As a result, host States do not receive the support they need to reform their institutions.

One of the key components in the process of recruitment is linked to gender equality. We are convinced that women, given their fundamental role in society, are the best agents to protect women and children from abuse and to heal the deep wounds caused by divisions in a society. Likewise, it is also critical to train police forces using personnel or contingents from the host State, who should not have a history of or links to abuse or violence perpetrated against the civil population. They should also have the ability to effectively lead and discharge their mission.

Furthermore, Venezuela fully supports the need for an ongoing dialogue between the Security Council and the countries that contribute contingents related to all aspects of activities in peacekeeping operations, especially in the planning stages and in the drafting of mandates, pursuant to Article 44 of the Charter of the United Nations.

In conclusion, we wish to reiterate the importance of the role of police contingents in United Nations

peacekeeping operations. However, it is necessary that the Security Council bear in mind that United Nations police officers are an integral part of those operations. As such, the Council must respect the prerogatives of the General Assembly, especially the mandate of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.

Ms. Power (United States of America): I thank Under-Secretary-General Ladsous and the four Police Commissioners who have joined us here today. I wish to thank all Police Commissioners serving around the world, as well as the 13,000 United Nations police.

In listening to the briefings, I was quite struck by how much each of the four Commissioners, who in turn represent the other Commissioners, have in common, but also by how very different each of their appeals to us are. Specifically, I noted just how unique each mission is and how we cannot take a solution that works for one mission and apply it to another.

Commissioner Munyambo described the hugely important task that peacekeepers in South Sudan are performing by protecting the protection-of-civilians sites — 200,000 people living at sites were never envisaged when the mandate was created in the first place. Now, suddenly, the police in South Sudan have had to adjust and take on that task.

Commissioner Makotose, as the sole female United Nations Police Commissioner — who works in the Darfur mission, where sexual violence is, sadly, quite widespread as a weapon of war — described the impact of having women occupy 19 per cent of the individual police officer slots as part of African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and how that changes the way the communities interact with the Operation and the way women and children come forward. She also described something that we maybe are less conscious of, that is, the extent to which the women who serve in these missions, in, relatively speaking, a higher ratio than what we are used to seeing, serve as role models for young girls in the communities where they serve. That is incredibly important.

Commissioner Monchotte has worked in a Haiti Mission that has experienced incredible ups and downs over the years, and the most devastating moment, of course, was the 2010 earthquake, where so many United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) officers, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, lost their lives serving the people of Haiti. Yet against that backdrop, MINUSTAH and the police have steadily gone about their business, taking a country that, as we know, had 6,700 equipped and trained police when MINUSTAH deployed, which will have next year up to 15,000 trained and equipped police. I also imagine they will have a different depth of training than had been available before MINUSTAH arrived in Haiti.

Commissioner Yacouba in Mali, by far the most dangerous, deadliest mission in the whole world, has made an appeal to us for support for intelligence-based policing. As we noted in the meeting that the Senegal delegation organized last week (see S/PV.7802) on asymmetrical threats, this is an extremely important appeal. That is because that in so many of the missions that exist now in very complex and warlike environments, the peacekeepers and the police are often blind to the threats out there and do not have the information and intelligence they need. I hope that we as a Council heed his appeal.

The challenge, as we as a Council talk about United Nations police, is that their mandate is unlike the mandate of any other police force. Therefore, the backgrounds the Commissioners and their officers have are very different in national settings. We as a Council expect United Nations police not just to support host Governments in maintaining law and order, but, as we have heard, to help restore the rule of law in places where armed groups act with impunity. We also expect United Nations police to kind of act as development advisers, working with Governments to rebuild national police forces, as we have seen work in Haiti.

Therefore, this year's external review of the United Nations Police Division, along with an evaluation of United Nations police from the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services, were together an important and comprehensive assessment of how Member States and the Secretariat together can improve a mission with few precedents to draw upon. I think others have already and will discuss all the challenges they are facing, drawing upon in their testimonies today. I just want to focus on two: the training and capabilities that United Nations police bring to their deployment, or the lack thereof in some cases, and the Security Council's lack of strategic guidance for them when we send them into the field.

First, briefly on training and capabilities, one key problem that as Commissioners they must deal with every day is the perpetual mismatch between supply

and demand for United Nations police. The United Nations Police Division at Headquarters is under pressure to find enough United Nations police to match the Council's requests — the figure that we put in our mandates. But unlike militaries, which may have units stationed in barracks waiting for a new contingency in each of our countries, police departments in all of our countries are using their officers to conduct everyday law enforcement. There is not generally a standing pool of officers waiting to get the call. A police department sending a formed police unit, especially to the United Nations, loses 140 to 160 officers to patrol their streets. That is why the United States is really and truly grateful to police-contributing countries for their commitments. But for the Police Division finding any new police experts or formed police units for peacekeeping missions is an extremely time-consuming task. The result is that the Police Division, I think it is fair to say, often focuses more on meeting their numbers, getting police contingents to 100 per cent of authorized strength, rather than being able to afford to look at whether the officers have the training and skills to actually meet the particular mission's goals.

In that regard, I would quote the United Nations Mission in South Sudan Police Commissioner who issued an appeal here today for more officers, as he put it, with the skill set and the mindset suited to the environments where the police are being deployed. Predeployment assessments are done by the Police Division, as we know, but those assessments may not align with the skills that United Nations missions actually need. We hear that from the Police Commissioners whenever we travel in the field.

One of the things the external review showed is that the Police Division tests for three basic skills — linguistic capacity for a particular mission, firearm proficiency and driving competency. Those are very important skills, but they are not necessarily tailored for any specific sui generis set of circumstances like the very varied circumstances we have heard about today. It turns out that approximately 55 per cent of candidates put forward to serve with United Nations as police fail even that three-pronged test.

But what peacekeeping missions and Police Commissioners really need to know is whether a police contingent can handle far more complex tasks, like responding to a terrorist attack in a town centre in Mali or explaining to new police recruits how to treat suspects in an interrogation, such as in the Central African Republic. And the Secretariat is not in a position to provide that training to police units that do not already have it. That is a real issue. The issues are so daunting and so systemic that it is tempting to be intimidated and to just go on with our business as we have been doing, but let me offer one place to start.

United Nations Member States and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) need to go beyond the basic proficiency test and increase focus on which skills each Mission needs, not just meeting numerical targets for force strength. The Police Division and the broader Secretariat should not expect contingents that pass the basic United Nations assessment test — again, linguistic, firearms and driving — to be ready to tackle the tasks in police mandates.

That is common sense but it has not happened enough, in part because the pool of eligible recruits in each of our countries is not large enough. So we Member States must bring intentionality to expanding our national pools of recruits to include officers with relevant skills. I know that we have already seen a number of countries placing a real emphasis on trying to recruit women nationally so that DPKO has more women police officers from whom to recruit. But if we ask the Secretariat and the Police Division to do more, that alone will not work unless the Member States that comprise the United Nations set about actually looking at the skills that are needed and recruiting such people.

That brings me to my second and final point, which involves mandates. We States members of the Security Council need to be more strategic about how we deploy United Nations police. In theory — I stress theory — United Nations police should be able to help facilitate the withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission. They can bridge the gap between an armed international military presence and the handover of responsibility for security to local authorities. United Nations police could be a peacekeeping mission's exit strategy, stepping in after peacekeepers restore a basic level of security, then building up a host country's law enforcement capabilities. Depending on the circumstances, one could even imagine a world in which troop numbers decline and police numbers increase. Then we could draw down police as a host country's police and security services are able to take up the baton for law enforcement and stabilization.

But that is not what we do today. We typically work with the Secretariat to assign a fixed number of

police to a mission, and then provide the police with a list of tasks to complete. Resolutions do not specify when police divisions should focus more on protection than on advising. We rarely consider surging police to allow for troop withdrawals. Of course, it is hard to use United Nations police strategically when serious gaps remain in their skill sets — which speaks to my first point — but part of the problem, too, is a lack of awareness among those of us in the Council about the role of United Nations police.

Here I would like to make an admission, which is that I could certainly spend more time thinking about the role of United Nations police in peacekeeping. I would ask my colleagues around the table to think back to the last time that they reviewed a peacekeeping mandate. How closely did they think about the performance of that Mission's police component? How closely did any of us think about the task that it was performing, about the division of labour even between formed police units, individual police oficers and so on. We can bring more intentionality to that task. Doing so matters, because countless civilians are relying on United Nations police to keep them safe.

I will close with just one example. Earlier this year, United Nations police in the Central African Republic deployed to secure polling stations through successive rounds of voting in the Central African Republic's elections. At one polling place, the Baya Dombia school, a rocket-propelled grenade was fired at a crowd waiting to vote. United Nations police were on hand to help secure the polling site after the attack and they immediately commenced an investigation into who had perpetrated the attack. Hundreds of voters, reportedly, stayed at the school chanting "We will vote, we will vote". In that case, the United Nations police made sure that violence did not keep those voters from making their voices heard. And United Nations police can play an incredibly important role in promoting security. We on the Council need to dedicate ourselves with greater fervour to helping enable police to do so.

Mr. Gasso Matoses (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): I express great thanks to the four Police Commissioners for briefing the Council on their experience on the ground. I also thank Mr. Ladsous for his briefing.

As the previous four Council members have said and subsequent speakers will say, we fully believe in the importance of the role played by police contingents in peacekeeping operations in building trust among the local population through close, ongoing contact with citizens, especially concerning the protection of civilians, as we have heard several times. Our objective, therefore, should be to ensure that the population views the police more as guarantors of their rights and freedoms, rather than in their essential role as law enforcers. That should be our objective, and it is the topic on which I will focus my statement. That is why we believe that we must take into account five key points.

The first is collaboration with the local population. There are clear examples, among which I will mention the case of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the lack of collaboration between the local population and the Mission's police component is due basically to the fear of retaliation from armed groups. It is a legitimate fear that should give us cause to further consider ways to prevent it. It is therefore critical that we focus on ways to build the host State's capacity in that regard.

Another example is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). I would like to address a question to Mr. Issoufou Yacouba in that respect. MINUSMA, as he rightly noted, is operating in an asymmetric environment. It is therefore especially important to have close patrols aimed at building confidence among the population and ensuring that encounters with United Nations police officers are capable of raising awareness of the work of the Mission, especially among the youth. Here, I wish to ask Mr. Yacouba how he believes we can combine close community policing with the justified need to maintain security in an asymmetric environment, where the Mission's mobility is severely limited. What impact would the threats in an asymmetric environment that hinders interaction with the population we are called on to protect have on limiting the work of the Mission?

The second thing I wish to mention concerns accountability, which is the flip side of my previous point. It is obvious that all Member States are firmly committed to accountability on the part of peacekeeping operations personnel, and Spain sincerely supports that. It is necessary to prosecute all crimes committed, particularly in cases of sexual exploitation or abuse. In that regard, we reiterate our full support for Under-Secretary-General Ladsous in the implementation of the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy.

My third point directly touches on the work of the police-contributing countries, including Spain and other countries. As Ambassador Power has said, we must be committed to providing carefully selected uniformed forces with predeployment training, including, importantly, the requisite human rights and international humanitarian law training and ways of preventing sexual exploitation and abuse. Vetting and training must be complemented with appropriate equipment for the uniformed police forces deployed on the ground. That is particularly true in an environment such as Mali, which requires robust police forces especially intended for quick deployment. In scenarios such as that, instruments such as the European Gendarmerie Force, in which the Spanish Guardia Civil participates and which was very successful in the European Union military operation in the Central African Republic in recent times, are especially useful.

A fourth aspect has to do with one of the essential functions carried out by police missions, that is, support for the host State's police. Once again, the case of Mali is meaningful, as are the case of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti when it comes to capacity-building for the Haitian National Police and the case of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan when it comes to support for the local police in establishing emergency response capabilities in Juba in the context of the protection of civilians.

Finally, the fifth aspect I want to touch on, which others have touched on, is to highlight the crucial role of mission police components in the context of the women and peace and security agenda. Ms. Priscilla Makotose indicated that clearly in the context of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. It is a fact that women's participation in police contingents is more advanced than it is in military contingents, but a great deal needs to be done to achieve the 20 per cent target that we have set for ourselves. The presence of women, as has already been mentioned, builds confidence among the civilian population and makes it easier to report sexual and gender-based violations. We must comply with resolution 2242 (2015), which the Council adopted in October 2015, and redouble our efforts to increase women's participation in peacekeeping operations if we want to ensure that those operations are truly effective.

Lastly, allow me to make a general observation. Spain has always been firmly committed to the efforts of the Organization to strengthen the peacekeeping operations system. This commitment was reflected in Spain's broad participation in international missions under the auspices of different international organizations. Currently, Spanish police forces participate in 11 international missions. That is why we have devoted special attention to the work of the Secretariat in this regard, and we welcome the outcome of the report on the external review of the functions, structure and capacities of the Police Division, which was requested by the Secretary-General in accordance with resolution 2185 (2014). The report includes a series of recommendations that warrant consideration by the Council. We also want to underscore the importance of finalizing the strategic guidance framework for United Nations police so that police resources can be utilized with common standards, which will allow them greater effectiveness and efficiency in discharging their mandates.

Mr. Rycroft (United Kingdom): This is a really important issue, and I want to thank all the briefers. Their presentations were very valuable indeed. One fascinating insight that I learned this morning is that 19 per cent of the police in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur are women, inspiring Darfuri women and girls.

United Nations policing is at the front line of our work. Policemen and policewomen under the United Nations flag help communities at risk of violence, they respond to incidences of disorder and they provide technical expertise to improve domestic police services in fragile States. But United Nations policing concentrates its efforts disproportionately on day-to-day security in fragile States, at the expense of capacity-building elsewhere. Therefore, the big question is how we can change that so that United Nations policing can realize its potential.

Rather than make a full statement today, I would like to hear from everyone around the table. In the interest of modernizing our working methods, I will now give up the floor.

Mr. Lucas (Angola): We thank Senegal for organizing this annual briefing and this very useful interaction between Security Council members and the heads of police components of selected United Nations peacekeeping missions. We are grateful to Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Hervé Ladsous, for providing an overview of current challenges facing United Nations police. We are

also grateful to the heads of police components of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for providing very thoughtful insights on the activities and prospects of United Nations police, prevailing challenges, as well as their safety and security. We wholeheartedly commend United Nations police for all they are doing in protecting civilians and in building capacities for law enforcement institutions in host countries.

The police component of United Nations peacekeeping and special police political missions plays a crucial role in conflict prevention and management in post-conflict peacebuilding, security, the rule of law and in sustaining peace. Additionally, they give support to the reform and developing of policing, law enforcement institutions and conducting interim policing and other law enforcement duties in host countries. Being the first line of protection and contact with local populations, they are an important element for restoring confidence in the national police, besides playing a crucial protective role centred around two axes, namely, protection against physical violence and the creation of a safe environment.

As a recognition of that reality, the Security Council adopted resolution 2185 (2014), which strengthened the role of United Nations police components in conflict and post-conflict situations; in supporting, restructuring and rebuilding law enforcement institutions and the rule of law; and in implementing security sector reforms. Resolution 2185 (2014) further calls on Member States to enhance the capabilities and expertise of United Nations police components regarding capacity development and institution-building, supporting host States' policing institutions and self-sufficiency, and the transfer of skills and expertise in order to ensure a successful and durable transition.

In our statement, we intended to deal with three issues, the protection of civilians, gender-sensitive policing and police capacity-building and security sector reform. Since previous speakers dealt at length with the key issues that underline the subject matter under consideration, we will stop at this time. We would like to request the Police Commissioners' assessment of the impact of resolution 2185 (2014), with its comprehensive approach to United Nations police, on the discharge of their mandates.

In conclusion, the complex context to which the United Nations police component is exposed calls on the Security Council to give clear, credible and realistic mandates and strategic guidance to the Police Division and to United Nations police components in the field and to ensure that sufficient resources are provided, informed by national and local priorities, including the host State's key reform objectives. In addition, police-contributing countries should pay greater attention to the training and selection of personnel, while ensuring that peacekeeping, peacebuilding and sustaining peace are tangible successes in conflict and post-conflict situations.

Mrs. Carrión (Uruguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to begin by commending you, Mr. President, for convening this briefing, as well as the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Hervé Ladsous, and the Police Commissioners of United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for their briefings.

It has been practically two years since the Security Council adopted resolution 2185 (2014), which was the first resolution on the functions of United Nations police and in which the valuable contribution to peacekeeping of the work of the United Nations police was underscored and strategic and practical guidance, among other services, for the heads of police components were provided.

Similarly, the importance and growing relevance of police work in peacekeeping operations was manifest after the celebration of the first Chiefs of Police Summit in June here at Headquarters, where Ministers of the Interior, heads of Police and high-level officials from more than 100 Member States met to analyse the evolution of United Nations police work. In the same way, meetings like today's contribute to maintaining the attention generated around this theme.

Uruguay is a long-term contributing country and is highly committed to United Nations peacekeeping operations. In respect of the contribution of police personnel, my country has participated in police work in peacekeeping operations since 1991, with its first contribution to the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala. To date, and without interruption, we have contributed to numerous United Nations missions,

including those in Mozambique, Timor-Leste, Western Sahara, Angola, Liberia, Côte D'Ivoire and Haiti. Our participation is generally oriented towards the deployment of individual police officerss, who mostly acts as instructors and advisers, and in some cases also undertake executive tasks.

As police-contributing country, Uruguay wishes to express its recognition to the assesment work of the Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in particular its visits to countries that decide to contribute personnel. In that connection, it is essential to continue to improve the training of formed police units and police officials, particularly in the field of protecting civilians, taking into account the increasingly complex environments in which peacekeeping operations operate.

Uruguay, as a police-contributing country, meets all United Nations requirements thanks to the training provided by the National School of Peace Operations of Uruguay, where both the military and the police components for service with the United Nations are trained. Training is comprehensive, with a special focus on policies of zero tolerance for sexual abuse and exploitation, gender policies and human rights training.

To conclude, I should like to direct an inquiry to the Mr. Monchotte, Police Commissioner of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). MINUSTAH is recognized for its achievements over the years in training of the Haitian National Police, as well as the progress it has made with respect to complementarity, the gradual use of force and joint cooperation between the police and military components of the Mission, acting in support of and in coordination with the National Police. I stress in particular the good results that have been achieved with the operational application of the 1, 2, 3 mechanism. As Ambassador Power mentioned, the Security Council's exit strategies for peacekeeping operations must absolutely take into account the fact that strengthening the national police allows the military component to withdraw first, to be followed by the United Nations police, which would herald the success of the mission.

In this respect, I would ask if the progress achieved in training the Haitian National Police and in the aforementioned cooperation can constitute a basis for the exit strategy and transfer of responsibilities in the security sector, with a view to the gradual withdrawal of MINUSTAH military component in the future.

Mr. Vitrenko (Ukraine): I would like to thank you, Sir, for convening this important meeting, and to commend once again the outstanding contribution of Senegal to United Nations peacekeeping endeavours. I wish also to express my gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Ladsous for his valuable briefing. We look forward to receiving the relevant report of the Secretary-General.

My delegation is especially grateful to the United Nations Police Commissioners who briefed us today. I myself was privileged to see young police officers in the field, especially in protection of civilians sites, while on the Security Council mission to South Sudan, and their work is highly appreciated indeed.

Ukraine actively supports United Nations policing in its efforts to enhance the efficiency of field operations, including by contributing its best police officers to missions. As an active police-contributing country, we note that despite the challenges faced by United Nations uniformed men and women, policing is a highly promising endeavour of our Organization.

While activities in volatile missions like the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali hit today's headlines — and rightly so — I cannot but acknowledge the achievements in other peacekeeping and special political missions where United Nations police is deployed, such as the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

We welcome the fact the United Nations policing personnel has improved significantly in size and scope to respond to changing conflict dynamics and to ensure the efficient implementation of mandates, with due regard to the safety and security of United Nations personnel. The challenges faced by United Nations police components on the ground have also evolved significantly and need thorough consideration by the Council. In that context, I would like to highlight several points, and will try to do so in the spirit suggested by the United Kingdom delegation.

First, Ukraine welcomes the progress made in the development of the Strategic Guidance Framework for International Police Peacekeeping. We also commend the first United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit, organized by the Police Division last June. This event provided us with a solid foundation for the further strengthening of international cooperation in United Nations policing.

Secondly, the complexity of tasks and growing needs in building institutional police capacity in post-conflict environments require Member States to nominate their most qualified and skilled police officers to missions. In that respect, Ukraine holds that that predeployment and in-mission training of police personnel for United Nations peace operations should be enhanced. We also believe that ensuring deployment readiness and increased performance requires the collective and coordinated actions of the Secretariat and Member States. The Police Peacekeeping Training Center in Ukraine, with its predeployment course under United Nations standards, is our contribution to this joint venture.

Thirdly, we believe that peacekeeping operations should be provided with resilient mandates, sufficient to ensure security and public order, including by halting illegal cross-border inflows of weapons and mercenaries. Peace missions should have the means and resources necessary for the effective monitoring and verification of ceasefires, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and disarmament.

Fourthly, I would like to highlight the importance for police-contributing countries to register and manage all formed police unit commitments through the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. It is crucial to ensure United Nations capacity to rapidly deploy police forces to new or existing theatres, as well as to maintain their mobility on the ground. Timely troop generation and deployment are a prerequisite for mission success.

Fifthly, without a common understanding of United Nations standards and realities on the ground, successful United Nations policing is not possible. Recalling the presidential statement S/PRST/2015/26 of December 2015, on the findings of the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (see S/2015/446), would like to emphasize the need to enhance triangular cooperation between police-contributing countries, the Secretariat and the Council. In particular, more frequent police-related briefings by the Secretariat could improve information-sharing, including before mandating police elements of missions.

Finally, assistance to host States in capacity-building for the protection of civilians and counter-terrorism is a vital task of United Nations peacekeeping operations. To that end, police components, as integral parts of peacekeeping operations, should be provided with sophisticated technologies and clear mandates.

Let me conclude by thanking the heads of police components and their personnel for their dedicated service to the United Nations.

Mr. Wu Haitao (China) *(spoke in Chinese)*: We would like to thank Mr. Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and the Police Commissioners of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for their briefings. Today, more than 13,000 United Nations peacekeeping police officers are deployed in 13 peacekeeping operations and five special political missions. They perform their duties with devotion in trying, complex situations. China commends their spirit of dedication and sacrifice.

The international situation is currently undergoing profound changes. Conflicts and disputes are growing more diverse. The context for United Nations peacekeeping operations and the tasks they set out to achieve are increasingly complex. United Nations peacekeeping police mandates are steadily increasing. It is time for the international community to consider in depth the circumstances facing peacekeeping police, their tasks and a way forward by exploring ways and means of improving their work. China would like to share its perspective on the topic as follows.

First, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the three peacekeeping principles — the host country's consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate — are the cornerstone of peacekeeping operations. They provide an important safeguard for effective police work. It is necessary to fully respect the sovereignty of host countries, carefully listen to their views and communicate better with them over matters such as the duration of deployment and adjustments to mandates. When, as a result of changed circumstances, the host country demands an exit of United Nations peacekeeping police, the Secretariat should draw up a clear exit time frame under the political guidance of the Security Council in order to avoid indefinite stays in the host country.

Secondly, any peacekeeping police mandate must be unambiguous, feasible and focused. Peacekeeping

police components are confronted with a multiplicity of complex factors in the field with everchanging circumstances. The design of any given police mandate should consider in an integrated manner the host country's priority needs and prevailing realities, the capacity of police-contributing countries (PCCs) and other factors, making sure that their mandate is unambiguous, highly actionable and subject to timely assessment in the light of changing demands so that priorities and focuses may be adjusted continuously in order to serve the core objectives of the peacekeeping operation concerned.

Thirdly, the Secretariat should comprehensively consider the new context and challenges confronting peacekeeping police work by looking at the big picture and the long-term horizon, stay focused on critical processes, improve such work in a systematic manner and make police work more effective and resilient in the face of complexities. The Secretariat should pay particular attention to strengthening the emergency command capacities of the missions and boost coordination among the police, civilian and military components. It should elaborate on security rules for peacekeeping police, coordinate with PCCs and host countries, improve early warning capacities and internal information sharing and ensure adequate safety measures and the availability of medical equipment and supplies. The aim is to raise the security level across the board.

Fourthly, the role of PCCs should be accorded due importance. PCCs and troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are the main players undertaking peacekeeping operations. The long-term development of United Nations peacekeeping operations depends on the efforts of PCCs and TCCs. Their contributions and sacrifices must be acknowledged and respected. A failure to do so would be detrimental to the long-term development of peacekeeping operations. Communications between the Security Council and the Secretariat, on one hand, and PCCs and TCCs, on the other, should be strengthened. The role of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations should be fully leveraged and PCCs and TCCs should be given a greater voice.

China is the largest PCC for peacekeeping operations among the permanent members of the Security Council. China's peacekeeping police, who are scrupulously devoted to their duties, have given an outstanding account of themselves and have received broad accolades from various parties. China started contributing police officers to United Nations peacekeeping operations in 2000. Since then, we have sent close to 2,500 police officers to mission areas such as Timor-Leste, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Haiti. As we speak, more than 170 Chinese peacekeeping police officers are operating in the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, UNMISS and other missions. In September 2015, China's President, Mr. Xi Jinping, announced several major initiatives on China's part to support United Nations peacekeeping operations, including, inter alia, taking the lead on creating a standby formed police unit and providing training for peacekeeping police of other countries. Currently, all of our commitments are being honoured. China is ready to work with the international community to contribute positively to the development of United Nations peacekeeping police and to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Mr. Iliichev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Hervé Ladsous, as well as the Police Commissioners of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for their informative briefings. We also thank all of their staff for their implentation in good faith of the task of maintaining peace and security in difficult situations.

For us, this meeting is symbolic because in Russia today it is Police and Internal Affairs Servicemen's Day — the holiday of professional Russian police. We see the police components as an integral part of United Nations peacekeeping operations. They make a contribution to carrying out the singular mandate of each mission, as defined by the specifics of the respective situations in the countries of deployment.

Today United Nations police face a daunting task that has to do with the increasingly difficult and complicated nature of the mandates of missions. They monitor situations and report on violations of public order, but they do more than just that. They provide assistance to national bodies in the protection of civilians and play an important subsidiary role in the post-conflict reform of law enforcement institutions, as well as in the improvement of the national capacities of host countries. We are guided by the idea that, while providing such assistance on behalf of the entire

international community, police, just as all United Nations peacekeepers, must unstintingly comply with Security Council mandates and uphold the basic principles of peacekeeping. We must necessarily acknowledge that the growing importance of police places particular responsibility on peacekeepers and leaders, and logically requires adapting the police architecture of the United Nations.

We think that a crucial part of effectively implementating mandates is establishing constructive and confidence-based dialogue and relations with host countries and, as necessary, with other parties to the conflict. It is only in that context that assistance in the protection of civilians can be tangibly effective. While Acting in the difficult context of asymmetrical threats, in close cooperation with local populations, there is a need to carefully implement the so-called people-centred approach. That approach consists solely of the need, as necessary, of engaging in confidence-based contact with locals. Any deviation from upholding this principle creates the risk of being accused of breaching the principle of impartiality.

Let me provide an example: the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei provide support to the so-called community protection committees. Those committees consist solely of one of the tribes of the region, the Ngok Dinka. The other tribe, the Misseriya, is against their establishment. In that way, the Blue Helments seem to support unilateral actions of one party to the conflict, the Ngok Dinka, which runs counter to the principle of impartiality and the agreement of both sides. Furthermore, we think that United Nations police should not take on non-inherent political functions — in the case of monitoring human rights, for instance. That job is reserved for other United Nations bodies.

We would also like to mention the issue of the gathering and analysis of information. We share the view that without it, it is hard to work effectively in the field. Nonetheless, those activities have to be carried out solely with a clear operative end in sight and through legal means and with the agreement of the host country, while fully upholding that country's sovereignty. The idea of intelligence and the classical understanding of it are not applicable in this instance.

One of the key tasks for the leaders of police components and missions in general is to lend assistance in bolstering the capacity of the host countries to resolve law enforcement challenges, such as sharing their experience and training staff. Local police bear the primary responsibility for ensuring the security of civilians. It is important to prevent situations in which as a result of years-long presence of missions, United Nations peacekeepers in fact substitute the efforts of the local police. Without increasing local potential, there can be no sustainable exit strategy for United Nations presence.

In that regard, another important aspect is that United Nations police contingents must clearly understand their tasks, act in a professional manner and be appropriately equipped and trained. In that regard, we support the initiatives of many regional organizations, in particular those of the African Union, to increase the training level of their police components. This is an area of international cooperation that was particularly recognized at the June Summit of Chiefs of Police, attended by representatives of States Members of the United Nations, the Secretariat and United Nations field presences. During that meeting, the Russian delegation declared that it would double the number of its police officers in peacekeeping operations. That is already being done. Twenty per cent of Russian police officers are women.

We also intend to broaden our participation in the training of international police. Over the past 16 years, foreign police peacekeepers, including commanders, from more than 50 countries, primarily in Africa, have been trained at the training centre in the city of Domodedovo. Russia has unique experience in the area of the professional training of peacekeepers, which we stand ready to share. We are convinced that police peacekeeping should be the focus of due attention from Member States. Outside independent assessments cannot be a substitute for a discussion of police issues within specialized agencies of the United Nations. Discussions of the most difficult aspects — in particular, the structure of police forces — should be transparent. In that regard, we believe that the best format for dialogue already exists in the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations and the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in which all troop- and police-contributing countries are represented — without the artificial exclusions that unfortunately occurred during the police Summit — along with current and potential host countries.

Mr. Kandeel (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): At the outset, I would like to thank the Police Commissioners

for their comprehensive briefings. I would also like to express my full gratitude for their efforts and sacrifice in peacekeeping operations with a view to maintaining peace and stability.

Police components play a very central role in the implementation of United Nations peacekeeping operations, through the capacity-building of national institutions, while enabling host countries to exert security control throughout their territories. The police component is considered the primary nexus between the United Nations and civilians, and thereby plays a very important role in enhancing trust and building the confidence of communities in United Nations missions, which would eventually build the capacity to implement the mandates.

We note the recommendations contained in the report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (see S/2015/446), which is in charge of reviewing police peacekeeping operations. In that regard, we underscore the importance of addressing the recommendations of the General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which is tasked with addressing all peacekeeping-related policies. I take this opportunity to pose the following two questions to the police commissioners. My first question is addressed to the Police Commissioner of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan. We acknowledge the daunting challenges the mission faces in discharging its mandate, in particular with respect to the protection of civilians — as we witnessed during the Security Council's visit to Juba in September — and the efforts to overcome such challenges in an unfriendly environment. We also witnessed the challenge of securing civilian camps. The question, therefore, is what is the plan and how much progress has been achieved thus far with regard to the development and capacity-building of the police force in South Sudan?

The second question is addressed to the Police Commissioner of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. The All Sources Information Fusion Unit is considered to be a pilot model for developing intelligence units in peacekeeping missions. Notwithstanding the benefits of such units, there are certain concerns related to the sovereignty of States regarding the information obtained by United Nations forces and to what extent those forces coordinate with host States.

With regard to the vital role played by police forces in communication with communities, we have two questions. The first question is, to what extent have intelligence units provided the police component with an assessment of the risks to which those forces are exposed? The second question is, do the Government and the police forces coordinate efforts? Once again, I take this opportunity to extend my deep gratitude and acknowledgement to the police commissioners for the sacrifices and efforts they are exerting to keep the peace.

Mr. Bessho (Japan): I would like to begin by thanking Under-Secretary-General Mr. Ladsous and the Police Commissioners of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for sharing their experiences with us. I also express my heartfelt appreciation to all peacekeepers for their contribution in the face of severe challenges on the ground. Today's briefings remind us of the complex and diverse mandates being undertaken by United Nations police components, including protecting civilians, creating amenable conditions for humanitarian assistance, supporting peace processes, restructuring and reforming the security sector and promoting the rule of law and human rights.

Today, I would like to focus on national police capacity-building, in line with the presentation given by Mr. Monchotte, the MINUSTAH Police Commissioner, but I also listened with interest to references to the capacity-building of local police forces, which includes a gender focus, provided by the Police Commissioner of UNAMID. I believe that one of our long-term priorities should be to help build and reform the police and law enforcement institutions of host nations, although that may not always be the top priority in all cases in the short-term as pointed out by one of the briefers. That process will enable such institutions to play a sustained role in maintaining peace and security, including after the withdrawal of the peace operations.

The United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was a particularly solid example of the successful deployment of civilian police exploits. National police commanders identified the greatest improvements in administrative support areas such as project management, training, development and

maintenance of databases, human resources and finance. Work to strengthen the capacity of the national police contributed to UNMIT's successful closure at the end of 2012.

I believe MINUSTAH has the potential to be another successful example in that area. While challenges remain, MINUSTAH has successfully supported the Haitian National Police in a number of areas centred on capacity and the rule of law. Progress has been made through community violence-reduction programmes, improved criminal justice procedures, security sector reform, joint patrols, community policing and the development of the 2017-2021 strategic plan.

Police capacity-building efforts like these can play a major role in enabling United Nations peacekeeping operations to draw down and eventually withdraw. On that note, I would like to thank Mr. Monchotte for providing us with interesting statistics on the improvements and a list of the remaining challenges. I would like to ask Mr. Monchotte if he could describe, in concrete terms, some examples of successes and lessons learned from addressing challenges he has faced on the ground with regard to police capacity-building.

Mr. Walbridge (New Zealand): At the outset, I too would like to thank Mr. Ladsous and the four Police Commissioners for their informative and valuable briefings this morning. New Zealand would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge their respective efforts and those of the personnel under their command in working towards achieving the mandates set by the Security Council. New Zealand looks forward to the implementation of the recommendations and the external review of the functions, structure and capacity of the United Nations Police Division, especially with regard to United Nations policing having a more field-focused and results-oriented outlook, which should have a direct and positive impact on the good work that the Police Commissioners are all undertaking.

New Zealand recognizes the importance of capacity-building and creating enduring stability and security, and the need to recruit suitably qualified and experienced police personnel who are able to effectively contribute to building up the core functions of the national police of the country where they are employed. That includes recruiting more suitably qualified female personnel, given the unique contribution that women make to conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding, a point that was made by Mr. Ladsous, Commissioner Makotose and several other Council members around the table today. Capacity-building should also be linked to the need to implement sequenced and prioritized mandates that would allow for recruitment focus to switch from protection to development as the mission evolves.

The release last week of the Executive Summary on the independent special investigation into the violence that occurred in Juba between 8 and 11 July highlighted a number of shortcomings within the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and we consider it timely that the UNMISS Police Commissioner briefed the Security Council today on crisis management. We thank him for his insight and update. We consider it worth highlighting that it is not just about having plans in place, but also ensuring that those plans are understood by all, rehearsed and regularly reviewed so that, in the case of UNMISS, all are working towards the goal of effectively achieving the protection-of-civilians mandate. Having said that, New Zealand acknowledges that protection-of-civilians mandates, by their very nature, are complex and require vigorous and robust application of the rules of engagement.

We welcome the opportunity for interaction at today's meeting, and in responding to the questions already posed by my colleagues around the table, we would be grateful for any further specific comments from the Police Commissioners about how the Security Council and the United Nations Police Division can better help them and their personnel in achieving their mandates on the ground.

In particular, for UNMISS Police Commissioner Munyambo, New Zealand would be interested in hearing what measures have been put in place to address the issues raised in the special investigation, particularly as they relate to the actions, or inaction, of the formed police units and their protection-of-civilians role. In that respect, we welcomed his comments today concerning the importance of ensuring that all police officers not only have the relevant skill sets but also the right mindset to respond quickly and appropriately to respond to a crisis situation.

The President (*spoke in French*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Senegal.

At the outset, I would like to thank Mr. Ladsous and the other briefers this morning for having accepted

our invitation and, above all, for having illustrated the difficult conditions of our operations, under which our tasks are accomplished for the good of humankind. At this late hour, I hardly need to underscore the growing importance of police in peacekeeping operations — the briefers have more than adequately done that. I will simply note why my delegation took the initiative of convening this debate.

Senegal is the largest contributor of police units to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Given the growing role of the police in those missions, my delegation considered it useful to take this opportunity, as we preside over the Council this month, but also during United Nations police week, to ask Council members to participate in this interactive dialogue. With nine formed police units in six police stations, for a total of 1,250 personnel throughout our theatre of operations of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, not to mention individual police officers, Senegal has much to gain from this debate, by sharing its contribution and experience but, above all, by listening to others and asking for their input in order to improve its training and deployment policies for formed police units in peacekeeping operations.

The 65 recommendations issuing from the assessments — organized by Mr. Ladsous — on police units, including documents on strategic guidance, seem to be on the right path. Shortcomings, weaknesses and areas of improvement were identified — I will mention but a few, specifically: the often late deployment of police to missions, resulting in development aspects not being included in initial action plans; unqualified personnel, often due to poor training, which hampers their operational capabilities; the difficulty of the Police Division in filling vacancies within mission forces; mandates too rigid for specific and asymmetrical developments on the ground; the lack of a reliable and effective information- and intelligence-gathering system that would enable us to be proactive; but also the difficulty of missions in preventing the misconduct of their personnel, which tarnishes the image of the United Nations. And we have all emphasized the lack of women personnel, who in many cases are more appropriate for local policing efforts. The figure cited was 17 per cent, not 7 per cent, but in UNAMID, with a female Head of Mission, it is 19 per cent, still a significant degree of improvement.

I would now like to ask our briefers a few questions, the first of which — on the issue of the language that the missions are operating in in the various theatres — was raised by the French delegation. The second has to do with the fact that peacekeeping missions are increasingly deployed in hostile environments where functioning equipment and well-trained personnel are needed in order to carry out complex tasks effectively. Mr. Ladsous's Department has frequently deplored the lack of available equipment. On the other hand, some missions have problems with a lack of qualified managerial personnel. What are the implications of those factors for the execution of mandates? That question is for all four briefers and Mr. Ladsous.

With regard to MINUSTAH, Hurricane Matthew recently did enormous material damage to the country and significantly worsened the humanitarian situation there. MINUSTAH had to throw itself into assisting the population, which was very badly affected at a moment when the security situation was deteriorating, so the police component was forced to add aiding the population to its traditional tasks. How, in the Commissioner's opinion, was it able to combine the two missions? And what were the constraints in terms of personnel and equipment?

Regarding UNAMID, where the protection of civilians is concerned, what steps can be taken to ensure better physical protection for women in Darfur — Ms. Makotose is a woman and Force Commander — who are often at risk of being raped by armed groups?

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Mr. Ladsous (*spoke in French*): With your permission, Mr. President, I think it would be a good idea to ask each of our four Police Commissioners to respond — briefly, I would emphasize — to the questions specifically aimed at them, after which I

could complement their answers. I think that would be more logical.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to Ms. Makotose.

Ms. Makotose: I would like to express my appreciation for all the comments by Council members. They are very helpful to the mission and can also pave the way for our continued engagement regarding further support.

I will begin with the last question. The steps we are taking to protect women include actually sending patrols with them, especially when they are doing activities related to their livelihoods, since they are more vulnerable when they are farming, collecting firewood and gathering the grass that they use in their work. Apart from patrols for the camps for internally displaced persons, we have introduced patrols in the areas that women visit, which we plan in conjunction with the women's leadership. Thus we specify certain days when they can go out to fetch water and collect firewood. We have also been able to intervene in a personal capacity, by using the women's association network to introduce fuel-efficient stoves, which have helped to reduce the need to send out patrols.

I would also like to respond briefly to the issue raised by the representative of France on language and culture. We do indeed have to deal with such challenges in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). We do our best to learn the local language, as well as to teach English to the local communities, and that has improved our interaction with them. They really appreciate the lessons, and we appreciate being able to learn Arabic.

UNAMID appreciates the offers to do with the issue of training, as raised here today, and I am sure that the Police Division will be following up so that we can benefit from such offers for further training. I also want to mention the ongoing Police Division efforts regarding tactical and strategic guidance for mission development. I would mainly like to highlight the importance of deploying the 20 per cent of women individual police officers, but also to ask to see that extended to the formed police units (FPUs), because the need is there. The problem is that women are sometimes attacked by men carrying guns, and as a result, when they are patrolling they sometimes feel intimidated because most of the patrols are also made up of men carrying weapons. We would therefore love to see more women in the FPUs.

Another area where we are getting guidance is through the aforementioned women's association network. Another Police Division initiative is the gender toolkit, which helps us tailor our outreach to communities in our gender mainstreaming efforts. A website is being developed to help us reach out to women and police-contributing countries in order to enable them to contribute more women to missions. We also encourage prior training for women to better prepare them for deployment to missions and surviving the rigorous requirements of mission life. The Police Division is also developing a roster for members, especially the senior leadership, so that when they are needed women can be deployed more quickly.

I therefore do see us being able to surpass the 20 per cent target ratio for female police that we have set, and that in future a ratio of male to female deployment that actually represents the population is possible, with the Council's support. More importantly, however, I see it as essential if we are to meet the needs of the male, female and child populations.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to Mr. Munyambo.

Mr. Munyambo: I thank the members of the Security Council for their appreciation of the efforts of United Nations police (UNPOL).

I would like to respond to the question from the representative of Malaysia on the role of UNPOL in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan during the crisis. UNPOL did indeed play a very big role during and even after the crisis, including in such areas as search operations, crowd control and access control at gates and the deployment of robust patrols, even outside the civilian protection camps. I would also like to emphasize the importance of understanding the fear about what was happening at the beginning of the crisis. In Malakal in particular, we deployed additional formed police units (FPUs) to reinforce the city, while during the crisis in Wau we also deployed FPUs transferred from Bentiu. During the crisis in Juba we were protecting four categories of people — those in the protection-of-civilian sites fleeing the bullets; other internally displaced persons; and Dinka and Nuer, whom we had to separate, since they could not be mixed owing to their perceived threats to one another. We also had other categories of people, including non-citizens

doing business outside, including Eritreans, Ethiopians, Ugandans and some Kenyans, who also ran for protection to the protection-of-civilians sites. So I can say that we played a major role in the protection of all of those categories of people during the crisis. After the crisis, we continued to draw the lessons learned and training and working with other components to ensure the protection of civilians.

To respond quickly to the question posed by the Ambassador of Egypt on what we are doing with regard to building the capacity of the South Sudanese national police, I want to recall that while we do not have the mandate of capacity-building, there is a window of opportunity with respect to the joint integrated police. Indeed, in this regard, we have tried to develop a training curriculum and also provide the instructor who will be conducting the training of the joint integrated police. So far 500 have assembled, and we will continue engagements with them.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Munyambo for the clarifications he has provided.

I now give the floor to Mr. Monchotte to respond to the comments made and the questions raised.

Mr. Monchotte (*spoke in French*): The Permanent Representative of Malaysia asked a question as to the progress made in connection with the judicial police. While undeniable progress has been achieved in capacity-building, there is still room for progress. It is for that reason that we particularly support capacity-building in the area of judicial intelligence, training, crime-scene investigation and forensics.

I can give a concrete example of such progress. Recently there was a mass jailbreak from some of the national prisons. We carried out a large-scale operation that, without the intelligence gathered by the Haitian National Police, would not have been possible to the same extent. We also used a third-dimension observation capacity provided by our component's recently created drone units, with a view to the partner taking ownership.

I will now turn to the question posed by the Permanent Representative of Uruguay on the drawdown strategy, which is based on an assessment of the competencies taught. While the situation is not the same for the military component, there is a need for in-depth consideration of what has been taken on board by the partner. We are working regularly on this issue, and the elaboration of the strategic development plan accords with this. So the outlook is positive here, but I think that we need to take the time to carry out an evaluation in order to be able to better assess the situation when the time comes.

The Permanent Representative of Japan asked what successes have been achieved and what lessons have been learned. I would refer first to the progress made in democratic crowd control. We have put in place a protocol that gives priority to the involvement of the Haitian police force. Since I arrived, and even before then, United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti forces have not been deployed on the front lines. So the partner has taken ownership of best operating procedures, although we still need to make progress in that area.

The lessons learned from this include, first, those from the ongoing contacts that we have owing to the co-location of Haitian law-enforcement units with specialists from our police component; and the second lesson is the importance of the close contact I have with the Director General, which, when there are specific problems — I will come back to this issue later — makes it possible to enhance our capacity to respond.

Another example that I think is a positive one is the fact that ownership has been taken of the drafting of the upcoming 2017-2021 strategic plan. While other plans required substantial support, this most recent one is currently being drawn up in a much more autonomous way by the partner, although we are still providing some support.

As to the question raised by the President of the Security Council, which concerns the situation in the south of the country, of course that event complicated an already complex situation. It was completely unforeseen, brutal and sudden. We had to rethink the situation very quickly and, although we had been involved mainly in preparations for the elections, respond in an appropriate way. As I was saying a moment ago, we immediately and decisively contacted the Director General of the national police in order to coordinate our efforts. I had to redeploy personnel while taking account of the capacity available in terms of resilience and of the support to be provided to those units that were most affected by this unexpected climatic event. That is why I redeployed the Rwandan contingent; some of its forces were in Les Cayes, which

was slightly less affected than the town of Jérémie, where they were usually located.

The vacuum created by this redeployment, which was absolutely necessary in order to support the department affected, that of Grande Anse, was filled by the dispatch of 65 Senegalese gendarmes, representing a formed police unit in Port-au-Prince. Since they were already located in Les Cayes, I preferred to use those elements. Of course, I sent individual police officers as reinforcements, and all of this was done in coordination with the Haitian police.

I should like to touch for a moment on the linguistic challenge that we face, as it is important. It is up to the troop-contributing countries to make every effort to ensure that on the ground, in the Mission, police officers can benefit from all the distance training that is available, for example, the Rosetta Stone system. We have to recognize the efforts made by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on this issue, and I think that the initiative on joint coordination efforts with the International Organization of la Francophonie is very interesting in this regard.

The President (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Monchotte for the clarifications he has provided.

I now give the floor to Mr. Yacouba to respond to the comments made and the questions raised.

Mr. Yacouba (*spoke in French*): I should like to thank everyone present for the close attention paid to our briefings, which has given rise to some very relevant questions.

First, to respond to the question asked by the representative of France, I would note that there are two linguistic aspects here. I will not go into detail, but as far as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) is concerned, we deployed to northern areas, in addition to those who chose to go, individual police officers who speak the local language, in order to facilitate contact. We included all neighbouring countries, so we were able to find police officers who speak the relevant local languages.

As far as technology is concerned, I think that it has been fairly well developed. It is a very important issue, because unfortunately there is an urgent threat, and we have no reliable human sources of information that would make it possible to confirm the nature of the threat. But these surveillance methods make it possible better to protect personnel and populations and safeguard the mandate. The acquisition of drones is being considered as well as all of the rules that apply to their use, which are currently being developed. That is all I can say about this issue.

The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela asked a question about recruitment. I can provide the example of our experience in MINUSMA. With the Police Division, we have already identified specific elements that are of interest to us and of which we inform the Division. The latter in turn contacts the police-contributing countries, and we subsequently interview to recruit the people whom we believe will truly be appropriate to work in context of our Mission.

The representative of Spain referred to community policing and asked how we dealt with it in connection with our Mission. We are of the mind that security should not be imposed. The community needs to tell us what its issues are. Accordingly, because of the lack of police in some northern and central parts of the country, we took the initiative to strengthen cooperation with those units through patrols. We do not carry that out alone, but with the help of the other components of the Mission through the development of certain quick-impact projects. We try to ensure that the impact of the quick-impact projects is all-around, will benefit the entire community and rebuild trust between the population and the Malian forces because, in some regions, trust is lacking. We are however trying to gradually restore that trust.

The representative of the Russian Federation also asked a question that is really a question concerning terminology. The intelligence that we are discussing in this context comes from a criminal source. No other word in French better describes it. When we refer to "criminal intelligence", that is something else. That kind of intelligence is indispensable, so as to know how to ensure the protection of people when we know that we are going to deploy them to an area. When we say that a population is under threat, before we go and help them, we need to know, first of all, the dangers that we will face. In that regard, I believe that gathering this kind of intelligence is of the utmost importance. We use that intelligence to strengthen the capacity of the Malian forces. If the population does not want to provide information, it is because it is not protected. We therefore have to consider how we protect an informer, and all of that is linked to essential security aspects.

The representative of Egypt brought up the issue of the All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), which is a concern. In all respects, we are very happy with ASIFU, a unit at the core of the Mission. It carries out very relevant analyses that are always tied security issues. The information provided by ASIFU is shared by all MINUSMA structures in connection with carrying out activities. It is one thing to carry out activities in a specific area, but if the area in question is unfortunately unaccessible owing to security issues, one needs to be informed. That information is not kept solely within MINUSMA. The leadership of MINUSMA, for example, holds regular meetings with the Government authorities. Within the force, we have regular meetings with the Chief of Staff of the armed forces. I have regular meetings with the Malian forces, as well. We use that opportunity to exchange all information with the various components. In that regard, I believe that there is no problem.

That is the crux of what I have to say. We stress the importance of the support of the Security Council to further raise awareness of the work of police-contributing countries.

The President (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to Mr. Ladsous.

Mr. Ladsous (*spoke in French*): One of two timely questions was asked concerning Abyei, regarding which we must be aware of the fact that, despite several political commitments that were made five and a half years ago, there is still no joint police force there. The United Nations and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei provide the minimum necessary level of police to ensure the minimum level of law and order in the Abyei box. We have created units that provide and contribute to community policing in the Ngok Dinka community. Need I mention that we made the same offer to the Misseriya community, which was rejected by the Government of Khartoum and resulted in the asymmetrical situation, which, I believe, the representative of the Russian Federation pointed out. That continues to be our objective.

With regard to the events in Juba in July, as I told the Council, we are firmly committed to the implementation of the recommendations of the report, which resulted from the independent special investigation led by Major General Cammaert. My close colleague, Mr. Wane, is heading up a task force that is working towards implementing all of the recommendations in connection with soldiers, civilians and police officers. All of that has been put in motion, and I promise to keep the Security Council up to date in real time.

With regard to the host of questions that were asked this morning, I thank you, Sir, for having taken this initiative. We know the very special role that your country plays in the area of police contributions. I commend both the quantity and the excellent quality of your country's contribution of police personnel. The corps is made up of people who are highly professional and whose conduct is beyond reproach. And I am truly grateful.

I believe that the discussion has illustrated above all the fact that police activities, which form a part of peacekeeping operations, cannot serve as a universal model. At the core of the matter constant tensions arise from two constraints, which vary according to the context: on the one hand, the necessity to compensate for the inexistence or shortcomings of a national police, and, on the other, to boost national capacities. And the situation changes from one moment to the next.

Ten years ago in Haiti, the problem was the gangs of Cité de Soleil. The priority was therefore an intervention on the ground to neutralize the members of those gangs. Today, as the Haitian National Police has reached a greater level in terms of quantity and quality, priority has been placed on the very important area of training in terms of both of those elements. The police component of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, in its role of maintaining law and order, is much less needed and has become rather a backup force, composed of our troops and police units remaining in the country.

The situation in South Sudan was the exact opposite. In 2011, the mandate accorded by the Security Council was one of capacity-building. The terrible deterioration of the situation there, which began in December 2013, meant that, because of the impossibility of cooperating with South Sudanese institutions that had blood on their hands, we had to put capacity-building activities on hold. And we focused to a much greater degree on policing while hoping that the time would come — as the Police Commissioner said — for integrated joint policing, provided for in the peace agreements, and full-on capacity-building. There is no one-size-fits-all model. Every situation has to be dealt with individually.

I would like to address some of the other issues that were brought up. Clearly, language skills are a

must. Wherever possible, we need to have more police who can interact with the local populations. That was one of the goals of the Conference on Peacekeeping in Francophone Environments, held in Paris three weeks ago. In two weeks, I will take part in the sixteenth Summit of the International Organization of La Francophonie, to be held in Madagascar. I use all such opportunities to remind people of the major importance of capacity if we want to function correctly.

Secondly, with regard to intelligence policy, I know that the terminology continues to lead to certain comments, but it is clear — and Mali was clearly an interesting case here — that we cannot act effectively if we are blind and deaf. Therefore, we need intelligence capacities in military terms; we need intelligence for policing and for civilian activities. Therefore, Mr. President, you know that we are implementing, we are trying to design a type of framework for what could be the intelligence policy of the United Nations. It is clear — and we are working with Member States on that — that we do take account of all the limits concerning, first of all, the need to be consistent with our mandate, not working outside our mandate. It is really for the needs of implementing the mandate.

We work in a positive relationship with the host Government. We are prohibited from undertaking any James Bond-style or other such type of operations. Everything needs to be very much focused on the needs that we face. For all that, we need specific tools in terms of technology, that is, surveillance drones in many situations could really help us in our work. Then there are the observation balloons, with clusters of cameras and sensors. Those play a very critical role. They allow us to supervise the security in the capital of the Central African Republic, in Bangui. In terms of new institutions, including in Bangui, we have set up a task force for the security of the capital, and this brings the military and the police closely together, and all that is being constantly fine-tuned. I think all that is really necessary.

In part, all that is really the outcome of the impetus that was given by Senegal's resolution 2185 (2014) two years ago. I think that the Secretary-General's report that will be issued shortly will give a good illustration of the fact that the Council has given a major impetus to that, and it helps us out very much in all our work.

I will conclude on an important point, which was illustrated during the United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit held last spring. This is an opportunity for me to thank all the police-contributing countries because I know very well how in each country a permanent tension exists between its domestic security needs and the interest of ensuring that its national police acquire international experience and also contribute to the needs of the international community. I know to what extent that is very difficult for Ministries of the Interior, for the heads of national police forces and of gendarmeries. The figures show that. We have doubled the numbers of United Nations police force over the last seven or eight years. We now have 13, 500 police, and new pledges have been made in the framework of the United Nations Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. All that shows that there is now a greater awareness of the importance of all that work. Once again, it demonstrates the generosity of the contributing countries, and that should be commended. Allow me to particularly thank your own country once again, Mr. President, for all that Senegal is doing to help us.

The President *(spoke in French)*: I thank Mr. Ladsous. Once again, I want to convey to you, Sir, and to the Force Commanders the thanks of the Security Council.

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.